The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability by Keating, Gregory C.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 5 
1997 
The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability 
Gregory C. Keating 
University of Southern California Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol95/iss5/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE IDEA OF FAIRNESS IN THE LAW OF 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
Gregory C. Keating* 
ABSTRACT 
The theory and practice of enterprise liability are oddly dis­
joined. On the one hand, case rhetoric insists that considera­
tions of fairness are among the primary justifications for 
imposing enterprise liability. On the other hand, normatively in­
clined and theoretically ambitious scholarship on enterprise lia­
bility is overwhelmingly economic in cast. Economically 
inclined scholars have flocked to the field, while other kinds of 
tort theorists have shunned it, implicitly or explicitly conceding it 
to economic analysis. This paper argues that, contrary to this 
consensus, there is a powerful and important fairness case to be 
made for enterprise liability. This case fits the rhetoric of the 
decisions and the structure of the doctrines, and draws philo­
sophical support from Kantian social contract theory. When en­
terprises are in a position to spread the costs of nonnegligent 
accidents across the class of those who benefit from the risks that 
inevitably issue in such accidents, enterprise liability is more rea­
sonable than negligence liability. Under these circumstances, en­
terprise liability reconciles the competing claims of liberty and 
security more fairly, and more favorably, than negligence 
liability. 
I. THE ESTRANGEMENT OF TORT THEORY FROM TORT LAW 
In one of his more memorable and arresting aphorisms, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes remarked that "[o]ur law of torts comes from the 
old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and 
the like," whereas "the torts with which our courts are kept busy to­
day are mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. . . . 
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School. B.A. 1979, Amherst; 
M.A. 1981, Ph.D. 1992, Princeton; J.D. 1985, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Scott Altman, 
Jennifer Arlen, Howard Chang, Richard Craswell, Ronald Garet, Barbara Herman, Ed Mc­
Caffery, Lewis Sargentich, Michael Shapiro, and Chris Stone for comments, criticism, and 
discussion. Rick Cipra, Ryan Naftulin, Alison Sanders, Ed Sato and Charles Sewell provided 
excellent research assistance. 
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railroads, factories, and the like."1 The movement from a world of 
discrete and insular risk to one of generalized and interconnected 
perils transformed the impact of tort liability on the distribution of 
the costs of accidents. In the days of "isolated, ungeneralized 
wrongs," tort damages "might be taken to lie where they fell by 
legal judgment."2 In the emerging world of risks incidental to great 
industrial enterprises, "liability for [accidents] is estimated, and 
sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public. "3 
Holmes went on to observe that juries were quite sensitive to 
the moral significance of the differences between the old and new 
worlds, and did not seem to share the sense of justice embodied in 
traditional tort doctrine. In the vast majority of cases involving in­
dustrial accidents, they considered it fair to impose the costs of 
those accidents on the enterprises that engendered them. This 
double discrepancy between inherited legal categories and the so­
cial world that they assumed on the one hand, and emerging social 
realities and juries' sense of justice on the other, led Holmes to sug­
gest that the law of torts might need to be wholly rethought.4 
In the century that has passed since Holmes wrote, tort law has 
been reconstructed in ways that have reduced - though not erased 
- the mismatch that caught his eye. Modem vicarious liability, ab­
normally dangerous activity liability, and product liability all show 
the influence of an "enterprise" or "activity" conception of strict 
liability. That conception holds that the characteristic risks of the 
modem world are the inevitable by-products of planned activities 
- not the random consequences of discrete acts - and seeks to 
make activities - not actors - bear the costs of the accidental in­
juries that they occasion. 
Yet if the law of torts has been partially reconstructed, our un­
derstanding of the sense of justice expressed in that reconstruction 
remains incomplete. In fact, our understanding is incomplete pre­
cisely because it slights the sense of justice that lies behind enter­
prise liability. George Priest's influential history of the rise of 
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 
183 (Peter Smith 1952) (1920). Holmes originally delivered the paper as a lecture 100 years 
ago, on January 8, 1897, at the dedication of a new hall at the Boston University School of 
Law. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See id. at 182-84. Although Holmes was, to put it mildly, hardly an uncritical admirer 
of juries and often argued for limiting their role in tort adjudication, he nonetheless conceded 
that juries had a place to play in the formulation of liability rules, as well as in the determina­
tion of facts, because they embodied the sense of justice of the community. See O.W. 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Dover 1991) (1881). 
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enterprise liability, for example, overlooks that sense of justice en­
tirely. Priest argues that modem product liability law burst full­
grown upon the legal landscape in the mid-1960s, the precocious 
offspring of an academic literature thirty years in the making. In 
Priest's telling of the tale, the normative thesis of that literature was 
simple: the twin policies of preventing accidents whose costs out­
weigh their benefits, and dispersing the costs of those accidents that 
are not worth preventing, called for discarding negligence liability 
and adopting enterprise liability.s 
Whatever its merits as an account of the rationales and concepts 
informing modem product liability law,6 Priest's article is a power­
ful account of the rationales and concepts at the center of much 
contemporary academic writing on the normative basis of enter­
prise liability. Largely under the influence of economics, that litera­
ture works from and refines the twin policies of deterrence and loss 
dispersion. It recasts the former as a matter of preventing those 
accidents whose economic costs exceed their economic benefits. It 
recasts the latter as a matter of supplying insurance at the correct 
level and the cheapest cost for harms not worth preventing.7 
5. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462-64 {1985). More 
precisely, Priest's thesis is that these policies led to enterprise liability because they coalesced 
into three more specific propositions. First, manufacturers had "vastly greater power" with 
respect to "all relevant aspects of the product defect problem." Id. at 520. Second, manufac­
turers had commensurately superior ability to spread risks. See id. Third, forcing manufac­
turers to internalize the costs of all accidents attributable to their products would provide 
appropriate incentives for them to take cost-justified precautions; to modulate the level of 
their activities correctly; and to engage in desirable levels of safety research, development 
and innovation. See id. The policies of accident prevention ("precaution" or "deterrence") 
and loss distribution {"loss spreading" or "insurance") coalesced into these propositions 
largely because they were linked to empirical assumptions about the characteristics of mod­
em consumer markets. 
6. For forceful criticism, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the 
Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 602, 623-34 (1992). 
7. For the most part, normatively inclined and theoretically ambitious scholarship on en­
terprise liability is economically oriented. Although there is vigorous disagreement within 
that scholarship over the merits of enterprise liability, there is little disagreement that its 
merits are to be measured by its success at achieving optimal deterrence and supplying opti­
mal insurance. Contemporary academic critics of enterprise liability, including Priest, often 
insist that it fails on both fronts, but they are especially hard on such liability as a mechanism 
for supplying optimal insurance against accidents that should not be prevented. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 648-
53 {1985) (arguing that modem products liability law frustrates the tripartite insurance ideals 
of limiting moral hazard, ameliorating adverse selection, and diversifying risk); George L. 
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1553 (1987) 
[hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis] (arguing that first-party insurance is preferable to third­
party insurance through tort liability because the former can incorporate copayments, 
whereas the latter cannot); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1, 17 {1987) [hereinafter Priest, Tort Reform] (arguing that product manufacturers are 
in a poor position to acquire adequate information about the riskiness of insureds and cannot 
charge higher product prices to higher risk purchasers and users); Alan Schwartz, The Case 
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Contemporary academic writing has all but ignored a wholly dif­
ferent kind of justification for activity liability. That justification 
takes enterprise liability to rest "not so much" on policies of acci­
dent prevention and loss spreading "as in a deeply rooted sentiment 
that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for 
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activi­
ties. "8 This justification insists that considerations of fairness - not 
efficiency - call for making activities that benefit from the imposi­
tion of particular risks bear the costs of accidental injuries issuing 
out of those risks. Burdens should be aligned with benefits, and 
"the costs of [enterprise-related accidents should therefore] be 
borne by those who profit from" the enterprise.9 Tue costs of prod­
uct-related accidents, for instance, should be apportioned across 
"the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale and the 
buyers who profit from its use."10 In case law, this "fairness" justifi­
cation both competes and cooperates with efficiency justifications.11 
Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 819, 820, 832-40 (1992) (arguing that product 
defects should be subject to a "market" regime of "free contract" with compulsory disclo­
sure, because strict liability forces consumers to purchase excessive amounts of insurance and 
inefficiently depresses demand by forcing manufacturers to insure for nonpecuniary harm). 
Contemporary academic defenders of enterprise liability have presented a head-on chal­
lenge to the criticisms voiced by Epstein, Priest, Schwartz, and others. These scholars argue 
that third-party insurance is generally more efficient than first-party insurance, especially in 
the case of product-related accidents, and especially at sorting insureds into suitably narrow 
risk pools. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson. What Liability Crisis? An Alternative 
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1. 109-10 (1991) 
[hereinafter Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?] (arguing that enterprise liability is 
stimulating the rise of mutual insurance companies, which are constructing more homogene­
ous and thus more efficient risk pools); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party 
Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 129, 137 (1990) (arguing that first-party insurers fail to adjust premiums according to 
consumption choices and that a negligence regime therefore induces manufacturers to make 
suboptimal investments in product safety, whereas enterprise liability optimizes manufacture 
care and activity levels). Croley and Hanson have also challenged the argument that the 
award of nonpecuniary damages is inefficient. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The 
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1791-93 (1995) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Acci­
dents] (arguing that proposals to reform the tort system by reducing compensation are not 
efficient from a deterrence perspective and that tort law may show the existence of otherwise 
unmet consumer demand for insurance against pain and suffering). 
8. Ira S. Bushey /fa Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, 
J.). 
9. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982). 
10. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547. 
11. Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1984), is a nice example of a case in which 
fairness and efficiency norms worked cooperatively. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial 
Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1570, 1580 n.55 (1991) (discussing Wright). The court invoked both loss­
spreading and fairness in support of its ruling. See Wright, 735 F.2d at 1077 ("The seller is 
also generally better able to bear and distribute the costs resulting from injury due to a defec­
tive product."); Wright, 735 F.2d at 1077 ("[T]hose who reap a profit . . .  [should] pay for any 
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The absence of this conception of fairness from recent academic 
writing on enterprise liability is partially explained by the economic 
cast of that scholarship. Policies of deterrence and loss distribution 
lend themselves to economic explication whereas principle� of fair­
ness generally do not. The ascendence of law and economics, how­
ever, is only half of the story. The other half of the story is the 
recent renaissance of moral theorizing about tort liability and the 
reluctance of these moral theorists to embrace the fairness justifica­
tion for enterprise liability. For the most part, recent moral theo­
ries of tort have been organized around the idea of corrective 
justice, and this orientation has led them to view enterprise liability 
with suspicion. The guiding idea of corrective justice theories is 
that the proper end of tort law is the restoration of a preexisting 
equilibrium between victim and injurer, an equilibrium wrongly dis­
rupted by injurer's accidental infliction of harm on the victim.12 
Moral theorists gripped by this idea have thought that enterprise 
liability violates the institutional integrity of tort law because it rests 
either on the ideai of loss spreading, which smacks of distributive 
justice, or on the goal of optimal deterrence, which is instrumental­
ism incarnate. On a corrective justice conception of tort, neither 
criteria of distributive justice, however right, nor instrumentalist 
goals, however good, are legitimate grounds for the imposition of 
tort liability. 
In his influential account of the role of fairness in tort law, for 
instance, George Fletcher takes loss spreading to be the principal 
justification for enterprise liability, and asserts that this justification 
has no place in a fairness conception of tort liability because it "is 
an argument of distributive rather than corrective justice. "13 Tort 
liability, Fletcher rightly insists, must turn on what people have 
done, not on who they are.14 Writing around the same time, 
harm caused."). Bushey, 398 F.2d 167, discussed in detail in Part III, is a fine example of case 
law involving competition between fairness and efficiency. 
12. This claim is a very rough generalization, and it does considerable violence to the 
variety of corrective justice theories in the field. The reason why it remains the best brief 
summary of such theories is that it captures the essence of Aristotle's conception of correc­
tive justice. Contemporary tort theory has appropriated both the concept of corrective jus­
tice and the distinction between it and distributive justice from Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, 
N1CHOMACHEAN Ennes bk. V., ch. 4, at 114-17 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1980). 
13. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 
n.40 (1972). 
14. See id. Fletcher amplifies his objection in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS 
OF LEGAL THOUGHT 87-93 (1996). I agree with Fletcher's claim that tort liability must be 
grounded in principles of moral responsibility that connect the actions of injurers to the inju­
ries of victims in a defensible way. I disagree with Fletcher, however, in believing that the 
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Charles Fried articulated a fairness conception of tort liability simi­
lar to Fletcher's in its reliance on social contract ideals of equal 
freedom and mutual benefit,15 but that work, too, provided no sup­
port for the conception of fairness invoked by enterprise liability 
case law. Like Fletcher's work, Fried's account of fairness focused 
on the criterion of reciprocal risk imposition. That criterion does 
little to justify enterprise liability, and as a consequence Fried's own 
arguments only grapple with negligence law.16 
Not long after Fletcher and Fried's work, Richard Epstein pro­
posed a libertarian theory of strict liability that also claimed the 
mantle of corrective justice.17 Epstein's theory assumed a starkly 
individualistic vision of the social world within which accidental in­
juries arose. Its only reference to a form of enterprise liability oc­
curred in the course of a causation discussion. Even that reference 
was incidental. Product defects, Epstein explained, are one of the 
three most common instances of the "dangerous conditions" para­
digm of causation, 18 and this, not any distinctive characteristic of 
enterprise-related accidents, supports the imposition of strict liabil­
ity on them. Ernest Weinrib, another important corrective justice 
theorist, has pressed the argument that enterprise liability rests on 
instrumentalist ideals of loss spreading and deterrence that are 
wholly alien to private law.19 The principle of fairness invoked by 
enterprise liability principle of fairness is a principle rooted in what enterprises have done 
and not who they are. 
15. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SO­
CIAL CHOICE ch. 11 (1970). 
16. Unlike Fried, Fletcher explicitly justifies some strict liability doctrines on fairness 
grounds, arguing that the risks covered by those doctrines are nonreciprocal. See Fletcher, 
supra note 13, at 543-49, 570-71. However, the only enterprise liability doctrine justified by 
Fletcher on this ground is the liability of product manufacturers to bystanders injured by the 
use of their products. 
17. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) 
[hereinafter Epstein, Strict Liability]; see also Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent 
Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Inten­
tional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective 
Justice and irs Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). 
18. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 17, at 178-79. There is, to be sure, something 
starkly individualistic about libertarianism. But the stark individualism of Epstein's theory is 
remarkable even in comparison with Robert Nozick's treatment of tort issues in chapter four 
of his Anarchy, State and Utopia. Nozick's treatment makes a place for enterprise liability 
and the principle of fairness that justifies it. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND 
UTOPIA 79-81 (1974). 
19. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 681 (1985) (arguing that insurance or cost-shifting rationales have no place in the justi­
fication of liability rules because they do not grow out of the parties' relationship as doer and 
sufferer of the same harm); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGILL 
L.J. 403 (1989) (arguing that tort adjudication may consider only material that is inherent in 
the defendant's doing and the plaintiffs suffering of the same harm and that this forbids the 
invocation of insurance and deterrence justifications). Weinrib develops his views in ERNEST 
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Friendly as the master principle of vicarious liability, and cited in 
cases as a cornerstone of enterprise liability, is an academic 
orphan.20 
Its orphanage is all the more remarkable in light of the attrac­
tiveness of the fairness justification to judges. James Henderson's 
careful empirical study of judicial justification in products liability 
cases discovered that "[m]easured by what judges say in their pub­
lished opinions . . . fairness norms, not efficiency norms, 
[predominate]," and their predominance increases when they con­
flict with efficiency rationales.21 The prominence of fairness argu­
ments alone ought to spark academic interest. That interest seems 
all the more warranted in light of Henderson's observation that 
judges who relied on fairness rationales apparently "found it com­
paratively more difficult [than judges who relied on efficiency did] 
to explain why fairness supported a given resolution of a legal is­
sue. "22 When judges are confident that certain decisions are correct 
because they are fair, but are unable to explain precisely why those 
decisions are fair, scholars have their work cut out for them. 
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 36-38, 74-75 (1995). Ultimately, Weinrib's objec­
tions are very close to Fletcher's. See Fletcher, supra note 13 and accompanying text; 
FLETCHER, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
20. The treatment of vicarious liability in the latest edition of Richard Epstein's torts 
casebook supplies a striking illustration. The first case in the newly reorganized section on 
vicarious liability is Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
Bushey is followed by two pages of notes trying to identify its rationale. Nowhere in those 
notes is Friendly's principle of fairness even mentioned. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 450-56 (6th ed. 1995). To be sure, the principle has its support­
ers, but their voices have not been heard much of late. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND 
DESERVING 221, 221 n.21 (1970) (noting that "schemes of nonfault liability are supported by 
strong reasons of their own, principles both of justice and economy," and citing "the benefit 
principle (of commutative justice) that accidental losses should be borne according to the 
degree to which people benefit from an enterprise or form of activity"); ROBERT E. KEETON, 
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 158-62 (1969) (citing the principle as a basis of strict liability 
doctrine); Noz1cK, supra note 18, at 80 (advocating placing the costs of airport noise "pollu­
tion," and pollution more generally, on "those who benefit from the activity: in our example, 
airports, airlines, and ultimately the air passenger. [This], if feasible, seems fairest."). Implic­
itly, the principle is embraced by the selection of materials in PAGE KEETON ET AL., TORT 
AND ACCIDENT LAW 551-63 (2d ed. 1989); see also HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT 
AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 70-72 (1987) (discussing the principle as one of three 
main fairness justifications for tort liability). 
21. Henderson, supra note 11, at 1597. Henderson concludes that "[c]ourts explicitly de­
veloped and relied upon public policy reasoning in fifteen percent of the products liability 
decision[s] . . . .  " Id. at 1589. In those cases, "fairness was developed 18% more frequently 
than efficiency, and fairness controlled in the decision 24% more frequently." Id. at 1595 
n.131. Henderson identifies fairness and efficiency as the two most prominent substantive 
policy justifications relied upon in products liability cases. His third category of policy rea­
sons, "process" justifications, speaks to questions of institutional role and the sources of legit­
imate institutional authority. "Only 12% of the decisions developing policy referred to 
policies other than" these three. Id. at 1586 n.90. 
22. Id. at 1592. 
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In this article I propose to develop the "fairness" rationale for 
enterprise liability and to explore how its implications differ from 
efficiency rationales. I hope to show that the fairness rationale in­
voked by the cases is ripe for adoption into a family of principles 
embraced by a social contract conception of accident law as a realm 
of equal freedom and mutual benefit. When risks are recurrent and 
related, enterprise liability distributes the burdens and benefits of 
accidental risk imposition more fairly and reconciles the competing 
claims of security and liberty more adequately than negligence lia­
bility. Enterprise liability thereby establishes more favorable con­
ditions for free and equal persons to pursue their conceptions of the 
good on mutually beneficial terms. When the enterprise liability 
principle of fairness reconciles the competing claims· of liberty and 
security more fairly and favorably than negligence liability, social 
contract theory calls for its adoption in place of the reciprocity of 
risk criterion traditionally embraced by social contract scholars.23 
To clear the space for this argument, we must first work our way 
through a tangle of problems. For starters, tort scholars disagree 
both about the nature of enterprise liability and about its pervasive­
ness as a phenomenon in black-letter law. So much controversy 
swirls around enterprise liability that there is deep dispute over 
where the law draws its boundaries, and what defenses to it are 
characteristically recognized. There is equally deep disagreement 
about whether product liability law, Priest's preferred example of 
the phenomenon, actually incarnates it.24 For our purposes, how­
ever, one part of this controversy- the issue of how pervasive en-
23. The social contract theories of Fletcher and Fried take the presence of reciprocity of 
risk to justify the imposition of negligence liability, and Fletcher takes the absence of reci­
procity to justify the imposition of strict liability. See FRIED, supra note 15; Fletcher, supra 
note 13. 
24. Priest argues that after Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 
1960), and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962), the battle 
shifted to the details of enterprise liability and the benefits were accepted virtually unani­
mously. See Priest, supra note 5, at 511-12. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts expanded strict liability to sellers of all defective and unreasonably dangerous products 
without regard to the seller's fault. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966). 
By 1976, 41 of 50 jurisdictions had adopted this rule of "strict liability." Priest concludes that 
"although the theory [of enterprise liability] developed in most detail in the products liability 
field, the presuppositions of enterprise liability have been extended to engulf the larger part 
of modem tort law itself." Priest, supra note 5, at 520. By contrast, Gary Schwartz thinks 
that products liability law is driven primarily by negligence concepts. See Schwartz, supra 
note 6, at 633-34. Similarly, the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability takes the position that "very substantial [case law] authority supports the proposi­
tion that plaintiff must establish a reasonable alternative design in order for a product to be 
adjudged defective in design." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 2 
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). It thus takes the view that design defect liability is 
paradigmatically a kind of negligence liability. 
1274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1266 
terprise liability is in our law and just how much its presence is felt 
in product liability law - can be disposed of relatively quickly. To 
isolate both the forms of doctrine that interest us, and the theoreti­
cal issues that those doctrines raise, we shall not take product warn­
ing or design defect law as our examples of enterprise liability. 
Instead, we shall work with less contested instances of the phenom­
enon, namely, the modem expansions of vicarious liability and ab­
normally dangerous activity liability, and the law of manufacturing 
defects, the strictest form of product liability. 
The other part of the doctrinal controversy - the debate over 
where the law locates the boundaries of enterprise liability, and 
what defenses to it are and generally should be allowed - cannot 
be set aside so quickly. In the thicket of the law, the boundary of 
enterprise liability is entangled with the justifications for such liabil­
ity. The principle of fairness and the policies of optimal deterrence 
and optimal insurance draw that boundary in different places. In 
order to locate the boundaries of enterprise liability, we must ex­
amine, in a preliminary way, the basic contrasts between fairness 
and efficiency rationales that shall occupy us throughout this paper. 
Part II of this article turns to Judge Friendly's widely admired opin­
ion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States25 to fix these con­
trasts and their implications for the scope of enterprise liability. 
Part III takes up another preliminary problem - the prevailing 
assumption that the black-letter law of enterprise liability is hospi­
table to economic conceptions of tort liability, and inhospitable to 
noneconomic conceptions. Part III argues that this assumption is 
unwarranted. The structure of enterprise liability, like strict liabil­
ity more generally, pays scant attention to victim precautions and 
frequently fixes the boundaries of injurer liability in ways that seem 
only loosely tied to considerations of efficiency. It defines domains 
within which victims are free of any responsibility for their own 
protection against injury inflicted by injurers, and injurers are re­
sponsible for any harm that they inflict.26 The conventional wisdom 
notwithstanding, this structure of legal entitlements is troubling 
from an efficiency perspective, but heartening from a social con­
tract one. 
25. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). 
26. This contrast is the same as the one drawn by Professor Rose-Ackennan. See Susan 
Rose-Ackennan, Dikes, Dams and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law, 18 
J. LEGAL Sroo. 25, 26 (1989). Professor Rose-Ackennan finds the structure troubling from 
an efficiency perspective. 
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Part IV takes up the obstacles put in our path by prior writings 
in the social contract tradition. Prior writings have taken 
nonreciprocity of risk imposition to be the exclusive ground for the 
imposition of strict liability and have generally supposed that strict 
liability must recede in the presence of contractual relationships be­
tween victims and injurers. Part IV rejects both of these claims. 
On the one hand, it argues that the fields of enterprise liability law 
are not marked by nonreciprocity of risk, and that reciprocity the­
ory thus fails to "fit" the law that it purports to explain and justify. 
On the other hand, Part IV argues that social contract theory must 
understand tort law as a matter of justice and so cannot counte­
nance the wholesale surrender of tort to contract. Risks must be 
imposed on reasonable terms, and the contours of reasonableness 
cannot be fixed by private contractual agreements. 
Principles of justice protect our most fundamental interests and 
establish the framework within which we may order our lives as we 
choose. On a social contract conception, the interests in liberty and 
security that are at stake in questions of accidental injury are mat­
ters of justice because they are fundamental to our well-being. 
Questions of justice involve the reconciliation of competing claims 
of public right, not the balancing of competing private preferences 
for personal well-being. They must therefore be settled by the '"pe­
culiar compulsion of the better argument,'"27 not by the antecedent 
distribution of market power and bargaining strength among the 
affected parties. 
It follows that the fundamental terms of reasonable risk imposi­
tion must be fixed not by market mechanisms or private agree­
ments, but by common reason and public argument. Prior writings 
notwithstanding, social contract theory cannot simply cede author­
ity over the terms of reasonable risk imposition to the institution of 
contract law in either its market or its bargaining form. Ceding 
these matters to contract law makes matters of justice into ques­
tions of preference, and turns matters of right into questions of 
power. Because it aspires to reconcile the competing claims of lib­
erty and security in accordance with the persuasiveness of the rele­
vant reasons, tort must be the institutional mechanism for fixing the 
terms of reasonable risk imposition. 
Part V begins the constructive part of the article. This Part 
takes its basic interpretive task to be fixed by two features of activ-
27. RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRmCAL THEORY 72 (1981) (quoting JORGEN 
HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, in WIRKUCHKEIT UND REFLEXION: FETSCHRIFT FOR 
WALTER SCHULZ 240 (1973) ). 
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ity liability: (1) the structure of enterprise liability entitlements, 
with its relative indifference to matters of optimal precaution; and 
(2) the basic distinction between negligence and strict liability 
themselves. Negligence liability is liability for wrongful - that is 
unreasonable - risk imposition. Strict liability, by contrast, is lia­
bility not for unreasonably imposing a risk, but for unreasonably 
failing to accept financial responsibility for a harm that issued from a 
reasonable risk. Thus, a primary task for an interpretively sound 
account of enterprise liability is to show why, under certain condi­
tions, it is unfair (that is unreasonable) for enterprises not to accept 
financial responsibility for personal injuries issuing from their 
activities. 
Part V also lays out the basic apparatus of social contract the­
ory, and argues that the theory has identified itself too closely with 
the idea of reciprocity of risk imposition. That idea specifies the 
most reasonable reconciliation of liberty and security when injurers 
and victims face each other solely as free and equal persons, per­
sons whose relationships with one another are uncluttered by spe­
cial relationships and property rights, in a social world where the 
costs of nonnegligent accidents must be concentrated on either vic­
tims or injurers. Its authority is thus both presumptive of and rela­
tive to a particular social world, namely, Holmes's old world of 
"isolated, ungeneralized harms." 
Part VI examines the elements of the enterprise liability rheto­
ric of fairness, and the prima facie case that they make for enter­
prise liability, and sets forth the grounds for doubting that it is 
either fair or efficient to hold entities liable for the financial costs of 
accidents that are neither reasonable nor efficient to prevent. 
Part VII contains the heart of the article's constructive argu­
ment. It seeks to buttress the prima facie case for the fairness of 
enterprise liability, and to quiet doubts about its reasonableness 
and rationality. The gist of its argument is that the enterprise liabil­
ity principle of fairness reconciles the competing claims of liberty 
and security more fairly, and more favorably, than the reciprocity of 
risk criterion when risks are the incidental by-products of large and 
well-organized activities. Losses of life, limb and property disrupt 
the lives of victims even when they issue from risk impositions that 
are themselves justified. We therefore have reason to minimize the 
financial hardship that they cause, and to distribute their financial 
costs as fairly as possible. In Holmes's new world of interrelated 
and generalized risks, the imposition of enterprise liability is often 
able to effect these ends. When it can do so, it is reasonable for 
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enterprises to impose the nonnegligent risks characteristic of their 
activities, but unreasonable of them not to accept responsibility for 
the financial costs of those risks. 
Part VIII explores the boundaries of enterprise liability once its 
principal justification is taken to be a particular conception of fair­
ness, considers the defenses appropriate to such liability, and exam­
ines the tide of sentiment currently running against such liability. It 
argues, contra George Priest's influential thesis that enterprise lia­
bility tends to become absolute liability, that the fairness account of 
enterprise liability fixes the boundaries of such liability at the point 
where an enterprise ceases to create risks different from those occa­
sioned by the ordinary life of the community. Part VIII also argues 
that enterprise liability doctrine's relative indifference to optimal 
precaution and insurance concerns is frequently (though not al­
ways) justified by the presumptive freedom of persons to lead nor­
mal lives and use their property as they see fit. Lastly, Part VIII 
asserts that the tide of opinion running against enterprise liability is 
unconvincing because it rests on the implicit premise that persons 
are always and everywhere obligated to arrange their lives in ways 
that maximize overall social wealth. 
Finally, Part IX summarizes the interpretive case that social 
contract theory makes for the enterprise liability principle of fair­
ness. In doing so, this Part argues that the social contract concep­
tion "fits and justifies" aspects of enterprise liability law that 
perplex the prevailing economic accounts, and vindicates Judge 
Friendly's confident assertion that the structure of vicarious liability 
law rests ultimately on a sense of fairness, not on policies of optimal 
deterrence and insurance. 
Let us set out on the long path to this conclusion by unpacking 
Friendly's argument. 
IL THE MISADVENTURE OF SEAMAN LANE: OF FAIRNESS, 
EFFICIENCY AND DRUNKEN SAILORS 
"[A] little after midnight" on March 14, 1963, Seaman Lane re­
turned from shore leave "in the condition for which seamen are 
famed" to the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Tamaroa.2s The Tamaroa 
was undergoing repairs in a floating drydock in Brooklyn.29 Pursu­
ant to a provision in the contract between the government and 
Bushey (the drydock owner), members of the Tamaroa's crew had 
28. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 169, 168. 
29. See 398 F.2d at 168. 
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been granted access to her while she was being overhauled.30 As 
Lane made his way along a drydock wall, "he took it into his head 
. . .  to turn each of three large wheels some twenty times," for rea­
sons "not apparent to [the court] or very likely to Lane."31 These 
wheels controlled "the flooding of the tanks on one side of the dry­
dock."32 By turning them Lane flooded the drydock, causing the 
ship to list, slide off its blocks, and fall against the wall. "Parts of 
the drydock sank, and the ship partially did - fortunately without 
loss of life or personal injury."33 
Bushey sought, and was awarded, damages in federal district 
court on the theory that the government, as Lane's employer, was 
vicariously liable for his trespass. When it is clear, as it was here, 
that a tortfeasor is an employee of a particular enterprise, vicarious 
liability hinges on whether the employee's tortious acts were com­
mitted within the "scope" of her employment. The United States 
appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that Lane's actions were 
beyond the scope of his employment, and staking its appeal on the 
"motive test" for determining that scope. As formulated by section 
228(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the motive test pro­
vides that "[c]onduct of a servant is within the scope of employment 
if, but only if ... ( c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the master . . . .  "34 The circuit court conceded that "[i]t would 
be going too far to find such a purpose here," but agreed with the 
district court that this fact was not dispositive: "In light of the 
highly artificial way in which the motive test has been applied, the 
district judge believed himself obliged to test the doctrine's continu­
ing vitality by referring to the larger purposes respondeat superior is 
supposed to serve."35 After examining those purposes, the district 
court relied on allocative efficiency grounds to find Lane's conduct 
within the scope of his employment. 
Judge Friendly affirmed the result but not the rationale. Citing 
both Calabresi and Coase, he explained: 
It is not at all clear, as the court below suggested, that expansion of 
liability ... will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources .... 
30. See 398 F.2d at 169 ("[P]rovision shall be made so that personnel assigned shall have 
access to the vessel at all times, it being understood that such personnel will not interfere 
with the work or the contractor's workmen." (quoting the contract between the government 
and Bushey)). 
31. 398 F.2d at 169-70. 
32. 398 F.2d at 168. 
33. 398 F.2d at 168. 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958). 
35. 398 F.2d at 170. 
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[A] more efficient allocation can only be expected if there is some 
reason to believe that imposing a particular cost on the enterprise will 
lead it to consider whether steps should be taken to prevent a recur­
rence of the accident. ... And the suggestion that imposition of liabil­
ity here will lead to more intensive screening of employees rests on 
highly questionable premises . . . . It could well be that application of 
the traditional rule [finding Lane's conduct to be outside the scope of 
his employment] might induce drydock owners, prodded by their in­
surance 'companies, to install locks on their valves to avoid similar 
incidents in the future, while placing the burden on shipowners is 
much less likely to lead to accident prevention.36 
Indeed, the record "reveal[ ed] that most modem drydocks have au­
tomatic locks to guard against unauthorized use of valves."37 Opti­
mal precaution concerns thus favored locking valves over screening 
sailors, and so supported a restrictive reading of "scope of employ­
ment" doctrine. 
Friendly gave even shorter shrift to the loss-spreading justifica-
tion for enterprise liability: 
It is true, of course, that in many cases the plaintiff will not be in a 
position to insure, and so expansion of liability will, at the very least, 
serve respondeat superior's loss spreading function. But the fact that 
the defendant is better able to afford damages is not alone sufficient 
to justify legal responsibility, and this overarching principle must be 
taken into account in deciding whether to expand the reach of respon­
deat superior. 38 
Turning away from efficiency rationales, Friendly staked his 
claim that the deepest ground of vicarious liability was fairness, not 
efficiency. Our sense of justice calls for holding business enter­
prises liable for "accidents which may fairly be said to be character­
istic of [their] activities."39 "Characteristic" accidents are those that 
"flow from [an enterprise's] long-run activity in spite of all reason­
able precautions on [its] part."40 The proper domain of enterprise 
liability consists of both those risks that prudent injurers would pre­
vent by taking appropriate precautions, because the benefits exceed 
36. 398 F.2d at 170-71 (citations omitted). Friendly cites Calabresi in connection with his 
observation that improvements in allocative efficiency will result only if the imposition of 
liability induces improved precautions. He cites Coase in connection with his observation 
that placing liability on shipowners is much less likely to lead to accident prevention, because 
drydock owners are the ones in the position to take the cost-effective precaution, and ship­
owners are unlikely to insist upon drydock owners taking that precaution. 
37. 398 F.2d at 171 n.6. 
38. 398 F.2d at 171 (citations omitted); cf. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law 
of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959) (arguing that loss-spreading concerns almost never 
account for the imposition of tort liability and distinguishing such concerns from the fair 
apportionment of burdens and benefits). 
39. 398 F.2d at 171. 
40. 398 F.2d at 171. 
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the burdens of so doing, and those risks that are increased over 
their background level by an activity, but which are not worth 
preventing because the burdens exceed the benefits of so doing. 
The harm inflicted by Seaman Lane was "characteristic" of the 
Coast Guard's activity in this sense: 
[I]t was foreseeable that crew members crossing the drydock might do 
damage, negligently or even intentionally, such as pushing a Bushey 
employee or kicking property into the water. Moreover, the procliv­
ity of seamen to find solace for solitude by copious resort to the bottle 
while ashore has been noted in opinions too numerous to warrant ci­
tation. Once all this is granted, it is immaterial that Lane's precise 
action was not to be foreseen.41 
The boundary of this sort of liability is fixed at the point where "the 
activities of the 'enterprise' do not . . .  create risks different from 
those attendant on the activities of the community in general. "42 
For example: 
If Lane had set fire to the bar where he had been imbibing or had 
caused an accident on the street while returning to the drydock, the 
Government would not be liable . . . . Here Lane had come within the 
closed-off area where his ship lay, to occupy a berth to which the 
Government insisted he have access, and while his act is not readily 
explicable, at least it was not shown to be due entirely to facets of his 
personal life. The risk that seamen going and coming from the 
Tamaroa might cause damage to the drydock is enough to make it fair 
that the enterprise bear the loss.43 
Put otherwise, some accidents caused by drunken sailors are "char­
acteristic risks" of the Coast Guard's activity because the Coast 
Guard increases the level of drunkenness among its sailors above 
the ordinary background level of drunkenness. Some level of 
drunkenness is not attributable either to the "long run activity" of 
any distinct enterprise or to the negligence of anyone except, per­
haps, the drunk. It is the outgrowth of innumerable activities com­
mingling, the inevitable side effect of the legal availability of 
alcohol itself. This residual level is the background level. The ac­
tivity of the bar eclipses the activity of the Coast Guard because the 
bar's activity not only increases the level of drunkenness over and 
above the background level, but also increases the level of drunken­
ness over and above the level characteristic of the Coast Guard's 
activity. 
41. 398 F.2d at 172. 
42. 398 F.2d at 172. 
43. 398 F.2d at 172 (citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 
(1958)). 
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III. EFFICIENCY AND THE STRUCTURE OF STRICT LIABILITY 
The test for vicarious liability that Friendly formulates here, and 
the general account of enterprise liability thaJ it implies, instantiate 
a pervasive difference between the way that fairness- and efficiency­
based theories conceive of enterprise liability. To unpack that dif­
ference we need to refine our understanding of Friendly's position. 
His claim that policies of efficient deterrence and loss spreading will 
not lead to an interpretation of the "scope of employment" rule 
that encompasses Seaman Lane's misadventure needs to be inter­
preted carefully. That claim should not be mistaken for the claim 
that economic analysis cannot justify holding the Coast Guard lia­
ble for that misadventure. Economics supplies us with a complex 
and indeterminate framework, and it permits a variety of ap­
proaches to any particular problem. It is therefore likely that a 
credible economic argument can be constructed for the specific re­
sult reached by Friendly's opinion. 
For instance, one might argue that refusing to recognize a de­
fense of contributory negligence to a claim of trespass induces opti­
mal investment in private property,44 and that using a criterion of 
"enterprise causation" to allocate the costs of those accidents that 
occur once all cost-justified precautions have been taken will lead 
firms to regulate their activity levels efficiently.45 Taken together, 
these arguments yield a perfectly plausible economic case for hold­
ing the Coast Guard liable for Seaman Lane's trespass under the 
"scope of employment" rule.46 
44. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary 
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL L. REV. 1 (1990). 
45. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of 
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563, 572 
(1988) (offering definitions of "full" and "partial" "enterprise causation"). Sykes defines par­
tial enterprise causation as follows: "An enterprise 'partially causes' the wrong of an em­
ployee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the employee 
would reduce the probability of the wrong but not eliminate it." Id. This definition is very 
similar to Friendly's characteristic risk criterion, and Sykes interprets Bushey as "implicitly 
resting on notions of enterprise causation." Id. at 589 n.70. Sykes describes the activity level 
distortions that will be created by failing to make businesses "bear the full cost of the com­
pensable wrongs attendant upon [their] operation." Id. at 567. 
46. Other economic arguments are also plausible. One might, for example, agree that the 
"scope of employment" rule should be interpreted in the manner that Friendly proposes, but 
argue that victim negligence should be recognized as a defense to trespass in order to induce 
optimal precautions by property owners. Here, as elsewhere, one cannot tie economics de­
finitively to one particular account of the proper outcome and the reasons for it. Economi­
cally-oriented scholarship can draw even closer to Friendly's perspective, and to the 
perspective of this article, when it accepts the idea that it is often unreasonable to insist on 
victim precautions, because doing so is inconsistent with the victim's property rights (e.g., her 
right to plant whatever crops she pleases so long as she does not interfere with others' use of 
their property) or her right to a normal life off of her property (e.g., her right to stroll the 
sidewalks without having to take precautions against stray cricket balls). William Jones 
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Friendly's point, however, is both narrower and broader than 
the claim that it is inefficient to impose liability on the Coast Guard 
for Seaman Lane's trespass. It is narrower in that the precise point 
of law at stake is the interpretation of the "scope of the employ­
ment" rule. Here Friendly's point is that efficiency considerations 
support an interpretation of that rule that excludes Seaman Lane's 
trespass from the scope of the Coast Guard's enterprise. Excluding 
that trespass gives the cheapest cost avoider (the drydock owner) a 
better incentive to take the optimal precaution (installing automatic 
locks on its drydock valves) than including that trespass within the 
scope of Lane's employment does. Friendly's point is also broader 
than the claim that it is inefficient to hold the Coast Guard liable 
for Seaman Lane's trespass, in that the clash between efficiency and 
fairness that he pinpoints is a clash between two approaches to tort 
liability. The efficiency approach takes the task of tort law to be 
encouraging the optimal coordination of injurer and victim activity, 
whereas the fairness approach takes the task of tort to be the recon­
ciliation of conflicting claims of liberty and security on mutually 
beneficial terms. 
A. The Structure of Strict Liability 
The structure of strict liability doctrine fits uneasily with the 
logic of the efficiency norm. Strict liability doctrines fix spheres of 
injurer responsibility and victim freedom in ways that seem unlikely 
to induce optimal joint precautions, and they pin full responsibility 
for accidental harms on one of the acts or activities whose collision 
engenders those harms. Prescriptive economic analysis generally 
seeks to induce the optimal combination of injurer and victim pre­
cautions, and insists that injurers and victims are jointly responsible, 
generally speaking, for the accidental harms that acts or activities 
occasion.47 
adopted this approach. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1729, 1757, 1779 (1992). While I am deeply sympathetic to Jones's 
position, it marks a sharp, albeit subtle, departure from more traditional economic ap­
proaches and a partial embrace of the noneconomic view advanced here. Not surprisingly, 
Jones's argument has drawn fire for overlooking the superior efficiency of one critical and 
generally applicable victim precaution - first-party insurance against accidental harm. See 
Mark Geistfeld, Should Strict Liability Apply to Hazardous Business Enterprises (April, 
1996) (unpublished draft, on file with author). 
47. Coase forcefully argued that this is the path to efficiency. See R.H. Coase, The Prob· 
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960). 
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Not only do strict liability doctrines, both in their "enterprise" 
and "traditional" forms,48 seem indifferent to the pursuit of effi­
ciency, but strict liability case law appears to justify its articulation 
of duties by appealing directly to arguments about the legitimate 
boundaries of victim freedom and the fair reach of injurer responsi­
bility. Injurer responsibility is predicated on the belief that it is le­
gitimate to hold actors accountable for risks that they impose 
voluntarily and for their own benefit. Victim freedom is predicated 
on the belief that, within certain domains, persons may do what 
they wish with their persons and their property. That freedom in­
cludes the freedom not to take precautions for the protection of 
themselves and their property, even when so doing will prevent an 
accident at the lowest possible cost. 
For example, the argument that those who choose to impose 
certain risks and presumably benefit from their imposition may 
fairly be held accountable for harms issuing from such risks is im­
plicit in Bushey and explicit in other leading cases. Lubin v. Iowa 
City49 invokes this argument to justify imposing strict liability on a 
waterworks for accidents arising out of a cost-justified decision to 
leave water pipes in place until they break: 
It is neither just nor reasonable that [a] city . . .  can deliberately and 
intentionally plan to leave a watermain underground beyond inspec­
tion and maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability. A city 
or corporation so operating knows that eventually a break will occur, 
water will escape and in all probability flow onto the premises of an­
other with resulting damage. . . .  The risks from such a method of 
operation should be borne by the water supplier who is in a position 
to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true bene­
ficiaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and 
maintenance costs. When the expected and inevitable occurs, they 
should bear the loss and not the unfortunate individual whose prop­
erty is damaged . . . .  5o 
The conviction that people may do as they wish with their per­
sons and their property so long as they do not violate the rights of 
others is illustrated by Marshall v. Ranne, 51 a decision upholding a 
plaintiff's right to recover for personal injuries inflicted by his 
48. I would classify strict liability for wild animals as a "traditional" form of strict liability 
and strict liability for burst waterworks pipes as an "enterprise" form of strict liability. This 
distinction, and the grounds for it, need not detain us here. My present point is that both 
forms have an entitlement cast to them. 
49. 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964). 
50. 131 N.W.2d at 770. 
51. 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974). 
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neighbor's vicious ·hog.s2 Although the plaintiff was aware of the 
hog's viciousness and the dangers it presented - indeed, he had 
called that viciousness to his neighbor's attention - he took no 
steps to prevent the hog's entry onto his property, took no precau­
tions to disable it in the event of its entry, and did not curtail his 
own activity to minimize the risks of harm to himself. In concluding 
that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of the injury that befel}. 
him, the court had this to say: 
He had . . . only a choice of evils, both of which were wrongfully 
imposed upon him by the defendant. He could remain a prisoner in­
side his own house or he could take the risk of reaching his car before 
defendant's hog attacked him. Plaintiff could have remained inside 
his house, but in doing so, he would have surrendered his legal right 
to proceed over his own property to his car so he could return to his 
home in Dallas. The latter alternative was forced upon him against 
his will and was a choice he was not legally required to accept. . . .  The 
dilemma which defendant forced upon plaintiff was that of facing the 
danger or surrendering his rights with respect to his own real prop­
erty, and that was not, as a matter of law the voluntary choice to 
which the law entitled him.s3 
This reasoning is sharply at odds with the logic of efficiency 
analysis, in which victim precautions are an eminently possible -
and almost surely cost-justified - response to unwelcome intru­
sions on one's property by belligerent pigs. One might, for exam­
ple, shoot pugnacious pigs. The facts of Marshall underscore the 
attractiveness of this solution. Marshall was aware that Ranne's 
boar had "gone bad"; he had only refrained from shooting it be­
cause "he did not consider that the neighborly thing to do, although 
he was an expert with a gun and had two available."S4 Shooting the 
hog would certainly seem to have been cost justified: the sort of 
severe injury that did in fact happen was to be expected, and that 
foreseeable cost exceeded the value of the pig. From an economic 
perspective, we might readily say that the plaintiff was responsible 
for his own harm by failing to take a cost-justified precaution.ss 
52. Susan Rose-Ackennan discusses Marshall and related doctrines with an eye to high­
lighting the contrasts between efficiency and entitlement in accident and nuisance law. I am 
much indebted to her discussion. See Rose-Ackennan, supra note 26. 
53. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d at 260. Marshall is consistent with prevailing doctrine. See RE­
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER & KEE· 
TON ON TIIE LAW OF TORTS, 490-91 {5th ed. 1984). 
54. 511 S.W.2d at 257. 
55. The jury took this view of the matter, though perhaps without the economic animus. 
It found that Marshall's "failure to shoot the defendant's boar hog prior to the time the hog 
bit plaintiff was negligence." 511 S.W.2d at 257. The jury also found that Marshall was con­
tributorily negligent because he had "failed to maintain a fence about his premises suffi­
ciently close to prevent hogs passing through." 511 S.W.2d at 257. 
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The facts of Marshall underscore, but do not exhaust, the force 
of efficiency arguments. The attractiveness of victim precautions 
against "boars gone bad" does not tum on the prospective victim's 
awareness that a particular boar has gone bad. The optimal set of 
standing precautions against the risk of any boar turning vicious 
and injuring a neighbor may also be bilateral. Suppose that "the 
animal owner can either build a wall around his property that 
reduces the chance of escape to 5 percent or erect a barbed wire 
fence that allows a one-third chance of escape. [It may be] more 
cost-effective overall for him to erect a barbed wire fence and for 
the potential victim to distribute traps about his pasture."56 
The general doctrinal implication of efficiency analysis in this 
kind of case is that victim negligence should be recognized as a de­
fense. 57 Black-letter legal doctrine fails to heed this advice. The 
law permits victims to poison or shoot wild or vicious animals that 
come onto their property without compensating the owners of such 
animals, but does not limit the exercise of that right to circum­
stances where the value of the harm that those animals can be ex­
pected to cause exceeds the value of the animals themselves. 
Conversely, victims may recover fully for any actual damages that 
they suffer, even though they could have prevented all of those 
damages at lower cost by killing the trespassing animals. The law is 
inefficient in both directions: it does not discourage victims from 
killing animals that are worth more than the harm that they might 
56. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 26, at 34. 
57. I have elsewhere argued for a noneconomic understanding of negligence, but without 
specifically addressing the issue of victim negligence. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonable­
ness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1996). Here, I am using an 
economic understanding to bring out the conflict between the structure of strict liability doc­
trine and the thrust of the norm of efficiency. My use of economics in this regard should not 
be read to imply that only a theory that is concerned with the overall maximization of some 
value, such as wealth or utility, can justify the recognition of victim negligence as a defense to 
ordinary negligence. The history of tort theory suggests otherwise. See, e.g., Francis H. 
· Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 273, 
337 (1905) (arguing that the attainment of benefit-burden proportionality generally requires 
a regime of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence). Bohlen explains: "Such 
duties [affirmative duties of care] are only imposed upon those who have voluntarily assumed 
a position or relation from which a benefit is derived by them." Id. at 273-74. Mutuality of 
benefit is thus a necessary and sufficient condition of mutuality of duty (or mutuality of care). 
Whether this is the best way to justify victim duties of precaution against the carelessness of 
others, either within social contract theory or more generally, is not clear. For a recent, 
instructive discussion of the relevant issues and possibilities, see Kenneth W. Simons, Con­
tributory Negligence: Conceptual and Normative Issues, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 461 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). I suggest a slightly different view of the matter in 
the text accompanying notes 242-44, infra. For present purposes, however, I shall provision­
ally accept Bohlen's position. 
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cause, and it allows victims to spare animals even when they will 
inflict harm that exceeds the value of the animals themselves.ss 
This rejection of efficiency concerns is carried even further by 
the defenses qualifying the rights of victims who fail to exercise 
their privilege to destroy wild or vicious animals. An owner is 
strictly liable for the torts of her wild animals, and her vicious do­
mestic ones, unless the victim has waived her right to recover either 
by trespassing (and so violating the property entitlement of the 
animal's owner), or by voluntarily assuming the risk of injury.s9 
Neither of these defenses encourages optimal precautions; neither 
invites justification in efficiency terms. The assumption of risk de­
fense protects individual freedom; the trespass defense protects 
property rights (in particular the right of exclusion). Marshall had 
not assumed the risk of injury by Ranne's hog because he was enti­
tled to move freely about his own property.60 
fu short, the victim's right to kill wild or vicious animals that 
enter her property is a privilege, rather than a duty; that privilege 
protects a property entitlement to be free from such invasions, and 
its existence is not conditioned on its efficient exercise. 6l Here, as ·
elsewhere in the law of wild animals, minimizing the costs of acci-
58. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, §§ 21 & 89, at 642 (discussing the privileges of 
defending property and abating a nuisance). These privileges are not unqualified. If the 
value of a trespassing animal greatly exceeds the damage that it threatens, if there are effica­
cious alternatives to killing it, and if the harm is not imminent, then the property owner may 
not be privileged to kill it. The logic here is one of proportionality, with landowners being 
forbidden to kill trespassing animals when doing so would create a loss "greatly dispropor­
tionate to the threatened harm." Id. at 642; see also id. at 136-37. 
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 507, 508, 509, 511, 515, 517 (1977). Section 
507 imposes strict liability on possessors of wild animals to everyone except trespassers, for 
harms caused by the wild and abnormally dangerous properties of the animals, respectively. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 507 (1977). Sections 508 and 517 create partial 
exceptions to these rules. Section 508 applies to wild animals that escape and return to a 
natural state; the former owner is not liable once the animal returns to the wild. See RE­
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 508 (1977). Section 517 applies to animals kept in pursu­
ance of a public duty. It provides that "[t]he rules as to strict liability for dangerous animals 
do not apply when the possession of the animal is in pursuance of a duty imposed upon the 
possessor as a public officer or employee or as a common carrier." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 517 (1977). Section 509 applies the rule of section 507 to possessors of abnor­
mally dangerous domestic animals if the owner had reason to know that the animal had 
"dangerous propensities abnormal to its class." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 
(1977). Section 515 provides that the plaintiff has no obligation to discover that he is in the 
vicinity of a wild or vicious animal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515 (1977). 
Comment c to section 515(2) qualifies this rule: the plaintiff cannot recover if he "intention­
ally and unreasonably subjects himself to the risk of harm by the animal." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 515(2) cmt. C (1977). 
60. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. For a more general statement of the 
pertinent assumption of risk doctrine, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (1965). 
61. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, at § 89 (referring to a plaintifrs "privilege" as 
opposed to "duty" of abatement); Marshall, 511 S.W.2d at 261; cf. the doctrines described 
supra note 59 (explaining that the right of a victim to recover for injury from a wild animal, 
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dents, and maximizing the value extracted from competing uses, 
simply do not enter into the law's delineation of rights and duties. 
B. The Structure of Enterprise Liability 
Aspects of the law governing liability for wild animals are, no 
doubt, idiosyncratic. The general structure of that law, however, is 
not. By and large, the law of enterprise liability fails to heed the 
implications of efficiency analysis in the same ways that the particu­
lar decisions of Bushey and Marshall do: precaution concerns gen­
erally receive less emphasis than efficiency suggests that they 
should, and victim precautions are particularly de-emphasized.62 
The deeper ground of the economic criticism of enterprise liability 
doctrine is also the same. The conviction, voiced so powerfully by 
Coase,63 that most harm is jointly caused by the collision between 
victim and injurer activities, leads economics to insist on the appro­
priateness of bilateral precautions when legal doctrine insists on 
unilateral responsibility. 
Indeed, Friendly's claim in Bushey about the boundaries of the 
"scope of employment" rule is a general assertion about the charac­
ter of enterprise (or modern strict) liability as distinguished from 
negligence liability.64 Duty analysis in negligence law has two 
stages, although they rarely need to be distinguished. In the first 
stage, one must decide if the injury occasioned by the defendant's 
activity was "reasonably foreseeable." For "reasonable" foresee­
ability to be present, the defendant's act or activity must have in­
creased the risk of the injury suffered by the plaintiff above the 
or a vicious one, is not structured to track efficiency concerns); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 
26, at 34 (same). 
62. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (addressing the legal doctrines that I 
mean this claim to cover). 
63. See Cease, supra note 47. 
64. Robert Keeton has made essentially the same claim. See KEETON, supra note 20, at 
162 ("It may be that most strict liabilities now recognized are illustrations of a single basis of 
liability - a principle that each activity is accountable for the distinctive risks it creates."). 
Some of Keeton's examples suggest that his "distinctive risk" criterion is slightly narrower 
than Friendly's "characteristic risk" criterion. For instance, Keeton goes on to distinguish the 
"distinctive risk" criterion of liability from the more economic criterion proposed by Albert 
Ehrenzweig. See id. at 163 n.25 (discussing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGUGENCE WmI­
OUT FAULT (1951)). Keeton writes: 
[Ehrenzweig proposes] using "typicality" of the loss to the enterprise as a guideline to 
scope of liability. It seems likely, however, that "enterprise liability for harm typically 
and insurably caused" (p. 32) would be a liability of much broader scope, with much 
more overlapping of liabilities among enterprises, than liability based on a principle of 
distinctive risk. 
Id. Any difference between Keeton and Friendly is, at most, a variation of the same basic 
conception of liability, and I shall therefore use "distinctive" and "characteristic" risk inter­
changeably throughout this paper. 
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level of the mutually imposed background risks that all activities 
entail. 65 If the requirement of reasonable foreseeability is met, then 
a second inquiry must be undertaken. In this second stage, one 
must ask if the injury should have been prevented by an appropri­
ate precaution, because the benefits of that precaution outweighed 
its burdens.66 Friendly's point in Bushey61 is that the imposition of 
enterprise liability requires only an affirmative answer to the first 
inquiry - only a determination that the accident at issue sprang 
from a risk whose incidence was increased above its background 
level by the defendant's enterprise. Bushey thus locates the con­
ceptual boundaries of enterprise liability in contradistinction to 
both "absolute liability"68 and negligence liability. 
Conceived in this way, the very essence of enterprise liability 
seems to be out of sync with efficiency criteria. The boundary of 
such liability is expressly fixed beyond the point at which it is effi­
cient for injurers to prevent the accidental harms issuing from their 
activities. Moreover, it is fixed at this point without any attention 
to the possibility that victims may be able to prevent the relevant 
harms efficiently, and without any obvious reliance on the superior 
capacity of activities to bear the costs of accidents that they cannot 
prevent more efficiently than the victims of those accidents. In­
deed, Friendly explicitly dismisses such loss-spreading criteria, stat-
65. See Keating, supra note 57, at 350-52. 
66. Van Skike v. Zussman, 318 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), excerpted in KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 20, at 145-48, illustrates these two stages. The plaintiff, a child, had obtained 
a toy cigarette lighter from a gumball machine operated by Zussman in the store of Rivera, 
another defendant. The child then purchased lighter fluid from Rivera and "set himself on 
fire" when he tried to fill the toy lighter with lighter fluid. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint against both defendants for failing to state a cause of action. 
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as to both defendants, but on different 
grounds. With respect to Zussman, the appellate court found that the accident was not "rea­
sonably foreseeable," and so saw no need to investigate whether Zussman should have taken 
precautions against it. See 318 N.E.2d at 247. In other words, the court found that selling a 
toy lighter in a gumball machine did not increase the risk of children setting fire to them­
selves - the relation of the accident to the sale was merely coincidental. With respect to 
Rivera, the court implicitly found the accident reasonably foreseeable but the burden of pre­
caution too great to be required. See 318 N.E.2d at 247-48. 
Under a realm of enterprise liability as Friendly defines it, Rivera, but not Zussman, 
would be liable for the injury to the plaintiff. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. 
68. George Priest argues that enterprise liability is essentially absolute liability. See 
Priest, supra note 5, at 527 ("The unfolding of enterprise liability since 1964 might be given a 
different interpretation: as a struggle of courts to define some coherent conception of manu­
facturers' liability short of absolute liability . . . .  But the distance between prevailing stan· 
dards and a standard of absolute liability progressively narrows."). 
Friendly's criterion of characteristic risk is clearly something other than absolute liability, 
just as it is clearly something other than negligence liability. As Friendly himself emphasizes, 
that criterion excludes certain risks from the enterprise's domain. See supra text accompany­
ing note 43. 
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ing that they are "not alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility, 
and [that] this overarching principle must be taken into account in 
deciding whether to expand the reach of respondeat superior. "69 
In Bushey, Friendly implies that the domain of the characteristic 
risk principle far exceeds the scope of the employment rule. He 
suggests that it underlies modem vicarious liability doctrine, other 
versions of modem enterprise liability such as abnormally danger­
ous activity liability and the then incipient field of products liability, 
and administrative schemes such as workers' compensation law. 
While I suspect that Friendly is right about this, I shall settle here 
for pointing out that the law of abnormally dangerous activities, 
and the liability of product manufacturers for manufacturing de­
fects, appear to embody the characteristic risk criterion. 
As formulated by section 519(2) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the law of abnormally dangerous activities holds such activi­
ties liable for "the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the 
activity abnormally dangerous."70 This criterion is tracked by the 
cases: gasoline tanker trailers are strictly liable for harms issuing 
from the escape of gasoline, but not for driving decisions that result 
in ordinary traffic accidents;n those who handle, transport, or use 
dynamite for blasting are strictly liable only for harms issuing from 
its explosion or concussion;72 those who employ "field burning" as 
an agricultural technique are liable only for injuries attributable to 
those aspects of the technique that create "an effectively uncontrol­
lable danger of serious harm beyond the ordinary risks associated 
with common uses of fire that are readily avoided by due care."73 
Plainly, "scope of the risk" liability is broader than negligence 
liability. The risks that make an activity abnormally dangerous in­
clude both those that should be eliminated by the exercise of due 
care, and those that cannot be so eliminated. Such liability is like­
wise narrower than "absolute" liability. The risks that make an ab-
69. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation 
omitted). 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977). I shall call this the "scope of the 
risk" criterion. 
71. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972) (holding the owner of a 
gasoline tanker strictly liable); cf. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969) (hold­
ing that the storage of gasoline is an abnormally dangerous activity). 
72. See Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1931); Bedell v. 
Goulter, 261 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. 1953); cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF 
TORTS 105 (1963). 
73. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1265 (Or. 1982) (Linde, J.). Linde lists "the spark­
throwing steam locomotives whose incendiary propensities were a classic cost of industrial 
progress" among the forms of fire that are not abnormally dangerous. 652 P.2d at 1265. 
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normally dangerous activity abnormally dangerous are a subset of 
all the risks that such activities create. For example, the risks of 
transporting gasoline by tanker trailer include the risks of causing 
ordinary traffic accidents. In that respect, however, the transport of 
gasoline by tanker trailer does not "create risks different from those 
attendant on the activities of the community in general."74 All 
trucks and cars increase the risk of ordinary traffic accidents by 
their activity. Thus, under the scope of the risk criterion, abnor­
mally dangerous activities are liable for the risks that they create 
that are distinct from, and greater than, the background risks that 
persons mutually impose on each other in the course of their ordi­
nary activity. These are the characteristic, or distinctive, risks of 
their activities. 
The resemblance between the "scope of the risk" criterion for 
the imposition of abnormally dangerous activity liability and 
Friendly's criterion of "characteristic risk" is further underscored 
by the ultrasensitivity limit on the liability of abnormally dangerous 
activities. Section 524A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro­
vides that "[t]here is no strict liability for harm caused by an abnor­
mally dangerous activity if the harm would not have resulted but 
for the abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiff's activity."75 
Those who engage in blasting, for example, are not liable for the 
harm that ensues when the noise and concussion from such bl�sting 
frightens mink into killing their young.76 
Abnormal sensitivity is a natural boundary of liability for char­
acteristic or distinctive risk: the harm suffered by the abnormally 
sensitive is distinctive to, or characteristic of, their unusual constitu­
tion. Consequently, just as enterprise liability ends when the enter­
prise ceases to "create risks different from those attendant on the 
activities of the community in general,"77 so, too, enterprise liability 
ends when the special sensitivities of the victim render her so sensi­
tive to harm from the injurer's activity that she is harmed when an 
ordinary victim would not be. In the first case, the increased risks 
imposed by an activity blend into the background risks imposed by 
the community's activities. In the second case, the increased risks 
74. See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172. 
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A {1977). 
76. See Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942); Foster v. Preston Mill 
Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1954). 
77. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172. 
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are eclipsed by the even greater risks created by the abnormal sen­
sitivity of the victim.78 
The liability of product manufacturers for manufacturing de­
fects, the strictest form of product liability, is likewise consistent 
with Friendly's characteristic risk criterion. Manufacturers are held 
liable for injuries caused by a product's failure to conform to "the 
manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical 
units of the same product line"79 "even though all possible care was 
exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."80 Acci­
dents arising out of manufacturing defects are a "harm likely to 
flow from [a firm's] long-run activity in spite of all reasonable pre­
cautions on [its] part."81 At least some, and perhaps most, manu­
facturing defects exist because it is cheaper to bear the costs of 
certain accidents than to prevent them. Thus, they are a "distinc­
tive risk" of the manufacturer's activity: a risk deliberately created 
by its conscious investments in quality control, material inputs, 
human capital, equipment, and so on.82 
Finally, the accuracy of Friendly's "characteristic risk" criterion 
as a general account of enterprise liability is underscored by the 
way that the concept of "cause in fact" applies to such liability. 
Cause in fact comes into play in the guise of the "act of God" or 
"vis major" doctrine: injurers are not liable for harms involving ab­
normally dangerous activities if they can show that the harm "was 
due exclusively to an overwhelming agency beyond [the defend­
ant's] control and above human restraint."83 Under these circum-
78. While this limit on liability is a manifestation of the characteristic risk criterion, it is 
only fair to limit liability in this way if certain conditions are met. See infra text accompany­
ing notes 227-32. 
79. Barker v. Lull Engg. Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978). 
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2A (Tentative Draft No. 
2, 1995). 
81. See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 171. 
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 1995); KEETON, supra note 20, at 163. 
83. See Bratton v. Rudnick, 186 N.E. 669, 671 (Mass. 1933) (holding defendant not liable 
for harm caused by the collapse of a dam occasioned by rainfall, even though the defendant 
was negligent in its maintenance of the dam, because the rainstorm precipitating the collapse 
was "twice as great as any disclosed by easily available records in this part of the country"); 
see also Golden v. Amory, 109 N.E. 131 (Mass. 1952); City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 435 P.2d 
77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967). The doctrine finds its original articulation in Nichols v. Marsland, 2 
Ex D. 1 (1876) (Court of Appeal, Exchequer Division). In Nichols, "artificial ornamental 
lakes" on the defendant's property burst, and the subsequent flood swept away four county 
bridges. The defendant was absolved of liability on the ground that the rain and flooding that 
precipitated the breakage of the dam were so extraordinary that they could not have been 
foreseen. The basis of the "Act of God" doctrine is not as clear as one might hope. On one 
interpretation, the defendant had no "duty" with respect to these risks because they were so 
abnormal as to be unforeseeable. This sounds suspiciously like a negligence doctrine. On 
1292 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 95:1266 
stances, the defendant's activity is not a "but for" cause of the 
plaintiff's injury because the injury would have happened even in 
the absence of that activity. This version of cause-in-fact doctrine is 
the natural expression of enterprise liability understood as liability 
for "characteristic" or "distinctive" risk. When an injury would 
have happened even without the defendant's abnormally dangerous 
activity, the distinctive risks of that activity have been eclipsed, and 
liability for such risks has come to an end. By contrast, negligence 
liability does not go so far, and absolute liability - to be absolute 
- would have to go further. Here, then, we see that the idea of 
fairness fixes the scope of enterprise liability in a distinctive way, 
thereby supplying an answer to one of the problems that bedeviled 
our inquiry at the outset.84 
The defenses to abnormally dangerous activity liability likewise 
define zones of freedom and responsibility, rather than duties to 
undertake mutually beneficial precautions. For they are the de­
fenses to liability for wild animals at large: other than abnormal 
sensitivity, the only defenses recognized are those of assumption of 
the risk and "knowingly and unreasonably subjecting [one ]self to 
the risk of harm."85 These defenses are construed in the manner of 
another interpretation, the relevant harms did not issue from the distinctive risks created by 
the presence of the abnormally dangerous activity. They issued from a natural phenomenon 
that eclipsed the risks of that activity by virtue of its enormous magnitude. This sounds more 
like a strict liability doctrine and is conceptually preferable to the first interpretation for that 
reason. 
84. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. To be sure, the answer given here is 
preliminary. A complete account of enterprise liability would have to discuss the process of 
attributing accidents to activities in more detail. Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein have 
shown that the "principle of fairness" that "each person should bear the costs of her activi­
ties" admits of both libertarian and liberal interpretations and that the principle can be ap­
plied in a defensible way only by making evaluative judgments about the importance of 
various liberty and security interests. Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Mis­
fortune, 41 McGILL LJ. 91, 94 {1995). I am in complete agreement with the general thrust of 
their argument. Space permitting, I would argue that the evaluative process that they and I 
believe characteristic of negligence law can be - and, in fact, is - adapted to enterprise 
liability. The key is that, to attribute accidents to activities under enterprise liability, we must 
evaluate not the importance of various liberty and security interests, but the "character" of 
the relevant enterprise. See Ronald Dworkin's discussion of the "character" of chess in 
RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGIITS SERIOUSLY 81, 101-05 (1978). For my 
view of how the evaluative process works in negligence law, see Keating, supra note 57, at 
367-79. 
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 523, 524, & 524A (1977) (addressing as­
sumption of risk, contributory negligence, and abnormal sensitivity, respectively). The con­
tributory negligence defense of section 524 is narrower than normal contributory negligence 
because it requires that the plaintiff "knowingly and unreasonably" subjected himself to the 
risk of harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977). There is more than a hint of 
gross negligence or recklessness here. My discussion here describes the traditional regime of 
defenses to strict liability. Of late, comparativization has affected defenses to strict liability 
as well as defenses to negligence. See, e.g., Andrade v. Shiers, 564 So. 2d 787 (La. Ct. App. 
1990) (combining defense of comparative negligence with strict liability of animal owner). I 
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Marshall: the plaintiff's encounter with the risk must be knowing 
and free.86 The defenses to manufacturing defect liability are 
equally few and equally narrow - misuse of the product, and as­
sumption of the risk.87 
Ironically, it is modern vicarious liability - the doctrine in­
volved in Bushey - that presents the most ambiguous evidence for 
this conception of enterprise liability. One source of this ambiguity 
is the complexity of vicarious liability doctrine itself. Vicarious lia­
bility is a hybrid doctrine; it concerns the liability of principals for 
the torts of their agents. The part of the doctrine that concerns us 
speaks to the liability of employers (masters) for the torts of their 
employees (servants). The "scope of employment" rule for attrib­
uting the torts of employees to the employers (enterprises) they 
serve embodies a strict (not a negligent) principle of responsibility. 
Whether the liability of employers for the torts of their employ­
ees is best understood as resting on efficiency or fairness depends 
almost entirely on how the "scope of employment" rule is inter­
preted. On Friendly's reading of the "scope of the employment" 
rule, the vicarious liability of masters for the torts of their servants 
is not tailored to the specifications of efficiency: it permits recovery 
even when the victim might be the cheaper precaution taker. While 
Friendly's claims about the grounds and character of vicarious lia­
bility find powerful support in the cases, and have the backing of his 
considerable authority, they are contestable. Here, then, I must 
claim only that a noneconomic conception may provide the best in­
terpretation of vicarious liability - and even that claim requires 
further development. 
Finally, there is a third leg to the disjunction between efficiency 
concerns and the structure of strict liability doctrine. Efficiency is 
concerned not only with optimal precaution and deterrence, but 
also with optimal compensation (or insurance). The socially opti­
mal treatment of risk requires deterring those risks that should not 
be imposed, and compensating victims for those accidental injuries 
that optimal care will not prevent.88 To induce optimal injurer pre­
cautions, damage awards must include the nonpecuniary dimen­
sions of accidental injury and death. Even though money damages 
assess the appropriateness of a comparative negligence defense in the text accompanying 
notes 242-44, infra. 
86. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1212 {Alaska 1978). 
87. See REsTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h & n (1977); see also Ellsworth 
v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1984); Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 766 P.2d 
938 {Okla. 1988). 
88. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 293 (1987). 
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cannot make victims truly whole for losses of limb and life, those 
losses are very real, and they must be included, ex ante, in damage 
awards in order to induce injurers to exercise optimal care. Once 
an injury occurs, however, monetary damages should be awarded 
only for those injuries that can be redressed by money - the level 
of damages that the victim would buy if she were to insure against 
the injury in question.s9 
In practice, this makes it all but impossible for the law of acci­
dents to fix damage awards at the proper level, so long as victims 
receive the damages actually awarded by courts. If those damages 
are pitched at the level appropriate to the deterrence of wrongful 
risk imposition, victims will be overcompensated for their injuries. 
If they are pitched at the level appropriate to compensate victims 
for their injuries, injurers will be insufficiently deterred. In theory, 
however, this is a problem that negligence can solve, but strict lia­
bility cannot: 
Under a perfectly functioning negligence rule . . .  the socially ideal 
outcome can be achieved, since under that rule injurers will always 
take due care and never be found negligent; hence victims will bear 
their losses and can and will optimally insure for amounts less than 
what injurers would have to pay were they liable.9° 
There is a familiar lesson in all of this: just as optimal accident 
prevention requires joint victim and injurer precautions, so, too, op­
timal accident compensation requires coordinated victim and in­
jurer activity. To achieve optimal accident prevention, injurers 
must be liable for the full costs of their carelessness. To achieve 
optimal loss spreading, victims must be responsible for insuring 
against any losses they might suffer. Even under ideal conditions, 
this delicate division of labor between, and coordination among, in-
89. The statement in the text comes close to being a representative position in law and 
economics, but it may not represent anyone's views exactly. Professor Shaven, for example, 
argues that optimal compensation usually requires that damages be awarded only for pecuni­
ary losses, but notes that nonpecuniary damages are desirable when injury increases the mar­
ginal utility of money and that injurers need to internalize both pecuniary and non pecuniary 
losses to achieve optimal deterrence. See id. at 23-32. By contrast, Alan Schwartz argues 
that the tort system supplies more insurance than is optimal, because it awards compensation 
for pain and suffering even though consumers would not purchase insurance against these 
"losses" because "dollars cannot erase pain." Schwartz, supra note 7, at 825; see also George 
L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, J. 
EcoN. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 31, 44-48. Steven Croley and Jon Hanson argue that the tort 
damages may be evidence of unmet market demand for pain-and-suffering insurance and 
advocate awarding compensation for all injuries that increase the victim's marginal utility for 
money. See Croley & Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents, supra note 7. 
90. SHA VELL, supra note 88, at 232 n.4. In practice, of course, findings of negligence do 
occur, and thus the "optimal outcome cannot be achieved because victims will in fact receive 
awards." Id. Those awards will be too high for insurance purposes. 
March 1997] Enterprise Liability 1295 
jurers and victims is incompatible with the structure of strict liabil­
ity doctrine. The basic thrusts of the efficiency norm and the 
structure of strict liability entitlements sit uncomfortably with one 
another. 
In short, there is reason to believe that the overall structure of 
enterprise liability doctrine, like strict liability generally, does not 
exhibit the features of an efficiency-driven doctrine. On their face, 
enterprise liability doctrines ignore optimal precaution concerns in 
both directions - that is, both in their definitions of the boundaries 
of liability and in their recognition of defenses. And strict liability 
cannot be reconciled, even in theory, with the pursuit of optimal 
loss spreading. This triple departure from the implications of effi­
ciency, and the overall structure responsible for it, gives us reason 
to pause before subscribing to the economic justification of enter­
prise liability. 
IV. MORAL THEORY AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
If the reigning economic theory of enterprise liability fails to fit 
the legal phenomenon hand and glove, the prevailing moral theo­
ries of tort liability fare even more poorly. These theories fit the 
structure of enterprise liability law even worse than economic theo­
ries do. The reigning version of social contract theory, for example, 
has made nonreciprocity of risk the touchstone for the imposition 
of strict liability, yet the risks to which such liability applies are 
more reciprocal than not.91 So, too, the reciprocity criterion directs 
our attention to the distribution of risk between the affected par­
ties, whereas the enterprise liability principle of fairness directs our 
attention to the distribution of (the financial costs of) harm. While 
these disjunctions between theory and doctrine are particular to 
Fletcher's version of social contract theory, the disjunction itself is 
general. Richard Epstein's corrective justice theory of strict liabil­
ity is no more attuned to the logic of enterprise liability law than is 
Fletcher's social contract conception.92 
91. Although I believe that a detailed examination of the relevant cases and black-letter 
law would support this claim, I shall not undertake such an examination here. For present 
purposes, it will do to observe that neither George Fletcher nor Charles Fried, the primary 
proponents of reciprocity theory in the past thirty years, have argued that enterprise liability 
should be imposed in the areas of vicarious liability and manufacturing defects, and in certain 
cases involving abnormally dangerous activities, such as Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765, 
770 (Iowa 1964), and Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wash. 1972), because those 
areas or cases are marked by the nonreciprocity of risk. The only exception to this general­
ization is product injuries to bystanders. See FLETCHER, supra note 14; FRIED, supra note 15, 
at 194-99. 
92. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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The fact that their theories fit enterprise liability doctrine poorly 
is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, reason that moral theo­
rists have been unable to exploit the interpretive weaknesses in the 
economic account of enterprise liability law. By and large, these 
theorists have been disinclined to exploit the opening. They have 
believed either that enterprise liability is normatively suspect, or 
that special economic principles apply to the domain of activity lia­
bility. Ernest Weinrib's work illustrates the suspicion that enter­
prise liability is normatively indefensible.93 George Fletcher's 
important work in the social contract tradition, and Jules Coleman's 
influential work in the rational choice tradition, exemplify the con­
viction that noneconomic principles apply to enterprise liability.94 
For the most part, I hope to address these doubts by showing 
that a powerful idea of fairness underlies enterprise liability law, an 
idea that looks to what enterprises have done and might do, not to 
who they are. I also hope to show that this conception of fairness, 
far from being alien to social contract theory, has a place in the 
family of principles that social contract theory takes to govern tort 
law. The belief that principles of contract law or economic effi­
ciency should govern circumstances when the parties have preexist­
ing contractual relationships with one another, even though 
fundamentally different principles should control accidents among 
strangers must, however, be addressed head on.95 That view is both 
widespread and infiuential.96 Taken seriously, it is capable of con-
93. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
94. Fletcher believes that either bargaining or market relationships make the application 
of social contract theory problematic and so conceives of his theory as one applicable to 
accidents among strangers. He writes that "the market relationship between the manufac­
turer and the consumer [in product accidents] . . .  chang[es] the question of fairness posed by 
imposing liability." Fletcher, supra note 13, at 544 n.24. Fletcher's specific reason is that this 
market relationship makes "loss-shifting in products-liability cases . • .  a mechanism of insur­
ance." Id. Later, he says that Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), is 
"not entirely apt for my theory. The existence of a bargaining relationship between the de­
fendant and the plaintiff poses the market adjustment problems raised in note 24 supra." 
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 546 n.38. For his part, Coleman writes: "There seems to me to be 
a case for treating products liability on the contract model even if there isn't the same argu­
ment for treating all of tort law in that way." JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 418-
19 (1992). 
95. As I have implied in passing, contractual relationships between victims and injurers 
might take either of two forms: they might be market relationships or bargaining relation­
ships. The relationships between product manufacturers and consumers are market relation­
ships; the relationship between the drydock and the Coast Guard, for example, was a 
bargaining one. For a succinct economic exposition of the differences between bargaining 
and markets, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 1 1  J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). In one 
sense, Cooler's whole article is a commentary on this distinction. For a brief, clear statement 
of the distinction, however, see id. at 15-20. 
96. Prominent proponents of the view, in addition to Coleman and Fletcher, include lib­
ertarians and several different kinds of economists. Richard Epstein endorses a regime of 
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suming enterprise liability law.97 Market relationships are present 
in one of the core cases of enterprise liability (namely, manufactur­
ing defects) and bargaining is a live alternative to tort liability in 
innumerable cases of strict liability. Some of those cases, including 
Rylands and Bushey, are central to enterprise liability. Kantian so­
cial contract theory firmly rejects the idea that contract law can be 
charged with fixing basic tort duties, because it takes the matters at 
hand to be matters of justice, properly settled not by the coercive 
power conferred by bargaining position, but by the " 'peculiar com­
pulsion of the better argument.' "98 The position adopted by Kant­
ian social contract theory appears poorly understood in the 
strict liability for accidents among strangers and no liability (contract) for accidents among 
parties in bargaining or market relationships with one another. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 101 (1995); see also id. at 91-111. This is, I believe, a 
logical position for a libertarian to take. Robert Nozick's views have a roughly similar struc­
ture, although they make more room for the enterprise liability principle of fairness. See 
NOZICK, supra note 18; supra note 20 (quoting Nozick). Two different strands of law and 
economics endorse contract as an alternative to enterprise liability. One strand, represented 
by Alan Schwartz's work in product liability law, embraces contract for reasons rooted in its 
views of efficient markets. See Schwartz, supra note 7. Another strand, growing out of 
Coase's work on bargaining, embraces contract because it believes that private bargains are 
more likely to reach efficient results than governmentally-imposed solutions. See infra note 
101 and accompanying text. Even Croley and Hanson, who specifically reject the claim that 
product accidents should be handled by a regime of free contract rather than a regime of 
enterprise liability, accept the proposition that, absent market failures, contract is generally 
more efficient than tort. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: 
The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688-89 (1993) ("Other 
things equal, legal economists typically prefer freedom of contract over immutable liability 
standards. By most accounts, an immutable liability rule is justified if and only if it prevents 
some significant negative externality or other market failure." (citation omitted)). There 
may be less to this consensus than meets the eye, however. In another article, Croley and 
Hanson point out that advocates of a regime of "free contract" for product-related risks show 
explicit "distrust of unregulated product markets" in certain respects, Croley & Hanson, The 
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents, supra note 7, at 1808, and that these advocates are quite 
selective in their endorsements of disclaimability. See id. at 1807-09. 
97. Fletcher lucidly explains how Coase's views led to a powerful assault on enterprise 
liability. See FLETCHER, supra note 14. at 162-68. 
98. GEuss, supra note 27, at 72 (quoting JORGEN HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, in W1R­
KLICHKEIT UND REFLEXION: FETSCHRIFT FOR WALTER SCHULZ 240 (1973)). The topic that 
we are touching on is deep and complicated, and I do not mean to imply that Kantian social 
contract theory embraces Habermas's ideal speech situation account of truth for purposes of 
practical reasoning. Rawls makes clear the substantial difference between his "political liber­
alism" and Habermas's more "metaphysical" doctrine in his Reply to Habermas. John Rawls, 
Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995). My point is simply that Kantian social contract 
theory accepts the proposition that something like the "weight of the relevant reasons" deter­
mines whether an arrangement is just, and this favors settling questions of justice by weighing 
the relevant reasons. In the context at hand, this recommends tort law over contract law. The 
idea that disagreements should be settled not by the balance of bargaining power, but by the 
balance of reasons, is not only recognized by economists, it is accepted by them as the ideal 
that should govern scholarly argument. See, e.g., Stephen Figlewski, Remembering Fischer 
Black, J. DERIVATIVES, Winter 1995, at 94, 96. Figlewski writes: 
Fischer • • .  was not "a political person" . . .  and "refused to be swayed by sheer political 
power." "Nobody had any bargaining power with Fischer," one person told me. What 
he thought was important was to "build the most truthful model you could, even if you 
couldn't solve it analytically or accurately." He "reinvigorated your sense that it was 
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contemporary legal academy, even though it is familiar in contem­
porary philosophy, and consistent with a long tradition of liberal 
political thought and practice, including the practice of modem tort 
law. 
A. Why Not Contract? 
Stripped of its subtleties, the argument that different principles 
ought to apply to risks embedded in market or bargaining relation­
ships among the affected parties is an argument for freedom of con­
tract. Proponents of this view agree that the parties to particular 
risk impositions ought to be free to choose the terms on which 
those risks are imposed. Freedom of contract, pronounced dead 
not so very long ago,99 is now very much alive and well. Newly 
powerful currents of libertarian and economic thought now con­
verge in its support. Libertarians see the market as the institutional 
mechanism that builds individual consent into every arrangement. 
As buyers, sellers, and bargainers, persons are free to decide what 
risks to bear and what obligations to accept. Legal economists see 
the market as the best institutional mechanism for the optimization 
of welfare. In the absence of transaction costs, participants will 
trade with each other until there are no more mutually beneficial 
trades to make. There will, then, be no social state that is Pareto­
superior to the one achieved through free market exchange. Free­
dom and utility, efficiency and consent, both converge on the desir­
ability of freedom of contract.100 
As this view is articulated in the language and conceptual frame­
work of law and economics, it both subordinates tort to contract 
important to do the right thing and concentrate on quality even if people around you 
sometimes didn't appreciate it." 
Id. What economics denies is that this ideal applies to the domain of what Kantians call 
"practical reason." 
99. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
100. For a representative statement of the convergence from a libertarian perspective, see 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI· 
NATION LAWS, 25, 23 (1992) (arguing that, in a regime of freedom of contract, "the consent of 
both parties guarantees that the transaction works to their common benefit" and that 
"[t]here are powerful functional reasons to believe that the overall social consequences will 
be improved as well"). For a representative statement from a mainstream law and economics 
perspective, see Robert Cooter, Torts As the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on 
Causation, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 523, 544-50 (1987). For a typical invocation of both 
grounds in an applied economic analysis of tort rules, see Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Prod· 
ucts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357 (1988) ("The consumer 
sovereignty norm may govern cases of both actual and hypothetical consent. In the former 
case, well-informed, uncoerced consumers actually consent to particular contract clauses. 
The consumer sovereignty norm uncontroversially supports enforcement of these clauses; the 
various moral theories to which Americans adhere respect truly consensual arrangements."). 
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and makes tort parasitic
' 
on contract. The view subordinates tort to 
contract by asserting that, when bargaining is possible, the law 
should confine itself to specifying an initial allocation of property 
rights and tort duties - an allocation that minimizes transaction 
costs - and grant to the affected parties the authority to bargain to 
a different final allocation, if they so desire.101 It makes tort para­
sitic on contract by asserting that, when transaction costs are high, 
the law should impose the solution that the parties would have 
agreed upon, had transaction costs been low. 
The challenge mounted by this view is clear: Why impose strict 
liability in Bushey? Why do so in Rylands? Why not let these 
losses fall where they lie, unless the parties themselves agree other­
wise? Why not stick with a contractual regime of no liability for 
product accidents? Why not, at the very least, permit the affected 
parties to alter the relevant liability rule by contractual agreement? 
This view raises a host of questions.102 At present, what needs to be 
explained is why Kantian social contract theory rejects the liberta-
101. As Cooter asserts: 
The basic idea of the [Coase] theorem is that the structure of the law which assigns 
property rights and liability does not matter so long as transaction costs are nil; bargain­
ing will result in an efficient outcome no matter who bears the burden of liability. The 
conclusion may be drawn that the structure of law should be chosen so that transaction 
costs are minimized, because this will conserve resources used up by the bargaining pro­
cess and also promote efficient outcomes in the bargaining itself. 
Cooter, supra note 95, at 14. In the footnote to this passage, Cooter observes that this is "a 
theme in Richard Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)." Id. at 14 n.11. 
Coasean arguments appear to be one source of George Fletcher's hesitation about the exten­
sion of social contract arguments to market and bargaining relationships. See supra note 94 
and accompanying text. The other source of hesitation appears to be the essentially Aristote­
lian belief that when tort law uses market mechanisms to disperse the costs of accidents, it 
impermissibly mingles distributive justice with corrective justice. This belief is strongly and 
clearly expressed in WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 74-75 ("Expressed in the terms of Aristotle's 
analysis, the difficulty is that the introduction of loss-spreading into tort law mixes corrective 
and distributive justice . . . .  [S]ince coherence consists in having a legal relationship reflect 
one of the forms of justice, loss-spreading as a tort doctrine is incoherent."). 
102. For one thing, the surface clarity, and apparent simplicity, of these questions con­
ceals a deep conceptual puzzle over the proper specification of initial entitlements. The 
thought that the decision should be left to the parties to resolve as they see fit does not 
explain which initial specification of rights and obligations is correct. Contract is a device for 
altering rights and obligations, and it therefore presupposes some initial assignment of entitle­
ments - some specification of property rights, liability rules, and contractual norms for their 
alteration. Which initial specification of entitlements, if any, is correct? What is the ground 
on which it is correct? The efficiency norm seems to require an answer instead of supplying 
one. These issues are discussed in Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and 
Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). Their work follows Robert L. Hale, 
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). From a slightly 
different angle, these issues are raised by Ronald Dworkin's criticism of Richard Posner's 
wealth-maximizing criterion for the assignment of legal entitlement. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251-55 (1985). I am not sure that con­
vincing economic answers can be given to the criticisms offered by Kennedy, Michelman, and 
Dworkin, but I am not pressing them here. 
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rian argument that respect for individual freedom requires freedom 
of contract, and endorses nondisclaimable tort duties as the appro­
priate institutional expression of such respect.103 
Paradoxically, perhaps, Kantian social contract theory under­
writes the nondisclaimability of tort duties because it believes that 
certain forms of liberty are the preeminent social and political good 
for persons concerned with leading their own lives in accordance 
with their aspirations. The forms of liberty necessary for each citi­
zen of a modem industrial democracy to have reasonably favorable 
circumstances for leading her life in accordance with her aspirations 
are plural. Perhaps more importantly, these liberties conflict with 
one another: just as freedom of contract can conflict with precondi­
tions of a free market by restraining trade, so, too, freedom of ex­
pression can conflict with privacy, and freedom of action can 
conflict with security.104 
On a social contract conception, then, a basic task of principles 
of justice, and the institutions that they govern, is to reconcile con­
flicting liberties in a way that secures, for each person, the most 
favorable circumstances for her to realize her conception of the 
good over a complete life, consistent with a like freedom for others. 
To specify appropriate principles of justice, social contract theory 
introduces the idea of a social contract: an agreement among free 
and equal citizens governing their basic social and political relation­
ships with one another. Because the parties to the social contract 
are represented solely as free and equal democratic citizens, they 
are uniquely well positioned to agree upon principles of justice that 
secure for such citizens the most favorable circumstances for realiz-
103. I previously offered a different set of reasons in support of nondisclaimability. See 
Keating, supra note 57, at 342-46. The issue is approached from a slightly different angle 
here, and the reasons offered are commensurately different. The two sets of reasons are, 
however, complementary. 
104. By enabling some transactions and foreclosing others, contracts both create and de­
stroy market freedom. This paradox is the source of the famous "rule of reason" applied to 
the first section of the Sherman Antitrust Act. That section states that every contract in 
restraint of trade shall be void. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Because virtually all contracts 
restrain trade, the courts have construed the provision to forbid only "unreasonable" re­
straints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64-65, 68 (1911). As 
Justice Brandeis noted: 
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to re­
strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed 
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.); see also 
WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS, III, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: POLICY AND PRAC· 
TICE 19 (1992); PmLLIP AREEDA & LoUIS KAPLOW. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 202-03 {1988). 
On the conflict between freedom of expression and privacy, see generally Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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ing their conceptions of the good. By contrast, the actual agree­
ments and actual consent favored by libertarianism are far too 
likely to reflect not the freedom and equality of democratic citizens, 
but the vast inequalities of wealth, power and privilege that charac­
terize existing institutions. Only a hypothetical agreement can hope 
to escape the distorting influence of these inequalities.1os 
To be sure, this paper does not attempt to use a device like 
Rawls' original position to select appropriate liability rules. It does 
not, for example, ask what liability rules the parties to an original 
position would adopt at the legislative stage of their delibera­
tions.106 The article's aims are "interpretive" in Ronald Dworkin's 
sense of the word - it proposes to "fit and justify" most aspects of 
existing legal doctrine (and to criticize some aspects of that doctrine 
as mistaken).107 It thus uses the apparatus of social contract theory 
to guide its interpretive efforts.10s When we bring the ideas ex­
plained in the preceding paragraphs to bear on our present con­
cerns, the principal lesson that we take from them is that the basic 
questions of tort liability are matters of justice, properly settled by 
the persuasive force of the relevant reasons of justice. 
Kantian social contract theory thus favors tort over contract be­
cause questions of justice are at stake. Freedom of action and se­
curity are essential liberties, central both to our interests and our 
status as free and equal persons. Their protection by concrete legal 
duties governing the imposition of risks of physical injury and death 
ought to reflect both their central importance to our personhood, 
and our fundamental equality as persons. The proper reconciliation 
of the conflicting claims of freedom of action and security for a plu­
rality of persons is thus a question of justice. It is a question of 
what claims free and equal persons, engaged in mutually beneficial, 
but risky, activities, may assert against one another. 
105. See JoHN RAWLS, The Basic Structure As Subject, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM 257 
(1993); Thomas Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, in READING NozicK: Es. 
SAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 107 (Jeffrey Paul ed., 1981). 
106. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 198 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JusncE) (discussing the legislative stage of the parties' deliberation); RAWLS, The Priority 
of Right and Ideas of the Good, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 105, at 184. 
107. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 139, 230-31, 239, 255, 257, 410-11 (1986) (dis­
cussing fit and justification in an interpretive conception of law). For a discussion of 
Dworkin's criteria of fit and justification and their connection with the principle of fidelity to 
preexisting law, see Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of 
Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21-55 (1993). 
108. For discussion of this use of Rawls' view, see Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism 
and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 619, 659-68 
(1994). 
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Because the reconciliation of the claims of freedom of action 
and security is a question of justice, its proper resolution depends 
on the strength of the competing claims of freedom of action and 
security as a matter public moral reason, not on the bargaining 
strengths of the affected parties, or on the comparative intensity of 
their preferences for their own welfare. The deepest wish of 
democracy, as Kantian social contract theory understands it, is to 
found political authority on the shared reason and public agree­
ment of free and equal persons.109 Contract in its bargaining form 
makes the balance between freedom of action and security far too 
dependent on shrewdness, negotiating skill, and the preexisting dis­
tribution of wealth, power, and legal entitlements. Contract in its 
market form also allows forms of market power to shape the con­
tours of freedom of action and security. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, it makes the reconciliation of these two fundamental in­
terests tum on the balance of consumers' preferences for their own 
welfare. In both forms, contract makes the balance of these liber­
ties a private matter. Only tort makes the contours of those liber­
ties both tum on the strength of the relevant reasons for or against 
their specification in certain ways, and a matter of public right.Ho 
B. Liberty, Security, and Bargains 
In its endorsement of tort over contract, Kantian social contract 
theory displays its credentials as a distinctively "democratic" form 
of social contract theory. Following Rousseau, democratic social 
contract theory holds that the basic institutions of civil society -
including the law of tort, contract and property - must be "part of 
the subject matter of the social contract, rather than . . .  part of its 
background."111 Those institutions must themselves embody the 
109. See Keating, supra note 107, at 55 & 19 n.46. 
110. To say the least, tort does not perfectly realize the aim of making the reconciliation 
of freedom of action and security a matter of public reason, rather than power or preference. 
If nothing else, the requirement of fidelity to imperfectly just preexisting law ensures this. 
See Keating, supra note 107, at 21-25. But the issue is not the "absolute" merits of tort, but 
the comparative merits of tort - whether tort is to be preferred to contract as a device for 
specifying the balance between the competing claims of freedom of action and security. 
Speaking comparatively, the critical point is that tort has the correct aspirations, whereas 
contract does not. Tort aims to make the contours of freedom of action and security tum on 
the strength of the relevant moral reasons. Contract does not. 
111. Joshua Cohen, Structure, Choice, and Legitimacy: Locke's Theory of the State, 15 
PHIL. & Pun. A.FF. 301, 323 (1986). Locke, by contrast, took the distribution of property 
entitlement as part of the background to the social contract. The connection between this 
understanding of one of Rousseau's central aims and Rawls' enterprise in A Theory of Justice 
should be clear. The parties in Rawls' original position are represented solely as free and 
equal democratic citizens, and they "bargain" about the basic structure of society. My aim in 
these remarks is not to assert the rightness of a particular reading of Rousseau, much less to 
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freedom and equality of democratic citizens. Because they must, 
their terms cannot be fixed by actual, as opposed to hypothetical, 
bargains. The outcomes achieved through bargaining depend on 
the relative positions of the bargainers outside - independent of 
and prior to - the bargain. Outcomes depend, among other things, 
on the antecedent distribution of wealth and legal entitlement, and 
on the relative skill and shrewdness of the parties. For example, if 
the parties in Rylands were to bargain over the liability rule gov­
erning their relationship, the initial assignment of the relevant legal 
entitlement - the initial choice of the liability rule governing non­
negligent flooding of land - would profoundly affect the ultimate 
outcome. Permitting parties to bargain over the contours of secur­
ity and freedom of action, then, would make the contours of those 
basic liberties turn, not on the freedom and equality of the parties 
as democratic citizens, but on the preexisting distribution of wealth, 
legal entitlement, shrewdness, skill, and so on. 
Put differently, the contours of liberties such as freedom of ac­
tion and security are not properly settled by bargaining, because the 
contours of those liberties should turn on only our best understand­
ing of what the freedom and equality of democratic citizens re­
quires them to be. The basic duties of care that citizens owe to one 
another are matters to be settled by "public deliberation among 
equals."112 Rather than being determined by bargains, properly 
specified tort rights and duties ought to be one of the things that 
democratic citizens bring to the bargaining table. The fair specifica­
tion of rights and duties sets the background against which free bar­
gaining among equals is legitimate. Within a just framework, 
persons are generally free to bargain with each other, so long as 
they respect the constraints of justice. The constraints themselves, 
however, must be the product of reason, not power.113 
This ·view vindicates the position taken by Judge Friendly in 
Bushey against the kinds of criticisms that economists and libertar­
ians might press. The precise ruling of Bushey offends freedom of 
contract because of the way that it fixes the boundaries of vicarious 
liability. Instead of setting the parties free to fix the boundaries of 
vicarious liability as they see fit, Bushey fixes those boundaries by 
appealing to an idea of fairness. That offense, however, is limited. 
argue for that reading. My aim is to explain one aspect of his significance for democratic 
social contract theory. 
112. Id. at 324 (discussing Rousseau's approach to the features of the social order). 
113. For development of the general framework of which these ideas are an extension, 
see RAWLS, The Basic Structure as Subject, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 105, at 257. 
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Bushey allocates the costs of an accident that the parties did not 
foresee, and for which they did not expressly provide. In the ab­
sence of such agreement, Friendly takes the law to require that fi­
nancial responsibility for that accident be allocated fairly. Whether 
or not this is the optimal solution from an economic perspective, it 
provides a default rule in a circumstance when one must be sup­
plied. Bushey's deep offense to freedom of contract thus lies else­
where. Under prevailing tort doctrine, the parties to the accident 
are not free to alter the boundaries of vicarious liability - to alter 
the default rule - by bargaining among themselves. 
Expressed economically, the intuitive force of the case for free 
contract is this: drydocks and shipowners subject to the rule of 
Bushey have good reason to reallocate the burdens of precaution 
against such accidents by agreeing that drydock owners should in­
stall automatic locks on the valves that control the flooding of their 
docks. Making such agreements lowers their joint precaution costs, 
and the parties can pocket the money that they save. Because both 
parties stand to benefit from reallocating the burdens of precaution, 
economists bridle at the thought that such a deal might be 
forbidden.114 
If this is the point of the argument, however, the view of nondis­
claimable duties that it expresses is mistaken. Neither the law in 
general, nor the opinion in Bushey, forbids such a deal. Properly 
specified tort rights do not disable all contractual rearrangement of 
burdens of precaution. To the contrary, they leave parties pre­
sumptively free to reallocate burdens of precaution as they see fit. 
Unless we have reason to believe a particular reallocation substan­
tively unreasonable, or unfair to third parties, there is no reason to 
object to it. No such unreasonableness or unfairness is apparent in 
the reallocation that we are now considering. Indeed, the efficiency 
advantages of such a reallocation provide a perfectly good reason 
for undertaking it. 
What the law of accidents does by making its duties nondis­
claimable is to disable private parties from reallocating burdens of 
precaution by rewriting the law of torts. With certain exceptions not 
relevant here, the power to alter tort rights is held by courts and 
legislatures, not by private parties. This is hardly tantamount to dis-
114. See Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
481, 495 (1996) ("This is simply an instance of the general proposition that whenever a given 
rule would increase the total size of the 'pie' . . .  both parties would benefit by adopting that 
rule." (citations omitted)). Craswell is discussing a different set of circumstances, of course, 
but that only underscores the general applicability of the proposition. 
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abling all mutually beneficial reallocations of duties. Although the 
parties are disabled from legislatively altering tort duties, they are 
free to bargain within the framework, and with the entitlements 
conferred upon them by such duties. Shipowners may not waive 
their liability for accidents occasioned by their sailors' drunkenness, 
but they may pay drydocks to install automatic locks. Rather than 
disabling bargains, the nondisclaimable character of tort duties en­
ables them by fixing a definite framework within which bargaining 
can take place. Beyond that, nondisclaimability makes tort duties 
one of the things that determines the balance of bargaining power. 
By fixing tort duties fairly, the law distributes one kind of bargain­
ing power fairly and acknowledges that considerations of fairness 
take priority over those of efficiency. 
C. Liberty, Security, and Markets 
If contract in its bargaining form fails because it makes tort du­
ties wrongly dependent on bargaining skill and power, contract in 
its market form fails in a related way. Markets make the contours 
of basic liberties depend on critical masses of expressed consumer 
taste and on various constraints of efficient production. The con­
figurations of consumer preferences responded to by product mar­
kets and the constraints of efficient industrial organization, are, 
however, irrelevant to the basic liberties of democratic citizens and 
should not be allowed to defermine their contours. This is so for at 
least three reasons. First, consumers' subjective preferences for 
their own welfare are not the proper metric of interpersonal com­
parison when the competing claims of freedom of action and secur­
ity, for a p lurality of p ersons who hold divers e  and 
incommensurable conceptions of the good, are at stake. These 
competing claims must be reconciled in a way that reflects the ob­
jective importance of the interests at stake to the pursuit of concep­
tions of the good, not the balance of the affected parties' subjective 
preferences for their own welfare.115 Second, consumers' prefer­
ences for the safety of the products that they purchase are generally 
imperfectly informed. Rarely, if ever, are consumers perfectly ap­
prised of the risks of the products that they buy, the precautions 
that might reduce those risks, and the costs and benefits of those 
precautions. Under a regime of free contract, poor information not 
only undermines the freedom with which consumers subject them-
115. The case for the objective valuation of the interests at stake in accidental risk impo­
sition and against the subjective valuation of such interests is developed in Keating, supra 
note 57, at 367-73. 
1306 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 95:1266 
selves to risks, it also undermines the security of others. A regime 
of free contract puts the security and freedom of some consumers at 
the mercy of other consumers' knowledge of product risks. By 
making the freedom and security of some individuals dependent 
upon the chance that others will be well informed and rational, a 
regime of free contractual allocation of risk makes the protection of 
each person's basic interests largely a matter of luck. 
The influence of luck cannot always be avoided, and tort law 
does not completely avoid it. Under a tort regime for product acci­
dents, a particular plaintiff's chance of prevailing will be affected by 
the relative skills of the attorneys, the knowledge and preconcep­
tions of the judge who hears the case, the luck of the draw in jury 
selection, and so on. Nonetheless, the choice of a tort regime over a 
contract one can nonetheless diminish the role of luck. By allowing 
the information of some consumers to affect the level of product 
safety available to others, compared with a tort regime, a regime of 
free contract increases the role of luck in the regulation of product 
accidents. Moreover, a regime of free contract makes luck a legiti­
mate ground for the regulation of product safety. In such a regime, 
consumers are free to inform themselves only as much as they 
choose, and consumers and producers alike are free to disregard 
the effects that some poorly informed consumers may have on 
others. 
Third, the particular configurations of expressed preferences to 
which producers respond are determined by the constraints of effi­
cient industrial organization.116 Many of these constraints must be 
accepted as limitations on the possibilities open to the common law 
in its efforts to control product risks. The law cannot, for example, 
simply insist on perfect customization. The particular constraint 
stressed above117 - the way in which the expressed preferences of 
some consumers affect the level of safety available to other con­
sumers - is not, however, unavoidable in this way. That effect is 
far more prominent under a contract regime for the allocation of 
product risks than it is under a tort regime. A tort regime can em-
116. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110. It is not the case that each consumer's 
preferences will affect the level of safety available to others, because it will prove inefficient 
to satisfy certain preferences. See Schwartz, supra note 100, at 372 ("Some consumers proba­
bly want planes with couches and amphibious cars, and are the victims of unequal bargaining 
power in the sense that too few such consumers exist to make serving them in these ways 
profitable."). Preferences that are not part of a critical mass of like preferences therefore will 
not affect product design. 
117. See supra section IV.C. 
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body and effect collective judgments about the appropriate level of 
product safety. 
This is a difference that matters. It is undesirable for some peo­
ple's subjective preferences for their own welfare to affect the se­
curity or freedom of others, especially if those preferences are 
poorly informed and imperfectly rational.118 A regime of free con­
tract, however, makes just that connection: if a critical mass of con­
sumers is imperfectly informed, or if their preferences for product 
safety do not reflect the objective importance of the interests at 
stake, or if those consumers are imperfectly rational, actual prod­
ucts will not exhibit a level of safety appropriate to the magnitude 
and probability of the risks that they create. There is, moreover, 
nothing in a regime of free contract that will tend to make consum­
ers' subjective preferences conform to the correct objective evalua­
tion of the interests at stake. A regime of tort, by contrast, asks 
judges and juries to make that very evaluation. 
In short, the risks of product accidents are not personal but in­
terpersonal; the interests at stake are matters of justice and equal 
right; and the proper form of valuation for those interests is objec­
tive not subjective. Product accidents must therefore be governed 
by tort not contract, and by the principles of fairness or mutual ben­
efit applicable to interpersonal risk impositions, not by the princi­
ples of individual freedom applicable to the risks that persons 
impose on themselves alone. 
Put in a slightly different way, the point is that markets are insti­
tutions for the maximization of individual welfare. Within markets, 
persons may legitimately pursue their own individual welfare as 
they conceive it. The problems of product accidents are problems 
of freedom and responsibility - freedom to impose risks of injury 
and death on others, freedom from the infliction of accidental in­
jury by others, and responsibility for accidental harm to other�. The 
institutional task presented by the problem of product accidents is 
thus not how best to pursue our own welfare, but how to define our 
rights against, and responsibilities towards, each other with respect 
to risks of personal injury and death. This is a task for - indeed the 
task of - tort law. 
The time has come to take our legal doctrine, and the rhetoric 
that justifies that doctrine, seriously. The time has come not to 
challenge them, but to accept the challenge that they present to us 
- the challenge of constructing, if we can, a theory that does justice 
118. See Keating, supra note 57, at 369-73. 
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to the complexity of our practices. To begin that task, we must re­
construct the social contract tradition in tort law. And to begin that 
reconstruction, we must first pin down the interpretive puzzle we 
face, and second explain how social contract theory conceives of 
problems of accidental harm. 
V. RECONSTRUCTING SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
A. The Interpretive Challenge 
The gravamen of the complaint that I have lodged against the 
economic account of enterprise liability is that the thrust of the effi­
ciency norm, with its emphasis on optimal coordination of injurer 
and victim conduct, sits uneasily with the structure of enterprise lia­
bility entitlements. Enterprise liability doctrine is out of step with 
optimal precaution concerns both in its definition of the boundaries 
of liability, and in its recognition of defenses to liability. It is even 
more out of step with optimal loss spreading concerns. For enter­
prise liability (or any other form of strict liability) to achieve opti­
mal loss spreading, damage awards must be pitched at the 
deterrence level for negligently inflicted harms and at the insurance 
level for nonnegligently inflicted harms. Doing this, however, con­
verts strict liability into an echo of negligence liability. 
The structure of enterprise liability doctrine is one of three as­
pects of that body of law that frame the interpretive challenge fac­
ing Kantian social contract theory. The others are the contrast 
between negligence and enterprise liability and the location of en­
terprise liability within accident law as a whole. The fundamental 
contrast between enterprise and negligence liability is the contrast 
between "fault" and "conditional fault": Under enterprise liability, 
the payment of damages to those injured by the characteristic risks 
of an activity is a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activ­
ity.119 Under negligence liability, the payment of damages is a mat-
119. Legal doctrine and rhetoric often come very close to putting the matter this way. 
For example, a leading case on abnormally dangerous activity liability explains that under 
strict liability "the question is not whether the activity threatens such harm that it should not 
be continued. The question is who shall pay for harm that has been done." Koos v. Roth, 
652 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Or. 1982) (footnote omitted). An earlier case explains the basis of 
abnormally dangerous activity liability in language that comes even closer to the language of 
conditional fault embraced in this article: "The element of fault, if it can be called that, lies in 
the deliberate choice by the defendant to inflict a high degree of risk upon his neighbor, even 
though utmost care is observed in so doing." Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 317 (Or. 1961). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts observes that 
[t]he utility of [the injurer's] conduct may be such that he is socially justified in proceed­
ing with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it 
be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers 
harm as a result of it. 
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ter of redress for the wrongful infringement of the property and 
physical integrity of others.120 
Enterprise liability thus attaches to risks whose imposition 
should not have been prevented. This is, in fact, the precise point 
of Bushey. The Coast Guard did not act wrongfully when it chose 
to use the Tamaroa as a berth, or when it granted Seamen Lane the 
freedom to go ashore. It acted wrongfully only when it refused to 
accept financial responsibility for the harm occasioned by Seaman 
Lane's misadventure. Thus the challenge presented by the contrast 
between negligence liability and enterprise liability is to explain 
why it is: (1) fair for certain kinds of actors (enterprises) to (2) 
impose certain kinds of risks (ones "characteristic" of their activi­
ties) only if (3) they compensate those injured by accidents issuing 
from the imposition of those risks, even though ( 4) the imposition 
of those risks is not itself wrongful. 
The location of enterprise liability within accident law presents a 
different challenge. Here, the challenge is to show that the norma­
tive conceptions that justify negligence liability in some circum-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977) (discussing abnormally dangerous 
activities). 
120. This characterization of the essential difference between negligence and enterprise 
liability owes much to both Robert Keeton and Jules Coleman. The debt to Keeton is 
straightfonvard - I think that enterprise liability is a kind of "conditional fault" in Keeton's 
sense of the term. See Keeton, supra note 38. The debt to Coleman is more complex. 
Coleman distinguishes "three ways in which the justifiability of an agent's conduct can relate 
to his victim's claim to repair." COLEMAN, supra note 94, at 291. The view of negligence 
damages taken in the text corresponds to the first of Coleman's "ways," as I understand it. 
The view of enterprise liability taken in the text is very close to Coleman's third "way." 
Coleman writes: 
On [some] occasions, an injurer's conduct is justifiable only if the injurer pays compensa­
tion for whatever losses his conduct occasions. In such cases the rendering of compensa­
tion is a necessary condition of the justifiability or reasonableness of what the agent 
does. In that sense, it helps to right what in its absence would be a wrong. 
COLEMAN, supra note 94, at 291. This is my view of strict liability in general and enterprise 
liability in particular, and this is my understanding of what Judge Keeton means by "condi­
tional fault." 
I am not entirely certain, however, that Coleman would agree that my view of enterprise 
liability fits into his third category. Coleman's second way in which the justifiability of an 
agent's conduct can relate to a victim's right to repair contemplates circumstances when lia­
bility protects an independent property right. Coleman takes Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. 
Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), to be a canonical example of this category. See COLEMAN, 
supra note 94, at 293. Because I believe that property rights are often among the reasons 
why the contours of both strict and enterprise liability take the shape that they do, Coleman 
might conclude that my view straddles his second and third categories. · If so, I think that we 
disagree more about jurisprudence than about tort law. My views of law and legal reasoning 
are essentially Dworkinian, and I therefore think that property rights are often ingredients of 
liability rules - reasons whose "weight" tort Jaw must assess. Coleman's jurisprudential 
views are essentially positivist, and he may therefore believe that tort deliberations take the 
weight of property rights as antecedently given by property law norms. These jurisprudential 
subtleties do nol:, I think, substantially muddy the view of enterprise liability taken in the text 
and amplified in the first paragraph of this footnote. 
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stances also justify enterprise liability in others. Why is it that the 
fair allocation of responsibility for accidental harm among free and 
equal persons requires negligence liability in some circumstances 
and enterprise liability in others? 
George Fletcher's famous argument that the doctrinal division 
of labor between negligence and strict liability tracks reciprocity of 
risk imposition - and rightly so - provides the kind of explana­
tion that we need. Fletcher argued that, when risks are reciprocal 
once due care is exercised, both tort law and social contract theory 
favor negligence liability; when they are not, both tort law and so­
cial contract theory favor strict liability. Reciprocity of risk draws 
its normative power from the fact that it defines a regime of equal 
freedom and mutual benefit. Reciprocity defines a regime of equal 
freedom because reciprocity exists when risks are equal in 
probability and magnitude.121 When risks are equal in these re­
spects, persons relinquish equal amounts of security and gain equal 
amounts of freedom of action. 
As long as reciprocal risks are imposed for reasons that are both 
good (that is, sufficient to justify the diminutions of security that 
they involve) and equally good, reciprocity of risk also defines a 
regime of mutual benefit. Each person benefits when these two 
conditions are met because, for each person, the loss of security 
occasioned by granting to others the right to expose her to risks of a 
certain probability and magnitude is more than offset by the free­
dom of action that a regime of reciprocal risk imposition grants to 
her, namely, the right to impose risks of equal probability and mag­
nitude on others. Perfect reciprocity of risk therefore defines a mu­
tually beneficial regime of equal freedom. When risks are perfectly 
reciprocal, each person's freedom of action is equally benefitted, 
each person's security is equally burdened, and each person gains 
more in the way of freedom than she loses in the way of security. 
When risks are nonreciprocal even if injurers exercise due care, 
Fletcher argues that strict liability does and should apply. The 
nonreciprocity of these risks prevents them from being mutually 
beneficial in the strong sense that the reciprocal risks subject to 
negligence liability are mutually beneficial. Those exposed to 
nonreciprocal risk impositions are not compensated for that expo­
sure by the value of their right to impose equivalent risks. The im­
position of such risks is not part of a normal life, and the value of 
121. This is my own reconstruction of Fletcher's argument. His account is somewhat dif­
ferent. See Keating, supra note 57, at 315. I endorse a version of this idea in the text follow­
ing note 132, infra. 
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the right to impose such risks is consequently less than the cost of 
having to bear exposure to them. The imposition of those risks is 
nonetheless justified, 122 and by ensuring that those injured by them 
are fully compensated for their injuries so far as practicable, strict 
liability restores mutuality of benefit so far as practicable. The 
damages paid under strict liability are, thus, not redress for wrong­
ful infringement of another's security, but a condition for the legiti­
mate conduct of activities whose risks are not mutually beneficial 
even when due care is exercised. 
Fletcher's argument meets all three of the interpretive chal­
lenges set forth at the start of this section. First, it shows why the 
ideals of equal freedom and mutual benefit sometimes lead to negli­
gence liability, and sometimes to strict liability. Negligence is ap­
propriate when risks are, on balance, more mutually beneficial than 
not, so that the freedom to impose such risks on others more than 
compensates for having to bear exposure to equivalent risk imposi­
tions by others. Second, it explains why it is, under certain condi­
tions, wrong for injurers not to compensate the victims of justified 
risk impositions. Strict liability is appropriate when risk impositions 
are justified, but not mutually beneficial in the strong sense that the 
risks subject to negligence liability are. The payment of compensa­
tion for all harms issuing from such risk impositions restores mutu­
ality, so far as practicable. 
Third, Fletcher's account of strict liability explains why the 
boundaries of enterprise liability are properly pitched beyond the 
boundaries of negligence liability. The payment of compensation 
restores mutuality of benefit so far as practicable only if compensa­
tion is paid for all injuries issuing out of the "characteristic" risks of 
an activity. Indeed, in Fletcher's view, nonnegligent injuries are the . 
paradigmatic case of injuries for which compensation must be paid. 
The precise problem that the payment of compensation is meant to 
rectify is the absence of mutuality of benefit once all reasonable 
precautions are taken. 
The ideas of equal freedom and mutual benefit also suggest a 
justification for another aspect of strict liability doctrine - its ten­
dency not to recognize the defense of victim negligence.123 Reliev­
ing victims of the duty to take care for their own protection is 
justified by the fact that nonreciprocal risks are not mutually bene-
122. As far as I can see, Fletcher's argument requires this assumption, although Fletcher 
does not explicitly state or justify it. Presumably risks that are not justified ought to be 
forbidden. 
123. See supra Part III. 
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ficial in the strong sense that reciprocal risks are. Reciprocity the'" 
ory, and the social contract ideal that it instantiates, grounds the 
victim's obligation to exercise care for her own protection in the 
mutually beneficial character of the risks subject to negligence lia­
bility.124 When risks are not reciprocal even after due care has been 
taken, benefit is not mutual, and due care on the part of victims 
cannot fairly be demanded. 
Within its domain, then, reciprocity theory supplies the kind of 
account that we need. It uses the ideals of equal freedom and mu­
tual benefit, and it explains the structural features of strict liability 
that elude economic accounts. The catch is that the domain of reci­
procity theory is not the domain of enterprise liability. If nothing 
else, this narrows and sharpens our challenge: we need to show that 
social contract theory can make room for a form of liability that is 
concerned not with the fair distribution of risk, but with the fair 
distribution of the financial costs of harm. To make that room, we 
must first set out the defining philosophical features of the social 
contract conception of accident law. So doing should allow us both 
to detach social contract theory from the reciprocity of risk crite­
rion, and to grasp the proper place of that criterion within social 
contract theory. 
B. A Fresh Start 
Kantian social contract theory is distinctive in that it under­
stands the problem of accidental injury to be a problem of mutual 
freedom. It conceives of the problem of accidental liarm as a prob­
lem of freedom because it takes the most important feature of 
human (moral) agency to be "the capacity for critically reflective, 
rational self-govemance."12s By virtue of this capacity, we have 
both the ability to, and a fundamental interest in, shaping our lives 
in accordance with some conception of its point. Freedom is the 
social condition that is most critical to the realization of this inter­
est, and Kantian political morality therefore assigns lexical priority 
to those liberties that are essential to the "adequate development 
124. This is the thrust of Bohlen's thought. See Bohlen, supra note 57, at 220, 273-74; cf. 
Priest, supra note 5, at 467 ("Bohlen made clear [that] the legal implication of [his] benefit 
theory is the negligence standard with the contributory negligence and assumption of risk 
defenses." (citation omitted)). 
125. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 149, 174 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1988). 
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and full exercise"126 of our power to make our lives answer to our 
aspirations for them. Social contract theory conceives of the prob­
lem of accidental harm as a problem of mutual freedom because the 
doctrines and principles of accident law reconcile the competing 
claims of a plurality of persons, whose aims and aspirations conflict. 
The liberties at stake in accidental risk impositions are not part 
of the equal basic liberties of Rawls's first principle of justice -
those are liberties against the state - but the liberties protected by 
accident law have an analogous priority over our interests in acquir­
ing wealth and income. It is natural to think that their priority re­
flects the instrumental importance of physical and psychological 
integrity to our personhood. Serious bodily harm threatens the dis­
integration of our personality as well as, and sometimes more than, 
it threatens our physical integrity.127 Speaking instrumentally, we 
might say, with John Stuart Mill, that tort law protects our individ­
ual security, and to that, "an extraordinarily important and impres­
sive kind of utility" attaches. As Mill observed: 
[S]ecurity no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend 
for all our immunity from evil and for the whole value of all and every 
good, beyond the passing moment, since nothing but the gratification 
of the instant could be of any worth to us if we could be deprived of 
everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger 
than ourselves.128 
The priority of tort liberties in Kantian social contract theory 
reflects, in part, the force of Mill's point. However, social contract 
theory explains the force of Mill's point in ways that are neither 
consequentialist, utilitarian, nor instrumentalist. It holds that secur­
ity is, along with freedom of action, a precondition of effective ra­
tional agency. For Kantian social contract theory, the capacity to 
pursue a conception of the good - to act on and from a conception 
of what is worthwhile and valuable in life - is the central feature of 
human moral agency. A substantial measure of security is a pre­
condition of such agency because, without it, persons cannot pursue 
the aims and aspirations whose pursuit gives form and meaning to 
their lives. 
126. RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra 
note 105, at 289, 297. This criterion is one of two governing the identification of the list of 
equal basic liberties. 
127. Cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF TiiE 
WORLD 35 (1985) ("World, self, and voice are lost, or nearly lost, through the intense pain of 
torture • • • •  "); id. at 294-304 (discussing accident law and a tort trial). 
128. JoHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 50 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., The Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. 1971) (1861). 
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One aspect of this break with utilitarian accounts of the urgency 
of security is an insistence that the independent value of each indi­
vidual human life is at stake in the physical and psychological integ­
rity of our persons. Our equal capacity to affirm and pursue 
conceptions of the good makes us sources of claims in our own right 
- free, equal and purposive beings whose lives and aspirations are 
of value in their own right. The interests that ultimately count for 
purposes of political morality are the interests of persons. 
Mill's ostensibly instrumental and utilitarian account of the im­
portance of security fails to capture the independent value of human 
life. The value that it assigns to physical and psychological integrity 
is dependent upon the exceptional utility of security. By making 
individual liberty and integrity parasitic on the general good, Mill's 
account leaves open the possibility that someone might rightly be 
injured whenever others stand to gain more from her injury than 
she stands to lose, taking into account the special urgency of the 
utility on her side of the scales. This denies what Kantian political 
morality asserts - that persons are sources of value in their own 
right. Permitting violations of personal integrity whenever they 
promote overall welfare denies our status as independent sources of 
value. It asserts that our lives have no value except insofar as they 
serve the general good. 
The danger here is not primarily that Mill's utilitarianism, or 
other forms of instrumentalism or consequentialism, will often 
countenance battering or assaulting persons, experimenting on 
them without their consent, or invading their privacy and inflicting 
emotional distress upon them. The harms here are too vivid, the 
conduct too offensive to our sense of justice, for us to acquiesce 
quickly in such conclusions. The danger is more subtle: if we con­
ceive of our claims to freedom and security as dependent upon the 
balance of costs and benefits, we may erode our liberties in a thou­
sand small steps. 
To avoid such erosion, we must stake our freedoms on firmer 
ground. We must rest our claims to liberty, inviolability and pri­
mary authority over our lives on our status as free persons with our 
own ends and aspirations, as persons whose lives and projects have 
value quite apart from our contributions to the general good. It is 
our independent value that others must respect; it is that respect that 
rights and liberties express; and it is our equal possession of in­
dependent value that the equal provision of rights and liberties de­
clares. So conceived, tort law's protection of the liberty and 
integrity of our persons protects an essential precondition of ra-
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tional agency, expresses the independent value of each human life, 
and recognizes that each of us is equally and inalienably endowed 
with that independent value.129 
The importance of the protections conferred by intentional 
torts, such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to our capacity to determine the course of our own lives is 
plain. If others could gratuitously exercise control over our persons 
and psyches in the ways that these torts forbid, the scope of our 
security would be greatly diminished and our vulnerability would 
be commensurately increased. A legal regime that refused to rec­
ognize these torts would make each of us gratuitously usable by 
others. The significance of these torts for our moral status as beings 
of value in our own right is more subtle, but no less important. If 
the law granted people the right to invade the psychological and 
physical integrity of others at will - publicly denied the inviolabil­
ity of persons - everyone's public moral status would be altered for 
the worse. Each and every one of us would be disvalued by being 
legitimately subjected to gratuitous physical and psychological vio­
lations because we would all suffer a diminution in our moral status, 
a denial of the value of our lives, and a denigration of the impor­
tance of our most urgent interests.130 
The relevance of dignity and autonomy interests to accident law 
is less evident, but no less important. The law of accidents secures 
the preconditions of effective rational agency just so far as it ade­
quately reconciles the competing claims of freedom and security. 
Sufficient security from accidental injury and death, and sufficient 
freedom to impose risk upon others, are both essential if we are to 
work our will upon the world. The law of accidents gives voice to 
the independent and equal value of our lives just so far as it does 
not license the sacrifice of our lives and limbs for the general wel­
fare, but subjects us to risks of injury and death only on terms that 
we might reasonably accept as free and equal persons. 
When we come to understand the problem of accidental harm as 
a problem of human freedom, we see that the chief task of its doc­
trines and principles is to reconcile two conflicting aspects of indi­
vidual freedom. One of these is freedom of action - freedom to 
impose risks of accidental injury and death on others. The other is 
security - freedom from accidental injury and death. Our capacity 
129. See Keating, supra note 57, at 346-49 (contrasting social contract and economic theo­
ries based upon their differing views of individual autonomy). 
130. See FRANCES M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION 12 (1992); THOMAS NAGEL, 
EOUALlTY AND PARTIALlTY 148-49 (1991). 
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to shape our lives in accordance with our aspirations, and our fun­
damental interest in so doing, makes both of these forms of liberty 
precious.131 
Freedom of action is precious because leading a worthwhile life 
requires exposing oneself and others to risks of injury and death. 
Without this freedom, we could not, for example, drive to work, fly 
airplanes, or buy products that are less than perfectly safe. The less 
free we are to impose risks on others, the more fettered we are in 
the pursuit of our own aims and aspirations. Security is precious 
because accidental death brings life to a premature close, while ac­
cidental injury may foreclose the pursuit of certain aspirations, se­
verely impair the pursuit of others, and bring crushing financial 
burdens that are themselves deeply disruptive. With6ut a reason­
able amount of freedom from accidental injury and death, we lack 
favorable conditions for working our will upon the world. The first 
task of accident law is thus to reconcile freedom of action and se­
curity in a way that provides the space we need to lead our lives in 
accordance with our aims and aspirations. 
So conceived, the problem of accidental harm is a problem of 
mutual freedom because it governs the risks that persons may im­
pose on each other. Social contract theory holds that principles of 
mutual freedom must differ from those of individual freedom be­
cause it supposes that persons embrace diverse and incommensu­
rable aims and aspirations. These aims and aspirations are in 
natural, though not fatal, conflict. In the presence of diverse final 
ends, the circumstance when we voluntarily expose ourselves to 
risks in the pursuit of our own ends differs fundamentally from the 
circumstance when we expose others to risks in the pursuit of our 
separate ends. Social contract theory thus distinguishes between 
the canons of individual choice - the canons of rationality - and 
the canons of interpersonal choice - the canons of reasonableness. 
We may rationally expose ourselves to risks that it would be un­
reasonable to impose on others. For a single person, the rationality 
of imposing a risk on herself depends on the importance that she 
assigns to the end advanced by bearing that risk and the efficacy 
with which the imposition furthers that end. For a plurality of free 
and equal persons, the reasonableness of imposing a risk on others 
131. Our sense of justice - our capacity to honor principles that reasonably reconcile the 
competing claims of freedom of action and security for a plurality of persons - makes a 
regime of mutual freedom possible. By enforcing our duties against one another, law backs 
justice with force and gives us an additional reason to honor fair principles of social 
cooperation. 
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depends on whether that imposition is consistent with the equal 
freedom and equal value of others. Reasonable risks are ones that 
answer to terms of mutual benefit: the right to impose them recon­
ciles the conflicting claims of diverse persons on terms that all of 
them might reasonably accept. The canons of reasonableness thus 
set the boundaries of our freedom with respect to the risks that we 
may impose on each other. 
C. Reciprocity and Reasonableness 
Within Kantian social contract theory, the concept of reciprocity 
blossoms out of the concept of reasonableness. "The reasonable 
leads to the idea of reciprocity [which] is a relation between equals 
who are acting on a fair principle of social cooperation that all of 
them would propose to the others as fair, and are willing to follow 
faithfully, provided the others did so as well."132 Reasonable peo­
ple "insist that reciprocity should hold within [their] world so that 
each benefits along with others."133 Given the diversity of our aims 
and aspirations, the general justification that we have for bearing 
risks imposed by others lies in our reciprocal right to expose others 
to equal risks. The right to impose risks on others justifies bearing 
equal risk impositions by others because the right to impose risk 
secures the freedom of action essential to the pursuit of a concep­
tion of the good over the course of a complete life. When mutuality 
of benefit is fully realized, no one's life or limb is sacrificed to the 
greater good of others, and we each gain more from the right to 
impose certain risks than we lose from having to bear exposure to 
equivalent risks. 
For mutuality of benefit to be fully realized, risks must, first, be 
reciprocal in a qualitative (not a quantitative) way: they must be 
equal in probability and magnitude, and be imposed for equally 
good reason. Equality in these respects, however, is not enough to 
ensure that each of us benefits from such a regime.134 For each of 
us to profit from a regime in which risks equal in probability and 
magnitude are imposed for equally good reasons, the reasons must 
132. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 24 (Nov. 3, 1993) (unpublished manuscript 
presented to the Program for the Study of Law, Philosophy & Social Theory, New York 
University, on file with author). 
133. JoHN RAWLS, Powers of Citizens and Their Representation, in POLITICAL LIBER­
ALISM, supra note 105, at 47, 50. 
134. Indeed, equality in these respects is formally compatible with having no person gain 
from the imposition of the risks licensed by a particular regime. All of the risks might be 
imposed for inadequate reasons. Risks equal in magnitude and probability might be imposed 
for equally bad reasons. 
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also be sufficiently good - good enough to justify the balance that 
they strike between the competing claims of freedom of action and 
security. The aim of Kantian social contract theory is to secure the 
most favorable conditions for persons to pursue their conceptions 
of the good over complete lives. For the particular package of risk 
impositions licensed by the law of accidents to secure such condi­
tions, the gain conferred on our freedom of action by the right to 
impose those risks must exceed the loss to our security from having 
to bear exposure to such risks. Prima facie, the fullest satisfaction 
of this condition requires that each licensed risk imposition benefits 
the freedom of action more than it burdens the security of a repre­
sentative citizen.13s 
Under a regime where risks equal in probability and magnitude 
are imposed for sufficient and equally good reasons, we acknowl­
edge both the importance of leading our lives in accordance with 
our aims and aspirations, and the equal value of the aims, aspira­
tions, and lives of others. We acknowledge the former by willingly 
exposing ourselves to reasonable risks in pursuit of our aims and 
aspirations. We acknowledge the latter by accepting equal risk im­
positions by others. The former is central to our status as free per­
sons, the latter is central to our status as equal persons. Moreover, 
when reciprocity is understood in this way, the logic behind making 
reciprocity of risk imposition (once due care has been exercised) 
the master criterion for choosing between negligence and strict lia­
bility becomes evident.136 Taking reciprocity to require that risks 
be equal in probability and magnitude, and imposed for equally 
good and sufficient reasons, makes reciprocity of risk a test of equal 
freedom and mutual benefit. 
Once reciprocity is understood in this way, it is not so much 
mistaken, as it is misleading, to assign reciprocity paramount impor­
tance. The first respect in which it is misleading is theoretical: prior 
writings in the social contract tradition have implied that reciprocity 
of risk stands alone as the master concept of social contract theory. 
Within Kantian social contract theory, however, the idea of reci­
procity of risk neither stands alone, nor holds a position of preemi­
nent importance. It is inseparable from, incomprehensible 
independent of, and subordinate in importance to, the concepts of 
equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness. The second re-
135. In taking the liberties of a representative citizen as the touchstone, I am following 
JoHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 
105, at 289. 
136. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 15; Fletcher, supra note 13. 
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spect in which the assignment of paramount importance to reci­
procity of risk is misleading is practical: prior writings in the social 
contract tradition have made the presence or absence of reciprocity 
of risk the master test for the choice between negligence and strict 
liability. Properly understood, however, reciprocity of risk should 
serve, not as the master test of the appropriate liability rule, but as 
an ideal capable of organizing our thoughts about the choice of an 
appropriate liability rule. Speaking loosely, reciprocity of risk im­
position is a Kantian "idea of reason" - a concept whose role is to 
unify the elements of theoretical framework.137 Reciprocity of risk 
links the ideals of equal freedom and mutual benefit, specifying a 
regime of risk impositions that realizes them perfectly. 
The primary aim of a social contract conception of accident law 
is to secure the most favorable institutional conditions for free and 
equal persons to pursue their conceptions of the good over com­
plete lives. This aim assigns theoretical pride of place to the con­
cepts of equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness, 
because these concepts provide the framework for thinking both 
about risk imposition in general, and the choice between negligence 
and strict liability in particular. The choice between negligence and 
strict liability turns on the reasonableness of the different reconcili­
ations that they effect between the freedom of action of injurers, 
and the security of victims. This, in turn, depends on comparing the 
absolute and relative burdens that the regimes place on the victim's 
security and the injurer's freedom of action. Compared to.strict lia­
bility, negligence generally places lesser burdens on the injurer's 
freedom of action, but greater burdens on the victim's freedom. 
Strict liability reverses these relationships: it places greater burdens 
on the actor's freedom, and lesser burdens on the victim's security. 
The overarching theoretical unity of social contract theory, then, 
is found not in the concept of reciprocity of risk, but in the concepts 
of equal freedom, mutual benefit, and reasonableness. Social con­
tract theory asks the same question of the choice between negli­
gence and strict liability that it asks of the decision to take or to 
forego a particular precaution: Which rule (in the case of the 
choice between negligence and strict liability) or ruling (in the case 
of due care) reconciles the competing claims of freedom of action 
and security in the most reasonable way?13s 
137. For a discussion of "ideas of reason," see WEINRIB, supra note 19, at 87-92. 
138. For application of this criterion to judgments of due care, see Keating, supra note 57, 
at 341-82. 
· 
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If the theoretical significance of reciprocity of risk is less than it 
has generally been taken to be, so too is its practical significance. 
Reciprocity of risk cannot serve as a master test for the choice be­
tween negligence and strict liability. One reason why it cannot is 
that perfect reciprocity of risk is an ideal which can only be approxi­
mated in the real world. Even the risks of the road - the canonical 
case of reciprocal risk imposition139 - are, in fact, imperfectly re­
ciprocal. Vehicles vary in size, performance, and riskiness of cargo, 
and drivers vary in their native and acquired skills. The reasons 
why people drive are likewise not perfectly equivalent in a qualita­
tive sense - they, too, vary in their absolute and relative urgency. 
The reciprocity found on the road is, thus, a rough and "normal­
ized" one. Because the ideal of perfect reciprocity of risk can only 
be approximated, we should be wary of using the criterion of reci­
procity of risk too facilely, and too mechanically. It is neither pre­
cise enough, nor attainable enough, to serve as a master "test" for 
the appropriate liability rule. 
A second reason why reciprocity of risk cannot serve as the 
master test of the appropriate liability rule is more theoretically sig­
nificant. Considerations of reciprocity of risk do not capture all of 
the relevant grounds of responsibility for accidental harm. The idea 
of reciprocity of risk draws its considerable power from the fact that 
perfect reciprocity of risk (as I have specified it) defines a perfectly 
fair regime of equal freedom, with respect to risks of accidental in­
jury and death, between persons conceived solely as free and equal. 
The error that social contract tort theory has fallen into here is sub­
tle. Kantian social contract theory supposes that a person's stand-
139. Driving has served as the canonical example of reciprocal risk imposition at least 
since Judge Blackburn's opinion in Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 286·87 (1866), raised 
it as an example and contrasted it with the circumstances in the case at hand: 
Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing 
those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, 
those who go on the highway . . .  may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon 
themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger • . . .  But there is no ground for 
saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself any risk arising from the uses to which 
the defendants should choose to apply their land. He neither knew what these might be, 
nor could he in any way control the defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs 
they liked, and storing up in them what water they pleased, so long as the defendants 
succeeded in preventing the water which they there brought from interfering with the 
plaintiffs property. 
Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. at 286-87. Commentators have subsequently invoked the example. See, 
e.g., FRIED, supra note 15, at 196-200 (arguing that the risks of driving 50 miles per hour over 
a two week period are not reciprocal with the risks of driving 75 m.p.h. one week and 25 
m.p.h. the next, because of the greater danger and uncertainty that the latter arrangement 
creates); Fletcher, supra note 13, at 543 ("If we all drive, we must suffer the costs of ordinary 
driving."); id. at 549 (asserting that driving negligently is reciprocal within the community of 
such drivers). 
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ing as a free and equal individual is her fundamental status as a 
democratic citizen. It, therefore, also supposes that status should 
be the primary ground determining their basic rights and responsi­
bilities, including those specified by the law of accidents. The ideal 
of reciprocity of risk is, therefore, profoundly right to take that sta­
tus as fundamental for purposes of fixing the terms of which citizens 
may and may not expose each other to risks of physical injury and 
death. 
The mistake lies in believing that persons' status as free and 
equal democratic citizens is the sole ground of their rights and re­
sponsibilities with respect to risks of accidental injury and death. 
Social contract theory acknowledges - indeed insists - that per­
sons can acquire rights against and duties toward each other by vir­
tue of the choices that they make, the property that they acquire, 
and the responsibilities that they assume. If securing the institu­
tional rights and primary goods that citizens need to be effectively 
free and equal is one face of freedom, respecting the uses that citi­
zens have made of their freedom is the other. By the exercise of 
their civil and political freedoms, free and equal citizens take spe­
cial risks upon themselves, assume relationships of special trust and 
responsibility toward others, and acquire special rights toward and 
immunities against others.140 The normative weight of these rights 
and responsibilities must be reflected in the specification of tort 
duties. 
Leroy Fibre, Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway141 
nicely illustrates the relevance of property rights to the delineation 
of duties of due care. In Leroy Fibre: 
[the plaintiff operated a] factory for the manufacture of tow from flax 
straw. Upon its land, adjoining its factory and abutting on the defend­
ants' right of way, it stored flax straw in parallel rows of stacks, the 
nearest some seventy-five feet, the other eighty-five feet, from the 
center. of the right of way. A live cinder was emitted by a negligently 
operated engine of the defendant and carried by a high wind, then 
prevailing, into contact with the farther row of stacks which, being 
highly inflammable, ignited.142 
140. In connection with these three categories, think, respectively, of the special duties of 
care placed upon experts by the law of negligence, of the special duties of care connected to 
special relationships, and of the impact of property rights on the delineation of duties of care. 
141. 232 U.S. 340 (1914). 
142. 232 U.S. at 342. 
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The defendant claimed that the plaintiff itself was negligent, be­
cause it "had placed its property of an inflammable character upon 
its own premises so near the railroad tracks. "143 
The jury found the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent. The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the defendant was 
entitled to raise that defense in the first place - whether the de­
fendant had a duty to take reasonable protections on its own prop­
erty, for its own protection, against the negligence of the railroad. 
Over a terse, powerful, and eloquent dissent by Justice Holmes, Jus­
tice McKenna's majority opinion held that "[t]he doctrine of con­
tributory negligence is entirely out of place" in this setting.144 The 
correct rule is one drawn from nuisance law. "[E]very one must use 
his property so as not to injure others . . . .  "145 This rule does not 
condemn the operation of railroads - they are a "legitimate use of 
property" - but it specifies a particular division of the labor of 
precaution between railroad operators and adjacent owners and oc­
cupiers of land.146 Owners and occupiers of land next to railroad 
rights of way take the risks inherent in the rightful operation of a 
railroad, but not those stemming from its "wrongful" operation. 
This is not the place to explore the subtleties of Leroy Fibre, 
much less to settle the debate between McKenna and Holmes. For 
our purposes, the lesson to be learned is this: the embedding of the 
tort issue within a framework of property rights affects the specifi­
cation of tort duties. The parties in LeRoy Fibre did not stand in 
the same relationship as do drivers on the highway. For the most 
part, drivers on the road face one another simply as prospective 
injurers and prospective victims. They take risks upon themselves 
and impose risks on each other; they benefit from the precautions 
of others, and the precautions that they take benefit others. The 
terms of their interaction are largely uncluttered by special relation­
ships and property rights. 
143. 232 U.S. at 342. Leroy Fibre is thus the American counterpart to the case of the 
farmer and the railroad that Ronald Coase, following Pigou, made famous in The Problem of 
Social Cost, Coase, supra note 47, at 29. Coase used a large number of examples to develop 
his argument. All of the examples resemble the farmer and the railroad example in two 
ways: (1) the harm is "caused" by both activities; and (2) maximizing the total value of the 
two conflicting activities requires bilateral precautions. Nonetheless, the example of the rail­
road and the farmer has emerged as one of the more famous illustrations. See, e.g., Cooter, 
supra note 95, at 2-9. For a rare recognition by an economically inclined scholar of the signif­
icance of property rights in this context, see Jones, supra note 46, at 1729, 1757. 
144. Leroy Fibre, Co., 232 U.S. at 350. 
145. 232 U.S. at 350. 
146. See 232 U.S. at 350. 
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By contrast, the property rights of the parties in LeRoy Fibre -
their equal rights to the legitimate use and enjoyment of their 
properties - profoundly affected the terms of their relationship, 
and the law of torts must register the presence of those rights. Reg­
istering their presence, the definition of reasonable care is influ­
enced by the concepts and categories of nuisance law. Put more 
generally, property rights alter the "normative field" within which 
tort law works. Moreover, the same can be said of "special rela­
tionships," such as those of employers and employees, hotels and 
their guests, jailers and their prisoners, or schools and their 
pupils;147 of the decision to assume certain roles, such as lifeguard, 
pilot, or captain of a ship;148 and of voluntary choices to enter into 
activities whose intrinsic enjoyment is tied to the imposition of cer­
tain risks.149 
In the case of "special relationships," the assumption of posi­
tions of authority and trust extends the reach of responsibility. In 
the case of lifeguards, pilots and captains, the lives, safety, and 
property of many people depend on the skill and care of the occu­
pants of those positions, thus providing a ground for the imposition 
of special duties of care. In the case of primary assumption of risk, 
the maintenance of a shared good requires the acceptance of dis­
tinctive risks. In all three of these cases, the acceptance of certain 
roles entails the acceptance of distinctive responsibilities. Such an 
emphasis on institutional roles is hardly surprising. We have good 
reason to want the delineation of pilots' duties to be sensitive to the 
special risks and possibilities of their roles. For individuals and 
communities to flourish, those in positions of special trust and 
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821 (1948) 
(holding an employer liable for the wrongful death of a missing employee because agents of 
the railroad failed to act reasonably in ascertaining his whereabouts); Hutchinson v. Dickie, 
162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947) (holding that the defendant owed a duty of care to the decedent 
because the decedent was an invited guest on the defendant's cruiser); Pirkle v. Oakdale, 253 
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1953) (holding that school officials owed a duty of care in carefully supervising 
the physical activities of students); Iglesia v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1982) (holding that 
a police officer owed a duty of care to a prisoner that the officer knew to be incapacitated by 
alcohol at the time of release). This list is merely illustrative. Cf. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND 
AccIDENT LAw, supra note 20, at 236-52 (citing cases). 
148. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351 (1975) (holding the pilot/owner of 
private plane liable for its crash on a theory of res ipsa loquitur). Newing's analysis rests 
heavily on federal regulations placing responsibility for the safe maintenance and flight of 
such aircraft squarely on their pilots and owners. 
149. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (holding that ordinary careless 
conduct and incidental physical contact are essential to the enjoyment of a sport such as 
touch football and that the imposition of ordinary negligence liability on co-participants in 
"active sports" would impair their play); Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992) (holding 
that an injury received while water-skiing was not actionable unless it resulted from conduct 
showing a reckless disregard for safety). 
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power must discharge their responsibilities in ways that do justice to 
our dependence upon them. 
In all of these cases, liability regimes are not shaped exclusively 
by considerations of reciprocity. The majority opinion in Leroy Fi­
bre, for example, refuses to recognize the defense of contributory 
negligence because it takes such reconciliation to be inconsistent 
with the fair reconciliation of the parties' property rights. Property 
conceptions play two roles in this conclusion. On the one hand, 
they flesh out the abstract ideal of reciprocity. The risks of rail­
roading and farming are not reciprocal because farmers do not ex­
pose railroads to risks comparable to the risks to which railroads 
expose farmers. On the other hand, property conceptions alter tort 
judgments of reasonableness. One reason why the railroad is enti­
tled to impose nonreciprocal risks of fire on "farmers" in the first 
place is that the railroad is entitled to the reasonable use of its right 
of way. It is not the dangerous use that is "unreasonable." 
The unreasonableness of the railroad's use of its property lies in 
demanding that farmers, who do not impose comparable risks on 
railroads, take precautions against the risk that the railroad's negli­
gence will damage their property. Put differently, the railroad's un­
reasonableness lay in demanding that the plaintiff forego the use of 
some of its property simply because so doing would minimize the 
railroad's private liability costs, and, perhaps, total social costs as 
well. Farmers are neither under a general duty to act in the best 
interests of railroads, nor under a general duty to use their property 
in wealth-maximizing ways. Their general duty is to respect the 
rights of others, and to act in accordance with fair principles of so­
cial cooperation. McKenna's claim is that the fair reconciliation of 
these conflicting claims calls for not imposing a duty of victim pre­
caution against injurer negligence. Property rights are an ingredient 
in that conclusion. The judgment probably would not have been 
the same had property rights not been in play. We take it for 
granted that drivers on the public highway owe each other duties of 
victim precaution. 
Property conceptions figure in a similar way in the best interpre­
tation of the ruling and judicial rhetoric of Rylands v. Fletcher. On 
the one hand, the normal use of property in the region helped to 
specify which risks were reciprocal. One reason why the risks of 
reservoir building were not reciprocal was that the area was a min­
ing district. Here, the customary use of property fleshed out the 
reciprocal risks of owning and occupying land. It poured content 
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into the tort norm of reasonableness.150 On the other hand, prop­
erty rights played an important role in justifying the construction of 
reservoirs in mining country. One reason why people were entitled 
to construct reservoirs, and so to impose nonreciprocal risks, was 
that people are, at common law, presumptively entitled to use their 
property as they see fit, so long as they do not use it in a way that 
injures other people.151 Here, a property right does not flesh out a 
tort conception - it alters the application of tort conceptions. The 
right to use one's own property as one sees fit alters tort law's judg­
ment of reasonableness. 
The precise points illustrated by primary assumption of risk, 
"special relationships," and piloting are somewhat different. In 
these areas of the law, prior choices and the distinctive contours of 
various roles, rather than property conceptions, are ingredients in 
tort law's judgments of reasonableness. The broader point, how­
ever, is the same. In all of these areas, considerations of reciprocity 
alone do not determine liability rules and regimes. Property rights, 
prior choices, and particular relationships affect the normative field 
within which liability rules are constructed. Well-fashioned rules 
register the weight of those rights, choices, and relationships. 
This puts us, finally, in a position to state the general relevance 
of considerations of reciprocity to Kantian social contract theory. 
Reciprocity of risk is a master organizing idea, but it is not a master 
test of the choice between negligence and strict liability for three 
reasons: first, reciprocity of risk is an ideal, and can only be approx­
imated; second, reciprocity of risk is abstract, and can be given con­
tent only through the introduction of ancillary conceptions that 
flesh out the qualitative judgments of magnitude and reasonable­
ness on which it depends; and third, its authority is not "all things 
considered," but ''prima facie" or "presumptive." Its "all things 
considered" impact on the final shape of liability rules depends on 
its interaction with other normative materials. Those other materi­
als carry their own authority and have their own presumptive impli­
cations. Considerations of reciprocity figure in judgments of 
reasonableness, but, so too do the prior choices of the parties, their 
institutional roles and responsibilities, and the property rights that 
they bring with them. Indeed, the list of relevant considerations is 
open ended. 
150. Custom plays a similar, if perhaps less authoritative, role in general negligence law. 
151. See supra note 139 (quoting Judge Blackbum). 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, reciprocity of risk can serve 
as a master organizing idea, guiding our deliberations about the 
choice between negligence and strict liability. Indeed, the best way 
to understand the role of reciprocity of risk within traditional social 
contract theory is as the master organizing idea. The ideals of equal 
freedom and mutual benefit are the central ideals of social contract 
theory. The reciprocity of risk criterion articulates their bearing on 
problems of accidental injury and death. With respect to risks of 
accidental injury and death, perfect reciprocity of risk realizes the 
most favorable, and the most fair, conditions for free and equal per­
sons to pursue their conceptions of the good over the course of 
complete lives.152 Because Kantian social contract theory takes 
persons' status as free and equal to be their fundamental political 
status, reciprocity of risk can claim preeminence among the norma­
tive materials bearing on the choice of liability rules. 
Property rights and prior choices have some normative authority 
because persons make choices and acquire property through the ex­
ercise of their civil freedoms, and in pursuit of their conceptions of 
the good. Within the bounds of justice, respecting the freedom of 
democratic citizens requires respect for the rights they create, and 
the duties they assume, through the exercise of those freedoms. 
When, through the exercise of their freedoms, democratic citizens 
acquire property, they acquire rights that other democratic citizens 
must respect. When, through the exercise of their freedoms, they 
assume positions of trust and responsibility, they acquire duties that 
they are not free to disclaim. Prima facie, we cannot appropriate 
the benefits of an office and shed its burdens.153 
If property rights and prior choices have some normative au­
thority because they flow from the exercise of the powers and liber­
ties that we possess as free and equal democratic citizens, they 
generally have less authority than considerations of reciprocity do. 
The principle of responsibility embodied in the reciprocity of risk 
criterion flows directly from our status as free and equal citizens, 
whereas rights rooted in property interests, and the special role re­
sponsibilities that we assume, flow more indirectly from our free­
dom and equality. Our free and equal status is the ground on which 
152. See the discussion in the text supra at notes 135-37. See also Keating, supra note 57, 
at 324. 
153. Cf. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE, supra note 106, § 52, at 342-43 (1971) (stating the 
"principle of fairness"). This principle is also traced to H.L.A. HART, Are There Any Natural 
Rights?, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53, 61-63 (Anthony Quinton ed., 1967). 
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our more particular roles are built, and our more particular rights 
and interests acquired. 
Finally, these are questions to be settled by deliberation, not 
bargaining, because they are questions of right and justice, not pref­
erence or power. Property interests and prior choices alter the 
claims that persons may rightly make against others, and the claims 
that others may rightly make against them. They do not free us 
from the requirements of justice, and transport us to a realm where 
power, shrewdness, negotiating skill, or intensity of desire settle 
questions of freedom and responsibility. 
We are now in a position to understand the challenge presented 
by the enterprise liability principle of fairness. Like the reciprocity 
of risk criterion itself, the enterprise liability principle of fairness 
appeals directly to our fundamental status as free and equal citi­
zens, not to the property interests that we acquire, or to the choices 
that we have made, through the exercise of those freedoms. It chal­
lenges the reciprocity of risk criterion by taking accidental harm, 
not risk, as the touchstone for thinking about mutuality of benefit. 
Because it appeals directly to our status as free and equal individu­
als, it challenges the claims of the reciprocity of risk criterion to 
primary normative authority. Implicitly, the principle of burden­
benefit proportionality claims that the full realization of freedom 
and equality requires the fair apportionment, not just of risk, but of 
the financial costs of accidental harm as well. 
VI. THE RHETORIC OF FAIRNESS 
To justify the enterprise liability principle of fairness within a 
Kantian social contract framework, then, we must show why rea­
sonableness sometimes requires the fair distribution of the financial 
costs of accidental harm between an enterprise and its victims. To 
show that this framework makes sense of the pertinent law, we 
must connect it with relevant rhetoric and doctrine. The relevant 
rhetoric has three elements. The first is the principle of fairness 
itself, with its implicit insistence that harm, not risk, is what matters. 
The second is the conviction that the shift from a world of "isolated, 
ungeneralized wrongs," to a world in which "torts . . .  are mainly 
the incidents" of large enterprises,154 makes the fair distribution of 
harm between enterprises and their victims an issue, thereby chang­
ing the question of fairness presented by tort liability. The third is 
the claim that there is an intentional aspect to the infliction of "acci-
154. Hou.tEs, supra note 1, at 183. 
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dental" harms by large enterprises, and this intentionality provides 
a ground for the imposition of liability.155 
The argument that I shall develop is lengthy, but its gist is sim­
ple. When risks are the incidental by-products of large and well­
organized activities, the enterprise liability principle of fairness rec­
onciles the competing clailns of liberty and security more fairly, and 
more favorably, than the reciprocity of risk criterion does. Losses 
of life, limb, and property disrupt the lives of victims even when 
they issue from risk impositions that are themselves justified. We 
therefore have reason to minimize the financial hardship that losses 
cause, and to distribute their financial costs as fairly as possible. In 
Holmes's new world of interrelated and generalized risks, the impo­
sition of enterprise liability is often able to effect these ends. When 
it can do so, it is reasonable for enterprises to impose the nonnegli­
gent risks characteristic of their activities but unreasonable of them 
not to accept responsibility fo� the financial costs of those risks. 
A. Risk and Harm 
Both Fried and Fletcher take risk - not harm - to be the com­
ponent of, and threat to, human well-being governed by tort law. 
The equal freedom that concerns them is equal freedom to impose 
risks on others, and equal freedom from risk impositions by others. 
The fairness that concerns them is fairness in the distribution of 
risk, not fairness in the distribution of the (financial) burdens and 
benefits of accidental harm. On its face, this aspect of their 
thoughts is puzzling. They appear to count risk more important 
than harm, yet common sense and social contract theory alike sug­
gest that risk is only threatening because it may issue in harm. By 
itself, risk rarely threatens fundamentally the ability to pursue a 
conception of the good over the course of a complete life.156 The 
same cannot be said about the actual occurrence of physical injury 
and death. Because the avoidance of accidental injury and death, 
rather than the avoidance of risk, is fundamental to our well-being, 
155. The first and third of these elements of the enterprise liability rhetoric of fairness are 
identified as two of the major forms of fairness rhetoric by James Henderson, Jr. in his care­
ful study of judicial justification in products liability law. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 
1576-77. 
156. Exposure to carcinogenic toxins and radiation are exceptions to this rule. In these 
cases, risk persists long after exposure ends, and this may count as a harm in itself. See, e.g., 
In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that exposure to radiation beyond a certain 
threshold fixed by regulation constitutes a harm regardless of subsequent personal injury). 
But these are exceptional, and distinctively modern, cases. Fletcher and Fried clearly have 
more typical and traditional cases in mind. 
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Fletcher's and Fried's focus on risk instead of harm requires 
justification. 
Neither Fletcher nor Fried has much to say about the reason 
why risk, rather than harm, should be the touchstone of tort theory. 
One of Fletcher's brief asides contains the germ of an answer, how­
ever. Fletcher remarks that, when risks are reciprocal, holding ac­
tors strictly liable for the harms that they cause would merely 
"substitute one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for 
the risk of personal loss."157 Fletcher's thought, I take it, is this: 
strict liability has administrative costs, namely, the expense of using 
the judicial system to transfer the costs of an accident from the vic­
tim to the injurer. Because reciprocity defines a perfectly fair situa­
tion with respect to the distribution of risk, incurring those 
administrative costs does not lead to a fairer distribution of the 
costs of accidents. It leads to a different - but not fairer - distri­
bution of those costs. There is, therefore, no point in imposing 
strict liability in cases of reciprocal risk imposition and no point in 
focusing on the distribution of harm as opposed to the distribution 
of risk. 
The fairness argument that I have attributed to Fletcher would 
be sound if it were the case that, when risks are reciprocal, neither 
the victim nor the injurer could spread the costs of an accident 
across those who benefit from the activity that engenders it. Activ­
ity liability, however, supposes that the imposition of strict liability 
on reciprocal risks does not merely shift the financial costs of acci­
dents from victims to injurers, but spreads the costs of accidental 
harm across the enterprise that engendered those harms. If enter­
prise liability is capable of spreading the costs of accidental harm 
across those who benefit from the creation of the relevant risks, then 
it may be fair and just - not just efficient or humane - to shift the 
costs of accidents arising out of reciprocal risks onto those who im­
posed the risks. Aristotle himself saw the proportional alignment 
of burdens and benefits as a distinctive form of justice, different 
from both distributive and corrective justice.158 
Although the principle of proportionality is concerned with the 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of accidental risk imposi­
tion, it differs from distributive justice as Fletcher, following Aris­
totle, understands it. Distributive justice distributes goods on the 
157. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 547. 
158. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. V, ch. 5, at 117-22 (discussing justice as propor­
tionality and distinguishing it from both corrective and distributiye justice). 
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basis of status or virtue.159 The principle of burden-benefit propor­
tionality attributes responsibility on the basis of conduct. It assigns 
liability to the activity responsible for the accident, and so parcels 
out financial responsibility for harm on the basis of voluntary risk 
creation. Although the principle of proportionality is concerned, 
like corrective justice, with what has been done, it differs from cor­
rective justice as much as it differs from distributive justice. Correc­
tive justice seeks to restore a wrongfully disrupted preexisting 
equilibrium, whereas the principle of proportionality seeks to cre­
ate a new equilibrium in which the burdens and benefits of acciden­
tal injury are aligned. The principle of proportionality is, in short, 
neither distributive nor corrective, but commutative. 160 
This principle of fairness is not at odds with, but rather is sup­
ported by, social contract theory. Social contract theory is, after all, 
concerned with the fair reconciliation of two conflicting liberties -
freedom of action and security. Freedom from harm is more funda­
mental to security than freedom from risk, and the fair apportion­
ment of the burdens and benefits of accidental harm is therefore 
more important than the fair apportionment of the burdens and 
benefits of accidental risk creation. Social contract theory thus 
counsels us, when possible, to attend to the fair apportionment of 
the costs of accidents, rather than to the fair distribution of risk. 
When the imposition of strict liability simply shifts a concentrated 
harm from victim to injurer, the balance that it strikes between the 
competing claims of freedom of action and security is different 
from, but no fairer than, the balance struck by negligence law. 
When strict liability spreads accidents across those who benefit 
from creating the risks that result in those accidents, rather than 
simply shifting concentrated harms from victims to injurers, strict 
liability strikes a fairer balance than negligence does between the 
competing claims of freedom of action and security. Or so I shall 
argue. 
159. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. V, ch. 3, at 112-13 ("[F]or all men agree that what 
is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify 
the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of 
oligarchy with wealth (or noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence."). 
From a Kantian perspective, the principles of tort liability implicate distributive justice, inso­
far as they are aspects of a fundamental principle of equal right or equal liberty. For present 
purposes, these differences in Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of distributive justice are 
beside the point. The point is that the enterprise liability principle of fairness is not "status" 
based in an objectionable way. It specifies conditions under which free and equal citizens 
will be held responsible for what they have done. 
160. My usage of "commutative" follows that of FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 221 n.21. 
Feinberg uses "commutative" to describe the "justice as proportionality" that Aristotle dis­
tinguishes from both corrective and distributive justice. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12. 
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This argument reconciles the apparently competitive concep­
tions of fairness expressed by the reciprocity of risk criterion and 
the principle of burden-benefit proportionality by granting them 
different spheres of application. For this reconciliation to be suc­
cessful, we must identify the basic domains within which each of 
these principles of fairness applies. Here, the second element of the 
enterprise liability principle of fairness comes into play. Bearing in 
mind the caveat that each of these principles is a master organizing 
idea, not a master test, we can locate the essence of each concep­
tion's rightful sphere of operation in Holmes's distinction between 
a world of "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs," and a world where cer­
tain risks are the regular and routine "incidents of certain well 
known businesses."161 When risks are isolated and ungeneralized, 
the reciprocity of risk principle fairly reconciles the competing 
claims of freedom of action and security for a plurality of persons. 
When risks are systemic and generalized, the principle of burden­
benefit proportionality strikes a better balance. 
B. Two Social Worlds 
In Holmes's world of "isolated, ungeneralized wrongs" (let us 
call this world the "world of acts"), risk impositions are discrete 
"one-shot" events. The actors who impose risks are independent of 
one another and actuarially small. In this world, nonnegligent 
harms are as haphazard and unpredictable as natural disasters. Just 
as one might have the bad luck to be struck by lightning, so too one 
might have the bad luck to be struck by a man raising a stick high 
behind him as he struggles to break up a dogfight.162 In the world 
of acts, the typical actor is an individual or a small firm that creates 
risk so infrequently that harm is not likely to materialize from its 
actions alone, and the typical accident arises out of the independent 
actions of natural persons or small firms engaging in similar activi­
ties on an occasional basis. Viewed as a whole, the activities of 
these actors are diffuse and disorganized. Even in the aggregate, 
the activities of these actors may be actuarially small. 
The random dogfight that precipitated Brown v. Kendall nicely 
typifies torts in the world of acts. Dog owners were then - and 
pretty much are now - a diffuse and unrelated group. The risks of 
physical injury and death that each dog owner imposed were too 
actuarially small to make the infliction of serious personal injury on 
161. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 183. 
162. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
1332 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 95:1266 
someone else an ordinary and predictable part of individual dog 
ownership. Each dog owner is an actuarially small actor, and the 
risks imposed by her are independent of, and uncorrelated with, the 
risks imposed by other dog owners. Under these circumstances, lia­
bility rules shift, but do not spread, the financial costs of accidental 
injury.163 In the world of acts, the imposition of strict liability "sub­
stitute[s] one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for the 
risk of personal loss."164 
At the opposite pole from the "world of acts" is the "world of 
activities." In the "world of activities" risks are systemic. Systemic 
risks arise out of a continuously repeated activity (for example, the 
manufacture of coke bottles, the transport of gasoline, the supply­
ing of water by a utility) that is actuarially large. "Accidental" 
harm is statistically certain to result from such risks: if you make 
enough coke bottles, some are sure to rupture;16s if you transport 
enough gasoline, some tankers are sure to explode;166 if you never 
inspect water mains and leave them in the ground long enough, 
some are sure to break.161 
In the world of activities, the typical injury arises not out of the 
diffuse and disorganized acts of unrelated individuals or small firms, 
but out of the organized activities of firms that are either large 
themselves, or small parts of relatively well-organized enterprises. 
The defendant in Lubin is large in the first sense: a single entity is 
responsible for the underground piping of water, for laying and 
maintaining those pipes, for charging consumers for the water so 
transported, and so on. The transportation of large quantities of 
gasoline in tractor trailers on highways is large in the second sense: 
163. This claim assumes that adequate liability insurance is unavailable in the world of 
acts. This assumption is only partly correct. Although liability insurance was certainly not 
widely available in the nineteenth century, contemporary homeowner's insurance usually 
covers policyholders for liability arising out of damage that their domestic pets inflict on the 
persons and property of others. A standard California policy, for example, includes: "Per­
sonal liability protection," which pays for bodily injuries to other people, or damage to their 
property if you are liable, resulting from the acts of your pets. See Farmer's Insurance 
Group, Homeowner's Package Policy; II. Liability; E. Personal Liability. There is an impor­
tant general point here: liability insurance can convert the world of acts into the world of 
activities. I discuss this in the text infra at notes 170-78. 
164. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 547. While the activity of dog owning itself might have 
been actuarially large, the independence of dog owners from each other effectively prevented 
insurance mechanisms from stitching these independent and unrelated actors together into a 
unified enterprise. 
165. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
166. See, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972). 
167. See, e.g., Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964) (observing that the water­
works chose not to inspect underground water mains and decided to replace them only after 
they broke). 
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the firms that do the transporting may (or may not) be small and 
specialized, but they are enmeshed in contractual relationships with 
those who manufacture and refine gasoline, those who operate gas­
oline stations, those who manufacture tractor trailers, and so on.168 
In the world of activities, the financial costs of accidental inju­
ries can be spread fairly across the enterprises that engender those 
harms. In this world, accidents arise out of circumstances that sat­
isfy the basic criteria of insurability. Foremost among these criteria 
is the law of large numbers.169 The more the law of large numbers 
is met, the more risks are certain not only to issue in harms, but also 
to issue in harms with predictable regularity. When an activity is 
large enough, the accidental harm associated with its conduct is pre­
dictable, and the cost of that harm can be foreseen and priced into 
the activity. In the purest version of the world of activities, actors 
(enterprises) themselves satisfy the requirements of the law of large 
numbers. When enterprises themselves are actuarially large, they 
tend to engender nonnegligent accidents in a regular and calculable 
way, and the costs of those accidents can be factored into the costs 
of conducting the enterprise. The costs of manufacturing and dis­
tributing Coke can include the costs of injuries from exploding 
Coke bottles; the costs of supplying water to households and busi­
nesses can include the costs of the damage caused by broken water 
mains.170 
So far I have painted a picture of polar opposite worlds. In one 
world, not only are each actor's risk-creating acts infrequent and 
statistically small, but the aggregate risks created by all the actors 
who impose that risk are also actuarially small. Each dog owner's 
involvement with dogfights is rare, and the "enterprise of owning 
dogs" is itself an actuarially small one. In the other world, not only 
are each actor's risk-creating acts frequent to the point of being sta-
168. This perception is fundamental to the cases. For example, the Siegler court writes: 
"the commercial transporter can spread the loss among his customers - who benefit from 
this extrahazardous use of the highways. Also, if the defect which caused the substance to 
escape was one of manufacture, the owner is in the best position to hold the manufacturer to 
account." Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1188. 
169. See ROBERT I. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 32 (8th ed. 1985) (observing 
that the system of insurance is predicated on the law of large numbers, a theory under which 
the ability to predict collective losses supplants the impossibility of predicting individual 
losses). 
170. See Esco/a, 150 P.2d at 441 ("The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of 
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business."); Lubin, 131 N.W.2d at 770 ("The risks from such a method of operation [i.e., 
leaving water mains in the ground until they rupture] should be borne by the water supplier 
who is in a position to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true benefi­
ciaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and maintenance costs."). 
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tistically large, the aggregate risks created by all the actors who im­
pose that risk are even larger actuarially. Coke alone manufactures 
millions of soda bottles, and the enterprise of manufacturing soda 
bottles is far more vast than Coke's own contributions to it. The 
Coast Guard alone regularly looses innumerable cooped-up sailors 
upon the world, and the enterprise of sending sailors on shore leave 
is far larger than the Coast Guard's contribution to it. 
This picture has its charms, and one of them is a certain broad 
brush historical accuracy. As far as the genesis of accidental harm 
is concerned, the world of the nineteenth century really does seem 
to have differed from the world of the twentieth century in roughly 
the way that this picture suggests. But the picture is sweeping, and 
the contrast that it paints is crude and overdrawn. For example, the 
claim that dogfights were once isolated and rare events, because 
dog ownership was itself an actuarially small activity, invites skepti­
cism. People have "owned" dogs since the beginning of human his­
tory. So long as we are prepared to take a reasonably broad view of 
the matter (both temporally and geographically), the nineteenth­
century pool of dog owners and dogfights looks large indeed. Con­
versely, however vast the mid-twentieth-century shipping industry 
may have been, sailing is an ancient endeavor, and sailors on shore 
leave have been drinking their way into the "condition for which 
[they] are famed" for a very long time indeed. 
These misgivings about the accuracy of the sharp contrast be­
tween the nineteenth-century "world of acts" and the twentieth­
century "world of activities" are well founded. Given a sufficiently 
large pool of dog owners, the accidental harms characteristic of dog 
ownership should be predictable and therefore insurable. The ex­
pected incidence of dogfights should be calculable, and the actual 
incidence should tend to converge with the expected incidence. 
Problems associated with the organization and administration of in­
surance contracts aside,171 it should be possible to write liability in­
surance covering the risks of personal injuries attributable to 
domesticated dogs. The imposition of strict liability should there­
fore be able to spread the costs of dogfights across all dog owners, 
thereby aligning the benefits and burdens of dog ownership as far 
as the . infliction of accidental injuries on strangers is concerned. 
171. There are a range of problems here, and they can be quite fonnidable. The adminis­
trative costs of writing separate policies can make the offering of insurance infeasible; the 
cost of acquiring adequate infonnation about each insured's riskiness can have the same 
effect; the cost of monitoring the behavior of insureds can be prohibitive; moral hazard 
problems may prove insuperable; asymmetric infonnation can lead to cross-subsidization, 
adverse selection and unraveling, and so on. See infra text accompanying notes 173-81. 
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Thus, the picture that we have sketched of differing social worlds 
may leave out the most important difference between the social 
worlds of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely the fact 
that, in the nineteenth century, the institution of liability insurance 
was in its infancy.112 
The thrust of this objection is correct in two ways: first, the 
presence, and relative level of development, of the institution of 
liability insurance marks an essential distinction between the world 
of acts and the world of activities. Second, these two social worlds 
are not polar opposites, but points on a continuum. Indeed, the 
institution of liability insurance is important precisely because such 
insurance can go a long way towards converting a world of acts into 
one of activities. In the purest version of the world of acts, activi­
ties as well as actors fail to meet the requirements of the law of 
large numbers. Arguably, anyway, this version of the world of acts 
is an ideal type that exists nowhere.113 Let us, then, consider a 
f:ilightly less pure, but more realistic, version of the world of acts. In 
this world, activities are large - large enough to meet the law of 
large numbers - but actors are small and independent of each 
other. 
In this intermediate world, each actor's activity is too infrequent 
to satisfy the law of large numbers, and the accidental harm associ­
ated with each actor's activity is therefore unlikely to occur with 
predictable regularity. In the absence of liability insurance, strict 
liability will not spread an activity's characteristic accident costs 
across those who benefit from the imposition of its characteristic 
risks. The presence of adequate liability insurance may, however, 
make a profound difference. If independent insurance firms are 
able to supply adequate liability insurance to actuarially small ac­
tors, then the imposition of strict liability will spread the costs of 
172. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, § 82, at 585. 
173. Although this point is arguable, it is far from being obviously true. Judge John J. 
Francis describes the characteristics of the nineteenth-century world of accidental harm in 
the following way: 
The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in the 
law when marketing conditions were simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face 
to face on an equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were relatively 
uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer competent to evaluate their qual­
ity. With the advent of mass marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the pur­
chaser, sales were accomplished through intermediaries, and the demand for the product 
was created by advertising media. 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80 (N.J. 1960) (citation omitted). This 
description of the world in which privity of contract arose is a description of a craft economy. 
In such an economy, products are individualized and produced on a small scale. Acts as well 
activities are likely to be small, especially given the individuation of products. This may well 
have been the social world of the nineteenth century. 
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nonnegligent harms across the class of those who benefit from the 
imposition of the relevant risks in the form of insurance premi­
ums.174 Tue institution of insurance can thus effect at least a partial 
transformation of the world of acts into the world of activities.175 
Whether the institution of liability insurance can effect this kind 
of partial conversion depends on at least three things: the first is 
the extent to which the basic criteria of insurability - a large 
number of homogeneous exposures; losses that are each accidental; 
losses that are not correlated in the way that, say, property damage 
from earthquakes tends to be correlated; and so on - are met.176 
Tue second is whether the transaction costs of organizing and main­
taining such a market - the costs of acquiring information both 
about the riskiness of the activity being insured in general and the 
riskiness of particular insureds in particular; the costs of writing and 
administering separate liability insurance contracts for each actor; 
the costs of monitoring the claims and behavior of insureds and of 
adjusting premiums accordingly; and so on - are low enough to 
make the offering of insurance profitable. Tue third is whether the 
collective action problem of organizing such markets can be over­
come in a cost-efficient way. 
Tue provision of liability insurance presents a collective action 
problem because the extent to which such insurance spreads the 
costs of an actuarially large activity composed of actuarially small 
actors across that activity depends on the extent to which those ac­
tors purchase insurance and so participate in the loss-spreading 
mechanism.177 This means that liability insurance will spread the 
costs of accidents across the activity that generates those costs only 
if most or all of the relevant actors are persuaded or compelled to 
purchase such insurance. 
174. Insurance might spread costs in another way - it might spread them across unre­
lated risks. Whatever the merits of such insurance, it would not spread the costs of an activ­
ity's accidental harm only across the actors who participate in imposing the activity's 
distinctive risks. 
175. The transformation is only partial because the availability of liability insurance does 
not, in general, establish the kind of relationships among insureds that is created by participa­
tion in a shared enterprise. For example, an insurance company does not generally have the 
kind of authority over its insureds that the Coast Guard has over its sailors. 
176. See MEHR ET AL., supra note 169, at 35 (discussing criteria of insurability). 
177. Substantial participation is, moreover, a condition of effective insurance, not only 
because it is necessary to construct a sufficiently large pool, but also because it is often neces­
sary to overcome problems of adverse selection and cross-subsidization. Effective insurance 
depends on the insurer's ability to predict collective losses accurately. Other things being 
equal, the larger and more similar the risk pool, the more accurate the prediction of collec­
tive losses. 
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In general, whether the accidental harm associated with an ac­
tivity that is actuarially large but composed of actuarially small ac­
tors can, in practice, be spread across the activity will depend not 
only on the extent to which basic criteria of insurability can be met, 
but also on whether these transaction costs and collective action 
problems can be overcome at a cost that is low enough to nurture a 
flourishing liability insurance industry. When the number of actors 
is high, and each actor is small, these costs will tend to be high. 
Just as we might distinguish a slightly less pure and more realis­
tic version of the world of acts, so too we might distinguish a slightly 
less pure and more realistic version of the world of activities. This 
version of the world of activities bears a superficial resemblance to 
the world of acts, because it contains actuarially large activities and 
nominally small actors. In this world, however, actors are only 
nominally small. They are engaged not in unrelated acts, but in rel­
atively well-coordinated aspects of a common enterprise. Separate 
firms may, for example, handle different aspects of the refinement, 
transportation, and sale of gasoline, but their activities form a rela­
tively well-organized whole. When actors are small, but their activi­
ties are related and the enterprise in which they participate is large, 
the costs of accidents may still be spread across those enterprises 
with relative ease. What counts here is not corporate form but eco­
nomic substance - not whether activities are formally integrated, 
but whether they are functionally integrated.11s 
For example, the small size of each individual auto dealer does 
not preclude spreading the costs of auto defect-related accidents 
across the enterprise of manufacturing and selling automobiles; that 
spreading can be achieved simply by forbidding automobile manu­
facturers from limiting their liability for such accidents.179 So too, 
the ability of firms that transport gasoline by tractor trailer to 
178. See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1211 (3d Cir. 1977) (impos­
ing liability on the general contractor for the tort of an underinsured, formally independent 
subcontractor because the general contractor, who had "negotiated at length regarding the 
insurance coverage" of the subcontractor, was in an "excellent position to assure the proper 
degree of financial responsibility"); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Lia­
bility, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1261-71 (1984). Sykes analyzes the efficiency of the "control test" 
for the imposition of vicarious liability on independent contractors and criticizes some impor­
tant lines of cases for paying too much attention to the "pertinent agreements" between the 
principals and the "independent" contractors and too little attention to "economically rele­
vant factors" such as "the observability of loss-avoidance behavior, [and] the duration of the 
agency relation." 
179. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83-84 (N.J. 1960) (ar­
guing that the societal interest in consumer safety can be achieved by eliminating the require­
ment of privity between manufacturer and purchaser, thereby placing the costs of product­
related accidents on the manufacturer, the entity in the best position to reduce the danger to 
the consumer and spread product-related accident costs). 
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spread the accident costs of gasoline explosions across the enter­
prise of refining, distributing, selling, and using gasoline depends 
not on the size of those firms themselves, but on the size and inte­
gration of the enterprise as a whole and on the connections among 
the actors who constitute the enterprise.180 
These remarks only hint at the complexities of the topic they 
discuss. The connections between enterprise liability and insurance 
are both fundamental and intricate. Under some circumstances, the 
imposition of enterprise liability can further insurability by facilitat­
ing the construction of homogeneous risk pools.181 Under other 
circumstances, the imposition of enterprise liability can undermine 
insurance mechanisms by unraveling homogeneous risk pools.182 In 
some circumstances, enterprise liability may destabilize efficient in­
surance mechanisms; in others, it may destabilize inefficient insur­
ance mechanisms and stimulate the growth of those that are more 
efficient. To complicate matters further, it can be extremely diffi­
cult to tell whether a particular disruption is efficient or inefficient. 
These are precisely the issues at stake in the debate between schol­
ars such as Richard Epstein and George Priest on the one hand, 
and Steve Croley, Jon Hanson and Kyle Logue on the other, over 
the causes of, and policy cures for, the liability insurance crisis of 
the mid to late 1980s.183 
For our purposes, however, the critical point is not that the ebb 
and flow of enterprise liability has been sensitive to the availability, 
and perceived efficacy, of liability insurance, though sensitive it has 
been. For our purposes, the critical point is that the fairness of im­
posing enterprise liability depends on its ability to connect the fi­
nancial costs of accidental injury with the characteristic risk. The 
enterprise liability principle of fairness therefore makes questions 
of insurance fundamental. That insurance is important is not, to be 
sure, news. What is news is that the institution of insurance affects 
the extent of injurers' moral responsibility for the harms that they 
accidentally inflict. Morally oriented tort theorists have long as­
sumed that, if responsibility for accidental harm must be predicated 
180. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wash. 1972). 
181. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?, supra note 7, at 109-10. 
182. See, e.g., Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7, at 1550-63 (arguing that enterprise 
liability is causing liability insurance to unravel). Priest and Croley and Hanson are applying 
the model of asymmetric information and unraveling developed by George Akerlof. See 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha­
nism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488 (1970) (explaining how asymmetric information might lead the mar­
ket for used cars to unravel and showing how strict liability in the guise of compulsory 
insurance can stop the unraveling). 
183. See supra note 7. 
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on what people do, not on who they are, the institution of liability 
insurance must be essentially irrelevant to responsibility for acci­
dental injury. Just as this principle should forbid holding people 
responsible for harm simply because their pockets are deep enough 
to pay for it, so too it should forbid holding them responsible just 
because they have enough insurance to cover it. The second ele­
ment of the enterprise liability conception of fairness surprises us 
by showing us that this conviction is too sweeping. Whether or not 
it is fair to leave the financial costs of nonnegligent accidents con­
centrated on a few unlucky victims depends greatly on whether the 
costs of those accidents can be distributed across those who benefit 
by creating the risks that harm those unlucky few. The institution 
of insurance is intimately involved in the answer to that question. 
The surprise triggered by the third element of the enterprise liabil­
ity rhetoric of fairness comes from a different direction. Moral crit­
icism of the defendant's conduct is often thought to be largely 
absent from judgments that the imposition of some form of strict 
liability is warranted.184 Judicial opinions stressing the deliberate 
quality of the nonnegligent accidents caused by large enterprises 
urge that point as a sharp moral condemnation of the enterprise's 
conduct. 
This insistence on the deliberate character of certain nonnegli­
gent harms subject to enterprise liability is a recurring, if poorly 
articulated, theme of enterprise liability case rhetoric and commen­
tary. It is voiced, for instance, in the second tentative draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Commenting on 
the rationale for strict liability for manufacturing defects preserved 
by its proposed section 2A, the reporters state: "[b]ecause manu­
facturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels, their 
knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will enter 
the marketplace entails an element of deliberation about the 
184. For example, a striking concurrence in Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) 
(en bane), argues that the imposition of strict liability on medical mishaps would be prefera­
ble to negligence liability because judgments of negligence impose "a stigma of moral blame" 
on doctors. 519 P.2d at 984 (Utter, J., concurring). The imposition of strict liability, by con­
trast, simply expresses a view about proper loss distribution - the view that "the plaintiff 
should not have to bear the risk of loss." 519 P.2d at 984 (Utter, J., concurring). This view of 
strict liability distinguishes it sharply from both negligence and intentionally tortious conduct. 
The imposition of liability for intentional wrongdoing expresses moral criticism and disap­
proval, because it means that the defendant wrongfully invaded a protected interest of the 
plaintiff and did so deliberately. The imposition of negligence liability expresses at least a 
mild form of moral criticism and disapproval, because it means that the defendant failed to 
live up to a standard of care that establishes the level of respect owed to the lives, limbs, and 
property of others. 
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amount of injury that will result from their activity."185 Similar re­
marks are occasionally found in cases themselves.186 
This emphasis on deliberate action, however, will not bear the 
weight that remarks like this place upon it. Construed as a claim 
about the culpable self-consciousness with which manufacturing 
defect-related harms are inflicted, it is wholly unconvincing. For 
starters, the implicit empirical assumption on which the remark 
rests is shaky at best. While manufacturers may understand much 
more about the incidence and genesis of manufacturing defects 
than consumers do, there is no compelling reason to believe that 
manufacturers are a uniquely clairvoyant class with respect to this 
one narrow class of potentially dangerous product features. The 
precise consequences of various safety devices for automobile acci­
dent and injury rates may be highly predictable, for example. 
When manufacturers fail to install all technologically feasible safety 
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2A, cmt. a (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 1995). James A. Henderson, one of the reporters for the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, elaborates on this remark. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 1576 n.33 (observing 
that the producer of a defective product is like "an actor who shoots into a crowd; although 
the shooter may not know who will be injured, he commits an intentional wrong against the 
victim"). Unfortunately, this analogy begs the question it means to answer. We know that, if 
anything is wrong, gratuitously shooting a gun into a crowd is wrong. If anything exemplifies 
the sort of grave harm that cannot be gratuitously inflicted, this does. What we do not know 
is why investing in quality control at a reasonable (nonnegligent) level gives rise to a duty to 
compensate someone injured by an unprevented manufacturing defect. 
186. To my knowledge, the most explicit case law assertion that the deliberateness with 
which a nonnegligent harm is inflicted is itself a basis for the imposition of strict liability 
occurs in Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964), a case holding a waterworks 
strictly liable for property damage caused by the bursting of one of its underground pipes. 
The waterworks had a practice of leaving its pipes in the ground until they broke, and the 
court found this practice a ground for the imposition of strict liability. "It is," the court 
explained, "neither just nor reasonable that the city engaged in a proprietary activity can 
deliberately and intentionally plan to leave a watermain underground beyond inspection and 
maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability." 131 N.W.2d at 770; see also Norfolk 
& W. Ry. Co. v. Amicon Fruit Co., 269 F. 559 (4th Cir. 1920) (holding a private company 
liable for recurring leaks that occurred without negligence because the court found "plainly 
untenable" the defendant's implicit claim that it was not liable because it could not keep its 
pipeline from leaking). Waterworks are not generally subject to strict liability. See KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 53, at 550. When defendants act in ways that are substantially certain to 
inflict harm on some (but yet unidentified) person, courts are prepared to find the elements 
of battery present. See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990), 
vacated in part 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the allegation of battery 
presented a triable issue in a pollution case when the defendant disposed of highly toxic 
substances into sandy ground directly above a regional aquifer, because there was sufficient 
evidence that the defendant "knew that its conduct was substantially certain to cause an 
offensive or harmful contact"); Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 
1986) (adopting the "substantial certainty" test for determining what counts as intentional 
wrongdoing that is exempt from the exclusivity provisions of Michigan's worker's compensa­
tion statute). Such certain migration of hazardous materials may also establish a trespass. 
See Scribner v. Summers, 84 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1996); cf. State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. 
Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (subjecting disposal of hazardous wastes "that seeps 
onto the land of others" to strict liability on theory of Rylands v. Fletcher). 
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devices, they may therefore do so knowing the toll in life and limb 
that their decisions will exact. That fact alone, however, does not 
give rise to any special culpability. 
Furthermore, even if the incidence of manufacturing defect­
related injuries was foreseen with unique clairvoyance by product 
manufacturers, there is no reason to believe that such clairvoyance 
is, by itself, morally significant. Ignorance of the natural and prob­
able consequences of one's actions may be bliss, but it does not 
exculpate those blessed with it from responsibility for harms that 
the reasonably clairvoyant would have foreseen. Accident law con­
cluded long ago that responsibility cannot hinge on the clarity and 
self-consciousness with which one appreciates the results of one's 
actions.187 
Construed as a claim that manufacturing defects are special be­
cause defects will persist at any level of investment in safety precau­
tions, so that the residual defect rate is deliberately chosen, the 
point is equally unpersuasive. Innumerable risks are imposed in 
equally deliberate ways. For example, even if all reasonable pre­
cautions are taken, the transport of large quantities of gasoline by 
tractor trailer appears certain to issue in serious harm in the long 
run. Surely, the amount of harm in which this practice issues is sen­
sitive to the level of precaution. Settling on a reasonable level of 
precaution is therefore tantamount to deliberately choosing, in an 
abstract and statistical way, to sacrifice a certain number of lives, 
and a certain amount of property. Essentially the same observation 
might be made about the construction and operation of reservoirs. 
These, too, will occasionally rupture, even if all reasonable precau­
tions are taken. The frequency with which they rupture is almost 
certainly sensitive to the care with which they are constructed and 
operated. 
In fact, all activities may involve the deliberate imposition of 
some risks. Negligence law explicitly contemplates the existence of 
a residual level of risk once all reasonable precautions have been 
taken and insists that it is more reasonable for victims to bear this 
level of risk than to try to reduce it further.188 Unless this argument 
is always wrong, the fact that residual risks remain, and are deliber­
ately imposed, cannot be enough to justify the imposition of strict 
liability. 
187. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). 
188. See Keating, supra note 57, at 350-52. 
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Another line of thought shares the Restatement's conviction 
that certain kinds of enterprise-related harms are intentionally 
wrongful in some way, but it locates their wrongfulness in the statis­
tical certainty of the harm associated with large enterprises.189 
Large public and private construction projects provide the canoni­
cal examples here. When we tunnel under the English channel, 
construct a highway, or build a skyscraper, the "cost" in lives lost 
and limbs crushed may be foreseeable with considerable actuarial 
precision. Decisions to commence and carry through such projects 
therefore involve intending the "accidental" injuries and deaths 
that the projects inevitably entail. When we will the realization of 
an end, we will the means necessary to its attainment. By virtue of 
the statistical certainty that accompanies their great size, large en­
terprises intend the accidental harms that their actions cause. 
The claim that actors are subject to a special kind of culpability 
when they set in motion (or sustain) processes that are statistically 
certain to cause harm sweeps too broadly. Highway fatalities on 
Fourth of July weekends are actuarially predictable with great pre­
cision,190 yet no one thinks that we are, as a society, collectively 
culpable for failing to forbid driving on Fourth of July weekends. 
So too, no one believes either that we collectively "intend" the acci­
dents statistically certain to occur in the tunnels leading in and out 
of New York City, or that we are collectively responsible for those 
189. I have the impression that this kind of example is part of the oral culture of torts 
scholarship and that it owes its prominence to economically inclined writers, who use it to 
make two kinds of points. The first is that "we" as a society do not assign infinite value to 
human life. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault 
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965) ("Our society is not committed to 
preserving life at any cost . . . .  Ventures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain 
to cost lives. Thus, we build a tunnel under Mont Blanc because it is essential to the Com· 
mon Market and cuts down the traveling time from Rome to Paris, though we know that 
about a man per kilometer of tunnel will die."). The second is that our collective rationality 
is suspect because "in the uncustomary case of an individual - a known individual rather 
than a statistical unknown - in a position of life or death, we are apt to spend very much 
more to save him than in any conceivable money sense he is worth." Id. Rescues - for 
example, of trapped miners - are the canonical examples of the phenomenon Calabresi has 
in mind. Calabresi continues: "[W]hile I do not doubt this is as it should be, it seems odd 
that we should refuse to apply the same standards of 'value beyond any price' when we deal 
with the same man's life as part of a statistic." Id. 
The charge of collective irrationality is rooted in economists' distinctively consequentialist 
view of social morality. "The economist's instinct in all such cases is to say that the only 
rational strategy is that which maximizes the numbers of lives saved at the least sacrifice of 
other ends." FRIED, supra note 15, at 208. My arguments here address only one aspect of the 
"problem of statistical lives." 
190. The National Safety Council both estimates highway fatalities for major holidays 
and keeps actual statistics on the matter. In 1995 the NSC estimated that there would be 636 
fatalities on the Fourth of July; there were 631. Telephone Interview between Charles Sewell, 
research assistant to Professor Gregory Keating, and Alan Hoskins, manager of the statistics 
department at the National Safety Council in Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 15, 1996). 
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accidents, simply because we choose to operate those tunnels. In 
all of these cases, the language of proximate cause - of directness 
and intervening acts - is necessary to mark morally relevant dis­
tinctions. In all of these cases, when actuarially foreseeable acci­
dents issue in actual harm, that harm "will generally have been 
preventable, and its occurrence will be much more directly trace­
able to the wrongful agency of persons more immediately con­
cerned. "191 Attending, as this line of thought does, only to overall 
consequences and their statistical foreseeability leads us to ignore 
fundamental distinctions that affect both the grounds and the extent 
of responsibility for harm. 
The language and concepts of proximate cause point us towards 
the relevant distinctions. Some instances of enterprise liability are 
marked by a distinctive and culpable kind of intentionality. In 
these instances, the enterprise's acts or omissions are the direct (or 
if you prefer, proximate) cause of the plaintiff's injury. The enter­
prise both controls the events causing the accident, and intends the 
actions or inactions that lead to the accident. In Lubin v. Iowa 
City, 192 for example, the waterworks had exclusive control over the 
maintenance of the pipes that ruptured, and intended the actions -
leaving the pipes in place until they failed - that led to the plain­
tiff's injury. 
The kind of direct responsibility that is present in Lubin is mor­
ally significant. When enterprises are directly responsible for 
harms, their conduct stands in need of justification. This is not a 
special principle of enterprise liability, but a general principle of 
morality. If we know anything, we know that the gratuitous inflic­
tion of injury and death is unacceptable. The knowledge that such 
justification is required is a basic part of our moral sensibility, part 
of the perceptiveness and discernment that marks competent moral 
agents.193 When the harm is inflicted deliberately, and when the 
191. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and 
Allowing, 48 Pmr.. REv. 2�, 304 (1989). 
192. 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1965). 
193. See, e.g., BARBARA HERMAN, The Practice of Moral Judgment, in THE PRACTICE OF 
MoRALJUDGMENT 73, 82 (1993) (citing the knowledge that the infliction of unnecessary hurt 
and pain is something that "must (morally) be avoided" as a canonical example of the kind of 
moral perception that competent moral agents possess). Herman stresses, I think rightly, 
that the acquisition of such knowledge is "the substantive core in a moral upbringing." Id. at 
82. This perception is one of the sources of the conviction, expressed by some courts, that 
strict liability is presumptively more just than negligence liability. See, e.g., Green v. General 
Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928). The Green court wrote: 
[T]he rule that injury may exist without liability is, as has been so well stated by another 
court, "contrary to the general rule of liability where injury is caused; and since, in a. 
sense, it is a preference of the rights of one property owner or user over that of another; 
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agent who inflicted the harm is directly responsible for doing so, the 
demand for justification is all the stronger. 
Because action, not knowledge, is the fundamental ground of 
responsibility for accidental harm, mere knowledge of statistically 
certain harm, however actuarially precise, does not give rise to this 
demand for justification. When such knowledge is joined to action, 
in the form of a decision to initiate a large and complex project, the 
demand for justification arises, but it is also quite readily met. 
Those who initiate massive construction projects are rarely those in 
direct control of the circumstances that precipitate the accidents 
that their decision makes statistically inevitable. Primary responsi­
bility for avoiding statistically certain accidents must be lodged with 
actors closer to the dangers that occasion those accidents.194 
The core cases of enterprise liability - including manufacturing 
defects - are marked by direct control. Herein lies the force of the 
Restatement's observation about the deliberate and predictable 
character of manufacturing defects.195 Manufacturers exercise di­
rect and essentially exclusive control over the rate of manufacturing 
defects. The manufacturer's decisions about materials, production 
and inspection determine how often people's expectations for the 
products will be disappointed and how often their physical integrity 
will be violated. In Bushey, the Coast Guard controlled the risk 
that one of its sailors would tortiously damage the drydock's prop­
erty. The drydock lacked the legal authority to supervise the Coast 
Guard's employees. In cases like Rylands, legal authority over the 
risk is likewise lodged in the hands of the injurer on whose property 
the danger is created. Even in a more complex, abnormally danger-
and since the law is a jealous guardian of the right to lawfully use property without 
interference or diminution . . .  the rule which allows such injury without liability therefor 
is an exception which is and should be narrowly limited and carefully confined." 
Green, 270 P. at 955 (citation omitted). I am not making as strong a claim for the importance 
of this perception. 
194. It must be said, however, that the placement of primary responsibility for accident 
prevention in the hands of other agents does not absolve those who initiate such projects of 
all responsibility for foreseeable harm. Several kinds of "secondary" responsibilities (or du­
ties) may arise out of decisions to initiate complex projects when those decisions are made 
knowing that harm will probably result. Duties to hire competent personnel and supervise 
them adequately, duties to mitigate harms by providing for medical care, and duties to pro­
vide various forms of insurance (such as liability, worker's compensation, and disability) are 
all examples of secondary duties. While I believe that some forms of enterprise liability 
discharge such secondary duties, the proponents of the line of argument that I am consider­
ing write as if they think that statistical certainty of harm makes those who set large construc­
tion projects in motion primarily responsible for the accidental harm occasioned by those 
projects. The discussion in the text accompanying notes 210-215 infra illustrates aspects of 
enterprise liability that reflect "secondary duties." 
195. See supra text accompanying note 185. 
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ous activity case like Siegler, the injurer is in a position to exert 
control over related entities in the overall enterprise.196 
The rhetoric of enterprise liability is thus right to insist that in­
tentionality matters, at least in some circumstances. The kind of 
intentionality that has attracted the attention of courts and com­
mentators marks direct control over the circumstances leading up 
to an accident, and action that makes a particular kind of accident 
all but inevitable. When these circumstances hold, an enterprise 
may fairly be said to "intend the accident," and its conduct gives 
rise to a demand for justification. 
C. What's Wrong With Efficient Injuries? 
The presence of intentionality - and the control that it signals 
- only raises another question. Why is it wrong to intend an acci­
dent in this way, when everyone agrees that you are under no duty 
to take greater precautions to prevent that accident? Even if the 
waterworks in Lubin exercised direct control over the rate of 
watermain breakage, and deliberately chose to permit breaks rather 
than preventing them, what is wrong with its conduct? 
Indeed, from a consequentialist perspective, the waterworks' 
conduct looks irreproachable.197 There is good reason to believe 
that the practice of leaving pipes in the ground until they rupture 
minimizes the combined costs of preventing burst pipes and bearing 
196. If the cause of the accident turns out to be defective equipment, "the commercial 
transporter . . .  is in the best position to hold the manufacturer to account." Siegler v. Kuhl­
man, 502 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wash. 1973). 
197. By "consequentialist" I mean a view that "the chief point of morality is to make 
things go better overall - to increase average or total welfare within the human commu­
nity." Quinn, supra note 191, at 312. "Nonconsequentialism," by contrast, takes the chief 
point of political morality to define the terms of free association among equal, self-governing 
persons. So conceived, the contrast between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism is 
simply the contrast between utilitarianism and Kantian social contract theory, expressed in a 
vocabulary slightly different from the one I favor. As long as we heed Rawls's caution that 
nonconsequentialism does not ignore consequences, this vocabulary should highlight the con­
trasts that presently interest me. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 30 
("All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging right­
ness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy."). One obvious way in which 
nonconsequentialism attends to consequences is by examining how various arrangements af­
fect the central interests of each person. 
The general debate over consequentialism is broader than my focus here. For example, 
consequentialism has been taken to task for its inability to recognize and account for the 
expressive dimensions of morality. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Conse­
quences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 954-66 
(1991); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social 
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 2121 (1990). 
While these expressive concerns are not my primary focus here, Kantian social contract the­
ory has an important expressive dimension - it insists that the status of citizens as free, 
equal, self-governing persons be publicly affirmed and manifested by democratic political 
practices. 
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the costs of the accidents occasioned by their bursting. So long as 
we are prepared to take wealth as the best general surrogate for 
utility or goodness, as law and economics increasingly does, 19s this 
practice produces the most good in the world. If consequentialism 
is correct in insisting that overall goodness is the ultimate touch­
stone of morality, then there is no basis for the Lubin court's 
indignation. 
For the moral indignation expressed in the Lubin opinion to be 
well founded, the reasons and conclusions of consequentialism must 
deny something whose moral significance is substantial. On a Kant­
ian view, consequentialism does just that. It denies that persons 
have legitimate claims that are neither derived from, nor ordinarily 
overridden by, considerations of the general good. Powerful as con­
sequentialism is, its basic claim rejects one of our most cherished 
convictions. On a consequentialist view, the lives and property of 
individual persons have no independent moral significance. Society 
may do with them whatever is best for the whole - whatever pro­
motes the general good. 
Kantian social contract theory thinks otherwise. It takes as fun­
damental the conviction that any decent political morality must ac­
knowledge our status as self-governing beings, and must grant to 
each of us fundamental authority over our own lives. Consequen­
tialism turns that authority over to the community at large, and 
leases it back to us only to the extent that granting individual rights 
and liberties that we need to be the masters of our own destinies 
promotes the general good. It regards persons not as sources of 
moral claims that constrain the pursuit of general welfare, but as 
sources of the welfare that is to be maximized, and as lines along 
which it is to be parceled out. 
The very consequentialism naturally invoked to justify leaving 
pipes in the ground until they rupture is therefore ground for moral 
198. Cost-benefit analysis as customarily practiced by legal economists generally takes 
wealth as a surrogate for utility. See Keating, supra note 57, at 334-36. The familiar argu­
ment that every legal institution other than the tax system should aim at efficiency, while the 
tax system addresses distributive concerns because redistribution is accomplished most 
cheaply via the tax system, has likewise seemed to rest implicitly on a utilitarian framework. 
Louis Kaplow, one of the principal proponents of this argument, recently made his utilitari­
anism explicit. Standard instances of the argument include, inter alia, A. MITCHELL 
POUNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10, 113 (2d ed. 1989); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System ls Less Efficient Than the Income Tax Sys­
tem in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994); Steven Shaven, A Note on 
Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Mat­
ter Given Optimal Income Taxation, 71 AM. EcoN. REv. 414, 417 (1981). Kaplow's utilitari­
anism is laid bare in Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call 
for Utilitarianism, 48 NATI.. TAX J. 497 (1995). 
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indignation. By asserting that the plaintiff has no claim for redress 
because the damage to the plaintiff's property maximizes the gain 
to society as a whole, the consequentialist justification of the water­
works' practice denies that the property really belongs to the plain­
tiff. By asserting that his physical integrity might be sacrificed on 
the same ground, consequentialism also denies that the plaintiff's 
life is really his. If the plaintiff's physical integrity may be sacrificed 
whenever so doing maximizes the gain to society as a whole, then 
the plaintiff holds his life and property in trust for the general good, 
and may assert only those claims on his own behalf that promote 
the general good. 
If we think that people are free and equal - beings with pur­
poses of their own to pursue and lives of their own to lead, and 
equally so - then we will believe that their legitimate claims do not 
derive exclusively from considerations of the general good. We will 
think that their most fundamental claims flow from, and express, 
their freedom and equality. We will regard the waterworks' prac­
tice as suspect, and we will view the consequentialist justification 
for that behavior as unacceptable. 
D. What's Unreasonable About Reasonable Injuries? 
The rejection of consequentialism sets the stage for the defense 
of Lubin's conclusion that the intentional, albeit nonnegligent, tak­
ing of the plaintiff's property is wrong, but it does not make out that 
defense. Even if we grant that considerations of fairness take prior­
ity over those of efficiency, and even if we grant that settling the 
question of a practice's social rationality does not settle the ques­
tion of its reasonableness, we still have work to do. The problem is 
this: the conduct of the waterworks may be as reasonable as it is 
rational. When we turn our attention away from questions of effi­
ciency and rationality, and towards questions of freedom and rea­
sonableness, we confront a powerful argument that the waterworks 
acted in a reasonable manner. 
The reasonableness of requiring a precaution to be taken turns 
on the balance between the benefit that the precaution bestows on 
the security of prospective victims, and the burden that it imposes 
on the freedom of action of prospective injurers. Reasonable pre­
cautions enhance the security of victims more than they impair the 
freedom of action of injurers. By so doing, they help to reconcile 
the competing claims of freedom of action and security in a way 
that provides the most favorable terms for persons to pursue their 
1348 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1266 
conceptions of the good over complete lives.199 Judged by this stan­
dard, the practice of the waterworks may well be eminently 
reasonable. 
In order to reduce the risks of pipe rupture below their present 
level, the waterworks would either have to dig up and inspect its 
pipes, or replace them, at short and regular intervals. Pipe ruptures 
are relatively infrequent, and the harm that they inflict is relatively 
modest. The cost of unearthing and inspecting them regularly, by 
contrast, is likely to prove substantial, and not only financially. The 
disruption of daily life created by digging in densely populated 
areas is not likely to prove trivial. Because the benefits to the se­
curity of prospective victims are relatively modest, and the burdens 
to prospective injurers are substantial, it is probably unreasonable 
to insist on regular inspection of the pipes. 
The relative burdens and benefits of regular replacement are a 
closer call. If deterioration - as opposed to latent defects or 
changed subsoil conditions - is the primary cause of rupture, and if 
the rate of deterioration is predictable, this precaution may be quite 
effective. If replacement can be done less frequently than regular 
inspection, the cost and disruption of this precaution may be signifi­
cantly less than the cost and disruption of regular inspection. Even 
so, regular replacement still may not be warranted in light of the 
relatively infrequent and modest harm that water pipes inflict when 
they rupture. The balance of considerations is close, and the judg­
ment of reasonableness is hard to make. Equally significant, the 
information necessary to make that judgment - information about 
the causes of rupture, the effectiveness of regular replacement, the 
appropriate interval, and so on - is not easy to come by. In light 
of the even balance of the relevant considerations, and our igno­
rance of the exact facts on which the judgment of due care turns, we 
cannot confidently claim that the waterworks ' practice is 
unreasonable. 
Because the waterworks' practice of leaving pipes in place until 
they rupture seems to be both socially rational and reasonable, the 
facts of Lubin vividly illustrate the principal challenge involved in 
justifying enterprise liability. Negligence law leaves the financial 
costs of nonnegligent accidents on victims, unless those accidents 
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. En­
terprise liability shifts the costs of nonnegligent accidents to the ac­
tivities that engender them. Even more strikingly, enterprise 
199. See Keating, supra note 57, at 349-60. 
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liability shifts those costs in circumstances when the benefits of the 
underlying risks are not asymmetrical in the way that they are when 
those risks are nonreciprocal.200 Why is it reasonable to require 
that the costs of some nonreciprocal risk impositions be shifted in 
this way? 
VII. THE REASONABLENESS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
From a Kantian perspective, the basic task of tort law is to rec­
oncile liberty and security on fair (or reasonable) terms. Fair terms 
are mutually beneficial because they reconcile liberty and security 
in ways that supply each citizen with favorable circumstances for 
realizing her conception of the good. In accident law, the fairest -
or most reasonable - terms reconcile the competing claims of free­
dom and security in a way that secures for citizens the most 
favorable conditions for the sustained pursuit of their conceptions 
of the good.201 Such terms can rightly claim the allegiance of our 
sense of justice. They further the good of each of us on terms that 
acknowledge our equal freedom and value as citizens. 
In choosing between enterprise and negligence liability, there­
fore, we must ask: Which liability regime reconciles more fairly the 
liberty of injurers and the security of victims? Which liability re­
gime secures more favorable terms for persons to pursue their con­
ceptions of the good over complete lives? 
In answering these questions, we must recall the constraints im­
posed by the interpretive character of our endeavor. First, an inter­
pretively adequate social contract theory must explain why the fair 
allocation of responsibility for accidental harm among free and 
equal persons requires negligence liability in some circumstances 
and enterprise liability in others. A fully adequate social contract 
theory will do more than this: it will explain why the choice of a 
liability regime should be governed by the reciprocity of risk crite­
rion in some circumstances and by the principle of burden-benefit 
proportionality in others. Second, an adequate theory of enterprise 
liability must do justice to the fundamental contrast between enter­
prise and negligence liability, and must explain why it is reasonable 
for enterprises to impose the non.negligent risks characteristic of 
their activities but unreasonable to ask victims to bear the financial 
costs of the accidents that issue from those reasonable risks. Third, 
a successful account of enterprise liability will illuminate and sup-
200. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
201. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
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port the logic that drives its delineation of limits and defenses, par­
ticularly their indifference to optimal precaution and insurance 
concerns. Fourth and finally, a satisfactory social contract theory of 
enterprise liability will show why the elements of the enterprise lia­
bility rhetoric of fairness identify circumstances in which enterprise 
liability is, by social contract criteria, fairer than negligence. Such 
an account will throw the weight of social contract theory behind 
the prima facie force of the principle of burden-benefit 
proportionality. 
With these interpretive constraints in place, we may return to 
the questions themselves. Which liability regime reconciles free­
dom and security more fairly? Which liability regime strikes a more 
favorable balance between these competing forms of liberty? 
These questions direct our attention to fundamental features of 
negligence liability. A regime of negligence liability confers three 
benefits on those who exercise reasonable care when they expose 
others to risks of injury and death. First, a negligence regime con­
fers on injurers the right to impose certain risks - nonnegligent 
ones - without stigma or criticism. Second, it entitles injurers to 
save the precaution costs necessary to reduce or eliminate those 
risks. Third, negligence frees injurers from bearing the lesser cost 
of compensating those injured by their justified risk impositions. 
By conferring these benefits on prospective injurers, a negligence 
regime imposes corresponding burdens on prospective victims of 
nonnegligent accidents. Injurers capture the benefits of these as­
pects of negligence, and victims bear the burdens. Indeed, these 
asymmetries understate the apparent unfairness of negligence lia­
bility. Negligence liability concentrates the costs of nonnegligent 
risks on the unlucky few injured by accidents issuing out of those 
risks, and leaves the benefits of those accidents in the hands of 
those who impose the risks. 
This asymmetry gives rise to a demand for justification. Be­
cause the exercise of reasonable care does not eliminate all risks, 
because negligence liability leaves the benefits of those risks on in­
jurers and their burdens on victims, and because that asymmetry 
might be changed by imposing strict liability, the decision to insist 
only on the exercise of reasonable care requires justification. 
A. Mutuality of Risk and Harm 
Social contract theory has traditionally met this burden by in­
voking the idea of reciprocal risk imposition: citizens imposing 
risks on each other that are equal in probability and magnitude, 
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imposed for equally good reason, and imposed for sufficiently good 
reason. When risks are imposed for good and sufficient reason, 
each citizen gains more from the right to impose risks than she loses 
from the exposure to risks legitimately imposed by others.202 When 
risks are perfectly reciprocal, each citizen gains an equivalent 
amount in the way of freedom, loses an equivalent amount in the 
way of security (both for equivalently good reasons), and on bal­
ance gains more from her increased freedom than she loses from 
her decreased security. Perfect reciprocity of risk thus strikes the 
most favorable balance between the competing claims of security 
and freedom of action for citizens concerned to pursue their con­
ceptions of the good over complete lives, so long as they are pre­
pared to do so on fair terms. 
These considerations establish that citizens should have the 
right to impose certain risks - those that further their liberty more 
than they threaten their security. They do not, however, establish 
that these risks should be imposed subject to negligence liability 
rather than to strict liability. Unless we believe, implausibly, that 
the exercise of due care eliminates all risk, the question of responsi­
bility for residual risks remains an issue that must be addressed. 
Accidental property damage, personal injury, and death are no less 
disruptive of human lives just because they are inflicted without 
negligence. Victims still have an interest in minimizing these dis­
ruptions, and they still have a claim that those who impose and ben­
efit from the risks that result in these harms should also be 
responsible for minimizing their effects. 
Reciprocity theory rebuts the claim of the victims of nonnegli­
gent accidents to impose strict liability only by arguing that the im­
position of strict liability would disrupt the lives of injurers in an 
equally detrimental way, without apportioning the burdens and 
benefits of accidental injury any more fairly. In the world of acts, 
this argument is sound. Actors in the world of acts are actuarially 
small and independent of one another; they impose risk infre­
quently, and the incidence of nonnegligent harm issuing from their 
activities is unpredictable. In the world of acts, the risk of being 
held liable for an unpreventable accident is no more manageable 
than the risk of being injured or killed by a unpreventable risk. 
Strict liability is therefore as disruptive of freedom as negligence is 
- it just disrupts the freedom of action of injurers instead of dis­
rupting the security of victims. 
202. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
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· Just as strict liability is no less disruptive of liberty than negli­
gence liability, so too, it is no fairer. In the world of acts, the impo­
sition of strict liability simply shifts those financial burdens of 
nonnegligent accidents from unlucky victims to unlucky injurers. 
Fairness calls not for loss shifting, but for distributing the costs of 
nonnegligent accidents across those who impose, or benefit from 
the imposition of, nonnegligent risks of the kind that issued in the 
injury at hand. This distribution requires not only that the inci­
dence of nonnegligent harms issuing from particular risks be rea­
sonably foreseeable, but also that those who impose risks of the 
same kind be linked in such a way that the imposition of strict lia­
bility spreads the costs of nonnegligent harms across them as a 
class. In the world of acts, nonnegligent accidents are unpredict­
able, and actors are small and independent. Strict liability shifts the 
costs of nonnegligent harms from particular victims to particular in­
jurers, but it does not spread those costs across a class of injurers 
who generally benefit from the imposition of that risk. 
In the world of acts, then, shifting the financial costs of a non­
negligent accident to the particular actor who occasioned it is no 
fairer than leaving it where it falls. So doing only shifts misfortune 
around, and arbitrarily so. In the absence of nonreciprocity of risk 
imposition, there is no reason to single out the particular injurer 
unlucky enough to have imposed the particular risk that issued in 
the victim's harm to bear its financial costs. The only difference 
between the injurer and countless others who imposed identical 
nonnegligent risks is luck. The only difference between the injurer 
and the victim is that the injurer had the misfortune to occasion the 
injury, whereas the victim had the misfortune to suffer it. The only 
difference between strict liability and negligence is that the former 
pins the bad luck on the unlucky injurer, the latter pins the bad luck 
on the unlucky victim. Moving the costs of her misery around may 
console the victim and discomfort the injurer, but the misery is 
equally great, and equally undeserved, in both cases.203 
In sum, just as there is no improvement in the balance of secur­
ity and liberty when strict liability disrupts the liberty of injurers as 
203. Nonreciprocal risks are a different matter. When risks are reciprocal, the preexisting 
distribution of risk - as opposed to harm - is fair. When risks are nonreciprocal, the pre­
existing distribution of risk is not so fair: prospective victims lose more in the way of security 
than they gain in the way of liberty. Nonreciprocal risks impair the security of victims more 
than they benefit their liberty, because nonreciprocal risks are ones whose imposition is not 
part of a normal life. For most people, then, the value of a right to impose a nonreciprocal 
risk is generally less than the disvalue of having to bear exposure to one. The payment of 
compensation to the victims of nonnegligent but nonreciprocal risk compensates for this un­
derlying asymmetry of benefit and restores mutuality of benefit, so far as practicable. 
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much as negligence disrupts the security of victims, so too, there is 
no improvement in the fairness with which accident costs are dis­
tributed when strict liability merely shifts unpredictable and unde­
served misfortune from the victim to the injurer. Fairness in the 
distribution of nonnegligent accident costs requires their apportion­
ment across the class of those who impose, or benefit from the im­
position of, risks of the relevant kind. The lucky, as well as the 
unlucky, must pay their share. In the world of acts, strict liability 
cannot reach them. Strict liability shifts, but does not spread, the 
costs of nonnegligent accidents. It is thus no fairer than negligence. 
When we leave the world of acts and enter the world of activi­
ties, the character of nonnegligent accidents and the effects of strict 
- that is, enterprise - liability change markedly. Nonnegligent 
harm is no longer a matter of unpredictable misfortune. It is some­
thing foreseen with statistical precision, and inflicted with delibera­
tion. Strict liability no longer shifts a concentrated misfortune from 
victim to injurer - it spreads that cost across those who benefit 
from the activity. 
The move from the world of acts to the world of activities thus 
shifts the balance of reasons favoring negligence over strict liability. 
In the world of acts, when risks are reciprocal, negligence liability is 
more reasonable than enterprise liability because the financial costs 
of nonnegligent accidental harm cannot be fairly distributed. Strict 
liability thus incurs administrative costs without delivering substan­
tive benefits. In the world of activities, strict liability distributes the 
financial costs of nonnegligent accidents across those who benefit 
from the imposition of the risks that inevitably issue in them, and 
who therefore deserve to bear them.204 In the world of activities, 
strict liability is a more reasonable liability regime than negligence, 
even when the burdens and benefits of the underlying risk imposi­
tions are themselves fairly distributed, and even when licensing 
their imposition strikes a more reasonable balance between the 
competing claims of liberty and security than would be achieved by 
forbidding them. 
Even in the world of activities, natural persons live in the world 
of acts. However certain highway fatalities are in the aggregate, 
204. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 396408 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that, in the 
automobile accident context, nonfault liability aligns financial responsibility with moral de­
sert better than fault liability does, because fault liability concentrates massive losses on 
those momentarily careless drivers unfortunate enough to seriously injure someone, whereas 
nonfault liability distributes the financial costs of such accidents across all those who create 
similar risks). 
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and their incidence in each of our lives is highly uncertain. How­
ever certain explosions are when tractor trailers haul gasoline, our 
individual encounters with such explosions are utterly random.205 
However inevitable burst water pipes are, that it happens to any 
one of us is anything but inevitable. For victims, accidents are un­
predictable and profoundly disruptive events. Both their incidence 
and their impact need to be minimized. For enterprises, by con­
trast, accidental injury and death are far more predictable and far 
less disruptive. Enterprises live in - indeed they constitute - the 
world of activities. Enterprises are therefore able to anticipate 
those accidents that issue from their characteristic risks, minimize 
their incidence in advance, and disperse their costs after the fact.206 
In the world of activities, then, the choice between strict liability 
and negligence is no longer a choice between equally grave disrup­
tions of security and liberty. In the world of activities, strict liability 
does not shatter the freedom of injurers by forcing them to bear the 
concentrated costs of accidents whose incidence they cannot antici­
pate any more accurately than victims. In the world of activities, 
strict liability forces enterprises to bear the eminently foreseeable 
costs of their. characteristic risks - costs whose incidence they are 
in an excellent position to estimate and minimize ex ante, and to 
disperse ex post. Negligence liability places greater burdens on the 
security of victims. It asks them to bear the distinctive risks of 
others activities - risks that they either cannot control or cannot 
reasonably be asked to control,2°7 risks whose materialization may 
well prove devastating, and risks whose incidence is, from their per-
205. For example: 
Seventeen-year-old Carol J. House died in the flames of a gasoline explosion when her 
car encountered a pool of thousands of gallons of spilled gasoline. She was driving home 
from her after-school job in the early evening of November 22, 1967 . . . . [I]t was dark 
but dry; her car's headlamps were burning. There was a slight impact with some object, 
a muffled explosion, and then searing flames from gasoline pouring out of an overturned 
trailer tank engulfed her car. 
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Wash. 1972). The phenomenon emphasized here is 
another facet of the disproportion between freedom and security that underlies the social 
contract case for the "disproportion test" in negligence law and Charles Fried's rejection of 
the standard of individual rationality for interpersonal risks. See FRIED, supra note 15, at 
192; Keating, supra note 57, at 352-60. 
206. As Justice Traynor noted: 
[T]he manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre­
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of 
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of 
doing business. 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), 
207. See infra text following note 238. 
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spective, largely beyond meaningful prediction. As compensation 
for these threats to their security, a regime of negligence liability 
offers victims a boon to their freedom of action, namely the liberty 
to impose equivalent "characteristic risks" on others without the 
duty of redressing any ensuing harm to natural persons or property. 
The benefit to freedom here looks plainly less than the burden to 
security: few if any of us stand to benefit much from the right to 
expose others to the level of drunkenness characteristic of the 
Coast Guard's activity; to the risk of pipe breakage characteristic of 
the waterworks' activity; or to the risks of fire and explosion charac­
teristic of transporting huge quantities of gasoline by tractor trailer. 
For victims to benefit in this way, they would have to be engaged in 
either the same, or an equivalent, activity.zos 
In the world of activities, then, the choice between strict liability 
and negligence is a choice between a grave disruption of security 
and a more modest disruption of liberty. Activity liability strikes a 
more favorable balance between the competing claims of liberty 
and security than negligence liability does, because activity liability 
disrupts the liberty of injurers less than negligence impairs the se­
curity of victims. Enterprise liability thus secures more favorable 
conditions than negligence liability for citizens concerned to pursue 
their conceptions of the good over complete lives. 
Just as enterprise liability strikes a more reasonable balance 
than negligence liability between the competing claims of liberty 
and security, it also distributes the financial costs of nonnegligent 
harms more fairly than negligence liability. In the world of acts, the 
choice between negligence and strict liability is a choice between 
208. This requirement of participation in the same, or an equivalent, activity is tighter 
than Charles Fried's idea of reciprocity over time and across activities through the mecha­
nism of a "risk pool." See FRIED, supra note 15, at 187-91. 
There are circumstances when injurers and victims participate in the very same activity, 
and when they do the logic of enterprise liability may well be altered. Driving may be the 
most familiar such circumstance, and "No-Fault" automobile insurance may be the most fa­
miliar adaptation of the logic of enterprise liability. "No-Fault" insurance tailors enterprise 
liability to accommodate the fact that the prospective victims of the "characteristic risks" of 
driving gain a great deal from the freedom to impose the characteristic risks of driving, be­
cause those prospective victims are also and equally prospective injurers. "No-Fault" is a 
form of enterprise liability because it is a nonfault form of liability that seeks to make the 
activity of driving bear its "characteristic" (not just its negligent) costs. It is specially tailored 
to accommodate the participation of victims in the very same enterprise as injurers in two 
ways. First, and less important, "No-Fault" exploits the administrative efficiencies of first­
party insurance. Second, and more important, "No-Fault" pitches damages at a relatively low 
level. This pitching acknowledges the fact that victims have more interest in imposing 
equivalent risks on injurers than in reducing and redressing injuries inflicted by injurers. I 
cannot pursue these matters here, except to note that other nonfault administrative schemes, 
such as worker's compensation, may have similar aims and justifications, either in whole or in 
part. 
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pinning equally grave and equally undeserved misery and misfor­
tune on victims and injurers. In the world of activities, the choice 
between negligence and enterprise liability is a choice between 
leaving a grave and undeserved misfortune on the victim, and in­
flicting a far lesser burden on those who deserve to bear the costs. 
Because activity liability disperses the financial costs of nonnegli­
gent accidents, and distributes them across those who benefit from 
the imposition of the underlying risks, it both minimizes the bur­
dens of nonnegligent accidents and apportions those burdens fairly. 
In short, the argument is this: for social contract theory, the 
choice between negligence and strict liability turns on whether strict 
liability burdens the freedom of injurers more than it benefits the 
security of victims. The point of Fletcher's argument, as I have re­
constructed it, is that, in the world of acts, when risks are reciprocal 
strict liability disrupts the freedom of injurers as much as negligence 
disrupts the security of victims, and it does so without distributing 
the financial costs of nonnegligent accidents more fairly. Injurers 
are no more able than victims to bear the financial costs of nonneg­
ligent accidents, and they are no more able than victims to disperse 
the costs of nonnegligent accidents across those who benefit from 
the imposition of the risks that issue in such accidents. In the world 
of activities, matters are different. Enterprise liability disrupts the 
freedom of injurers less than negligence disrupts the security of vic­
tims, and distributes the costs of nonnegligent accidents across the 
activities that engender them. 
B. The Rhetoric of Intentionality Revisited 
This account of the reasonableness of enterprise liability ex­
plains and justifies the first two elements of its rhetoric of fairness 
- the principle of burden-benefit proportionality and the stress on 
the organized nature of enterprise-related risks - but it does not as 
obviously account for the third element, the emphasis on the "in­
tentional" character of certain enterprise-related accidents. The 
"intentionality" characteristic of core cases of enterprise-related 
harm also connects with the principle of burden-benefit proportion­
ality, but in a different way. 
Earlier, I argued that the "intentionality" that attracts the atten­
tion of courts and commentators is, in fact, best understood as a 
mark of direct control over the circumstances issuing in certain 
kinds of harms (for example, manufacturing defect-related acci­
dents). That kind of direct control matters, I argued, because the 
infliction of harm on other persons or their property requires justifi-
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cation.209 When the harm is inflicted deliberately, and when the 
agent inflicting it is directly responsible for doing so, the demand 
for justification is all the stronger. When we press the demand for 
justification further, we see that the kind of control characteristic of 
large, well-organized enterprises is itself a ground of elevated 
responsibility. 
In this context, control is power - power over the lives, limbs, 
and property of others. When someone exercises heightened power 
over the fundamental interests of others, they are, for that reason 
alone, a candidate for heightened responsibility.210 When someone 
is presumptively entitled to exercise that power over others as she 
sees fit, and for her own benefit, issues of fairness arise immedi­
ately. This is the circumstance of the Coast Guard in Bushey. Its 
broad authority over its sailors gives the Coast Guard a great deal 
of room to expose the drydock to risks of damage from drunken 
sailors roaming back and forth between their berths and Brooklyn. 
Having granted the Tamaroa's personnel access to her on condition 
that they not interfere with Bushey's work or workmen, Ira S. 
Bushey & Sons had exhausted its authority over the coming and 
going of the sailors. Bushey had no more authority over the sailors 
who shuffled back and forth on shore leave, and no more right to 
meddle in their superior officers' control of them, than Fletcher had 
authority over Rylands's use of his own land. Yet the safety of 
Bushey's property depended on the skill with which the Coast 
Guard supervised the comings and goings of sometimes drunken 
sailors. 
Because sailors almost surely lack the assets or insurance neces­
sary to be :financially responsible for the wrongful harms that they 
may inflict during the course of their "employment,"211 the :finan­
cial burdens of their wrongdoing will be borne by the drydock. By 
contrast, the benefits of their use of the drydock will be captured by 
the Coast Guard. Under a regime of negligence liability, the Coast 
Guard will capture the savings that accrue from having to take only 
reasonable precautions to prevent wayward sailors from damaging 
the drydock. Direct control enables those in possession to reap the 
209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
210. This is one of the lessons of "special relationship" law. See supra note 147-49 and 
accompanying text. 
211. This point is fundamental to the economic analysis of vicarious liability. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL Sruo. 29, 42-44 (1972) (discussing 
respondeat superior); Sykes, supra note 178, at 1241-42, 1244-47, 1254-58 (addressing the 
problem of agent insolvency). 
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benefits of a course of action and - in the absence of strict liability 
- to disclaim its burdens. 
The immediate upshot of this is that the rhetoric of intentional­
ity signals a different route to the same summit: direct control relia­
bly marks circumstances when enterprises are in a position to 
capture the benefits of certain kinds of risk impositions without 
bearing the burdens unless strict liability is imposed. This interpre­
tation is supported by language in Lubin, the case most concerned 
with emphasizing deliberateness. The court's observation that it is 
"neither just nor reasonable that the city engaged in a proprietary 
activity can deliberately and intentionally plan to leave a watermain 
underground beyond inspection and maintenance until a break oc­
curs and escape liability" is quickly followed by the further observa­
tion that "[t]he risks from such a method of operation should be 
borne by the water supplier who is in a position to spread the cost 
among the consumers who are in fact the true beneficiaries of this 
practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and maintenance 
costs. "212 
This explanation tempts us to take the presence of direct control 
as simply a different marker of the circumstances when strict liabil­
ity can spread the financial costs of accidents among those who ben­
efit from the risks that issue in them. In part, the presence of direct 
control does accomplish this result. But, in part, control enables an 
enterprise to capture the benefits of a nonnegligent practice. The 
power to fix maintenance practices is what enabled Iowa City to 
capture the cost savings generated by leaving water pipes in the 
ground until they broke. The adoption of such a practice is there­
fore not just a marker of circumstances when burdens can be par­
celed out among beneficiaries - it is also a ground for insisting that 
injurers take the bitter with the sweet: 
If the city accepts the advantages of lower maintenance costs and 
other benefits which result from its practice of burying long lasting 
cast iron pipe six feet underground beyond any reasonable opportu­
nity to inspect and intentionally leaves them there until breaks began 
to occur, it should also expect to pay for the damages resulting from 
such practice as a cost of its doing business in this manner.213 
The applicability of this point is quite general. It was his control 
over his own property that enabled Rylands to capture the benefits 
of a reservoir on his property, and control over their property is the 
power that generally enables landowners to reap the benefits of the 
212. Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1964). 
213. 131 N.W.2d at 771. 
March 1997] Enterprise Liability 1359 
property's use. So too, it is the master's control over his servants 
that generally enables him to reap the benefits of their service.214 
The flip side of this control is that the lives, limbs, and property of 
prospective victims are subject to risks whose nonnegligent circum­
stances they have no power to control. Strict (or enterprise) liabil­
ity rectifies this imbalance: it imposes responsibility on injurers 
commensurate with their power.21s 
VIII. THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF THE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS 
Enterprise liability can be, and has been, justified on three 
grounds: the principle of fairness examined and embraced in this 
paper, the policy of pinning liability on the party in the best posi­
tion to prevent accidents from happening, and the policy of placing 
the loss on the party best able to disperse and distribute it.216 These 
are the three justifications that Friendly considers in Bushey, and 
these are the three justifications that have animated both case law 
and commentary. The argument of this paper - that we should 
follow Friendly's lead and grant pride of place to the principle of 
fairness - does not require us to reject the policies of accident re­
duction and insurance as justifications for enterprise liability. What 
it requires is that we give priority to the principle of responsibility 
for characteristic risk over the policies of accident reduction and 
loss dispersion. Conflicts among these principles are hardly en­
demic. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that enter­
prises are generally in the best position to control the risks that are 
characteristic of their activities, and there is some reason to believe 
that they are usually in the best position to insure against those 
risks as we1i.217 
214. Vicarious liability law could not be more explicit about this. The critical distinction 
between "servants" and independent contractors turns on the master's capacity to control the 
agent. See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 53, §§ 69-71, at 499-516; Sykes, supra note 
178, at 1261-71. 
215. Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) ("[The strict liability test we suggest] requires . . .  only a decision 
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit 
analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once 
it is made." (emphasis omitted)). 
216. See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1209-15 (3d Cir. 1977) (en­
tertaining all three justifications for enterprise liability); see also sources cited supra notes 5 
and 7 (generally embracing the latter two justifications for enterprise liability, even when 
they reject enterprise liability itself). 
217. Strong support for the proposition that enterprises are generally in the best position 
to control the characteristic risks of their activities is supplied both by the closing argument 
of the preceding section - that control enables enterprises to benefit from the imposition of 
certain risks - and by important economic arguments for enterprise liability. See, e.g., Jones, 
1360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1266 
Notwithstanding these overlaps among the three principal justi­
fications for enterprise liability, resting the case for enterprise liabil­
ity primarily on its principle of fairness leads both to a general 
argument for enterprise liability and to a particular conception of 
enterprise liability. Each of these is simple, and each is controver­
sial. The general argument for enterprise liability is the argument 
that it is fair to make enterprises pay for the accidental injuries 
characteristic of their activities whenever doing so will distribute 
the financial burdens of those accidents among those who have 
benefitted from the underlying risk impositions. The particular 
conception is liability for the distinctive risks of an enterprise -
those risks it creates that are "different from those attendant on the 
activities of the community in general. "218 
The fairness argument for enterprise liability is controversial be­
cause, on its face, it sweeps broadly and goes against the grain of 
much contemporary tort thinking. Its basic thrust is that negligence 
liability should be the dominant form of liability in the world of acts 
and actors (with strict liability reserved for nonreciprocal risks), and 
that strict liability (in the guise of enterprise liability) should be the 
dominant form of liability in the world of enterprises and activities. 
While this aligns social contract theory with legal realism, and puts 
it in sync with the long ascendancy of enterprise liability in the first 
eighty-plus years of this century, it puts social contract theory at 
odds with the dominant position of the law and economics move­
ment, and out of step with an emerging trend in favor of negligence 
liability.219 The fairness conception of enterprise liability is contro-
supra note 46. Support for the proposition that they are often in the best position to insure 
against those risks is provided by Calabresi and by Croley and Hanson. See Guido Calabresi, 
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-27 (1961); 
Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis?, supra note 7; Hanson & Logue, supra note 7. But 
see Geistfeld, supra note 46; Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7; Priest, Tort Reform, supra 
note 7; Schwartz, supra note 7. 
218. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968). 
219. The normative implications of social contract theory and economic analysis and the 
facts of legal history are more ambiguous and complex than this sentence's crude generaliza­
tions suggest. But crude generalizations can paint big pictures accurately, and these general­
izations do just that. For a summary of, and a citation to, the views of legal realists, see 
Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 1. For evidence of the rise of enterprise liability in the twentieth 
century, consider worker's compensation statutes, "No-Fault" automobile insurance, early 
products liability law, and the expansion of vicarious and abnormally dangerous activity lia­
bility. Although both articles overplay their hands (or their fears), Smith's Sequel to Work­
men's Compensation Acts and Priest's The Invention of Enterprise Liability nicely capture the 
sense of enterprise liability's ascendance throughout most of the century. See Jeremiah 
Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV L. REV. 235, 344 (1917) 
(prophesying the triumph of enterprise liability); Priest, supra note 5 (proclaiming the fulfill­
ment of Smith's prophesy). For the present consensus of law and economics scholars against 
enterprise liability, see Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 
1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); Epstein, supra note 7; Geistfeld, supra note 46; Priest, Insur-
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versial because, if it is correct, one of the most familiar and influen­
tial criticisms of enterprise liability is simply off the mark. 
George Priest's famous and influential piece, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability, concludes that all enterprise liability is deeply 
flawed because enterprise liability is inherently illimitable.220 If the 
argument of this paper is correct, Priest's criticism is simply wrong. 
The principle of benefit-burden proportionality leads to a concep­
tion of enterprise liability as liability for characteristic risk, and this 
conception places a boundary on the liability of enterprises. Con­
ceived as a matter of fairness, enterprise liability ceases at the point 
when "the activities of the 'enterprise' do not . . .  create risks differ­
ent from those attendant on the activities of the community in gen­
eral. "221 As we have seen,222 this boundary characterizes not only 
vicarious liability, at least when fairness is its principal justification, 
but also strict liability for wild animals, "vicious" domestic animals, 
and abnormally dangerous activities. This boundary defines a form 
of liability that is more extensive than negligence liability, but less 
extensive than absolute liability. 
Notwithstanding Priest's assertions to the contrary, there is no 
reason to think that the boundary-drawing exercises to which the 
principle of liability for characteristic risk commits courts are inher­
ently impossible. Indeed, there is no reason to think that identify-
ance Crisis, supra note 7; Priest, Tort Reform, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 6; Schwartz, 
supra note 7. The works of Croley and Hanson, supra note 7, Hanson and Logue, supra note 
7, and Jones, supra note 46, represent a powerful countertendency, but a countertendency 
nonetheless. The trend in "the law" is represented by the powerful opinions of Judge Posner 
and by the reconceptualization of products liability law around negligence nonns in the Re­
statement (Third) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Gary Schwartz's Prospectus looks likely to continue the trend. 
See PROSPECTUS FOR RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: BASIC PRINCIPLES, REPORT TO THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Nov. 7, 1995). 
220. This is George Priest's thesis in The Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 5, at 
527. Its consideraJ?le influence is shown by the fact that both scholars and courts have 
backed away from imposing enterprise liability on insurance grounds. For example, William 
Jones, who strongly favors the expansion of enterprise liability, eschews insurance as a justifi­
cation for such expansion. See Jones, supra note 46, at 1778 (acknowledging that "the tort 
system is an expensive. and generally unsuitable, mode of social insurance" and emphasizing 
that enterprise liability is justified on other grounds). For evidence that courts have done so 
as well, see Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 791-92 (1992) (claiming that a more prodefendant 
attitude has emerged in products liability cases and arguing that the best explanation for the 
change is "[t]he combination of dramatic increases in insurance rates, widespread reporting 
of the insurance crisis, a multimillion dollar publicity campaign to link the insurance crisis to 
products liability rules, and such rules' effects on daily life" (footnote omitted)). Priest's 
paper was originally presented at a "Conference on Critical Issues in Tort Law Refonn" 
supported by Aetna. See George L. Priest & Richard A. Epstein, Introduction, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 459 (1985). 
221. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172. 
222. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text 
1362 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:1266 
ing zones of characteristic risk is any more difficult than deciding, as 
negligence liability requires, whether certain precautions should 
have been taken. On the whole, it seems likely that the boundary­
drawing exercises required by enterprise liability are sometimes 
easier, and sometimes more difficult, than the judgments of due 
care required by negligence liability. Drawing the boundaries re­
quired by enterprise liability will be substantially easier than mak­
ing the judgments of due care required by negligence liability when 
enterprises engaged in abnormally dangerous activities create risks 
that differ in kind from the ordinary risks of life. It will be more 
difficult when risks arise out of the mingling of multiple activities, 
as they do in the case of railroad crossing accidents. When multiple 
activities (for example, railroading, driving, designing automobiles, 
and regulating the flow of traffic) all contribute to a particular kind 
of accident (for example, automobile-train collisions), sorting out 
the distinctive contributions of each enterprise becomes exceed­
ingly difficult. Proponents of enterprise liability understand this 
difficulty well.223 
In fact, Priest's argument that enterprise liability is inherently 
illimitable speaks neither to the criterion of liability for characteris­
tic risk nor to the idea of fairness that justifies that criterion. His 
argument concerns an entirely different set of justifications for en­
terprise liability, albeit ones that he finds animating the law. Ac­
cording to Priest, "the three presuppositions of manufacturer 
power, manufacturer insurance, and internalization" irresistibly im­
ply "absolute liability,"224 because these three "presuppositions do 
not incorporate any conceptual limit to manufacturer liability."225 
Whether or not Priest is right about the logic of these presupposi­
tions, his argument simply does not speak to the distinctive concep­
tion of enterprise liability in which the idea of fairness issues. 
The enterprise liability principle of fairness bounds the scope of 
liability in another way - it leads to the recognition of ultrasensi­
tivity as a defense. As we have already seen,226 abnormal sensitiv­
ity is a natural boundary of liability for characteristic risk because 
the harm suffered by the abnormally sensitive is characteristic of 
their unusual constitution. Consequently, just as enterprise liability 
ends when the increased risks characteristic of an activity blend into 
223. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 20, at 163; Jones, supra note 46, at 1746, 1750-51, 1754, 
1766 & n.308. 
224. Priest, supra note 5, at 527. 
225. Id. 
226. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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the background risks created by the community's ordinary activi­
ties, so too enterprise liability ends when the increased risks created 
by an enterprise are eclipsed by the even greater risks created by 
the abnormal sensitivity of the victim.227 The conceptual logic be­
hind this defense is thus clear. The link between this conceptual 
logic and the fairness justification for enterprise liability, however, 
is not so clear. There is nothing particularly fair, for example, about 
counting the costs of a rare skin disorder a cost of the victim's ab­
normal sensitivity to an antiperspirant, when the victim.first learns 
of her hypersensitivity through an adverse reaction to a novel 
antiperspirant.228 
This example reinforces the point that liability for characteristic 
risk makes sense only when it is linked to benefit and control. It 
seems fair to recognize hypersensitivity as a defense to liability only 
when the victim is or ought to be aware of her sensitivity, and when 
the victim is in a position to control her contact with the activity to 
which she is abnormally sensitive without unduly burdening her 
right to use her own property as she sees fit, or to lead a normal life 
in the world at large. If the victim's hypersensitivity is not a previ­
ously unknown allergy to a rare chemical, but a well-recognized al­
lergy to a familiar food (strawberries, for instance), then it seems 
fair to make the victim bear the costs of her special sensitivity. So 
too, if minks who have recently given birth to kittens are easily 
frightened, and if blasting is only one of many disturbances that 
might prompt them to kill their kittens, then it seems fair to count 
the costs of their sensitivity as costs of mink farming. If, on the 
227. This argument is put clearly in Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1954). 
The court stated that "strict liability should be confined to consequences which lie within the 
extraordinary risk whose existence calls for such responsibility," 268 P.2d at 647, and held 
that the harm caused when blasting prompted a mother mink to kill her young was attributa­
ble to "the plaintiffs extraordinary and unusual use of land" rather than the "risks inherent 
in blasting operations," 268 P.2d at 648. The court counted the effects of the blasting as 
"relatively moderate" and "no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the commu­
nity" because the plaintiff was the only landowner injured by the blasting. 268 P.2d at 648. 
228. Courts have split on how to handle such cases. One line of cases holds that warnings 
of allergic reactions are appropriate only if the manufacturer can foresee a risk of such reac­
tions in a substantial number of persons. See Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790 (Ala. 
1984); Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Div. 1964), affd., 231 
N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1967); Morris v. Pathmark Corp., 592 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. a. 1991). This 
is a negligence position, and it is adopted by the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1995). Another line of cases imposes a duty to warn of any foreseeable allergy that may be 
serious and rejects, implicitly or explicitly, the defense of hypersensitivity. See Kehm v. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the defense of user's 
idiosyncratic reaction as inapplicable to strict liability claim); Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc., 
244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law). This is essentially a strict liability 
position. 
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other hand, only blasting frightens mink sufficiently to prompt them 
to kill their kittens, it seems fair to count the costs of their sensitiv­
ity as costs of blasting. 
What counts is not how atypical the victim's reaction is, but 
whether it is fair to ask the victim to change her way of life by 
either avoiding contact with, or bearing the costs of exposure to, the 
activity. Whether or not it is fair turns partly on the prominence of 
the sensitivity in the victim's life. The more prominent it is, the less 
the normal course of her life will be disrupted by being required to 
bear the characteristic costs of her ultrasensitivity.229 If the sensitiv­
ity is prominent, she will already have adjusted the normal course 
of her life to the special risks of her sensitivity. The fairness of 
holding victims responsible for the characteristic costs of their hy­
persensitivity is, however, not only a matter of how much it will 
disrupt the normal course of their lives. Fairness is also a matter of 
comparison. We need to measure the disturbance in the victims' 
lives effected by counting their injuries a cost of their peculiar con­
stitutions against the disturbance in the normal course of the enter­
prise's activity effected by holding it strictly liable for the harms 
that it inflicts on hypersensitive individuals. 
The general upshot of this is simple enough: abnormal sensitiv­
ity should be recognized as a defense to liability when bearing the 
costs of such sensitivity will disrupt the normal course of the vic­
tim's life less than pinning those costs on the enterprise will disrupt 
the normal course of its activity. The particular implications are 
varied. In some contexts, counting the hypersensitive plaintiff's in­
juries a cost of the activity might prove enormously burdensome. 
Nuisance law may be such a context.230 In other contexts, such as 
product liability and abnormally dangerous activity liability, count­
ing the rare hypersensitive victim's injuries a cost of the enterprise's 
activity is likely to be substantially less burdensome to the enter­
prise. In these contexts, the defense should be narrowly construed. 
Abnormal sensitivity should absolve the enterprise of responsibility 
229. In Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942), another case of a 
mother mink reacting to blasting by killing her young, the appellant alleged that "by nature, 
habit and disposition all mink, when with and attending their young, are highly excitable and, 
when disturbed, will become terrified and kill their young." 125 P.2d at 794. If this assertion 
is correct, then the ultrasensitivity of mink is prominent in the pertinent way. 
230. See Rogers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768, 772 (Mass. 1888) (holding that ringing a church 
bell every day was not a nuisance even though it caused convulsions in the plaintiff, who was 
recovering from sunstroke, and stating the rule that what constitutes a nuisance must be 
determined by the standard of "ordinary people, as it is, in determining . . .  negligence"). The 
court explained that failing to recognize hypersensitivity as a defense to a claim of nuisance 
might burden other activities excessively. 
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only when the unusual sensitivity of the victim's activity is central to 
her activity - central enough that requiring the victim to regulate 
her exposure to the offending product or abnormally dangerous ac­
tivity does not interfere substantially with the normal course of her 
activities.231 In still other contexts, the defense may have no appli­
cability at all; other considerations may settle the victim's duties to 
the enterprise. Vicarious liability illustrates this possibility - the 
duties of the plaintiff are settled by the substantive law governing 
the underlying tort.232 
Similar considerations support the recognition of assumption of 
the risk as a defense to enterprise liability.233 It seems intuitively 
wrong to count the deliberate, unburdened encounters of strangers 
· with enterprises as characteristic costs of the enterprise. The enter­
prise derives no benefit from such encounters, and is poorly posi­
tioned to control them. By contrast, strangers who freely choose to 
encounter the risks of an enterprise presumably do so because they 
deem the encounter beneficial, and are in the best position to con­
trol their own contacts with the enterprise. Their voluntary en­
counters are thus more "characteristic" of their own activities than 
they are of the activities of the enterprise. 
Once again, the application of the defense will be shaped by 
ancillary considerations and particular contexts. For example, the 
substantive law governing the underlying tort will determine the ap­
plicability of the defense to vicarious liability, just as it determined 
the application of the abnormal sensitivity defense. And, like the 
abnormal sensitivity defense, assumption of the risk has its clearest 
application in the context of wild animals and abnormally danger­
ous activities. These enterprises wear their characteristic risks on 
their sleeves, and property rights usually fix the boundaries of their 
231. Jones argues in connection with "hazardous" activities that the ultrasensitivity de­
fense is "sound if narrowly construed." Jones, supra note 46, at 1757-58. His conclusion rests 
on the premise that the "unusually vulnerable victim is the 'least cost avoider"' with respect 
to her peculiar vulnerabilities because she will be "acutely aware" of those vulnerabilities 
whereas injurers will not. Id. The similarity between my argument and Smith's argument 
underscores the close affinity between fairness arguments focused on characteristic risk and 
risk minimization arguments focused on the capacity to control risk. Victims, like injurers, 
are usually the "least cost avoiders" with respect to the "characteristic" risks of their 
activities. 
232. These variations in the application of the ultrasensitivity defense are another reflec­
tion of the shaping influence of subordinate doctrines and particular contexts on generally 
applicable grounds of responsibility. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text (discuss­
ing the applicability of the reciprocity of risk criterion). 
233. Assumption of the risk has a number of meanings in the law, including "no duty," 
perhaps its most common meaning in modem negligence law. The doctrine that I have in 
mind is a true affirmative defense. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E 
(1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1977). 
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legitimate activity with considerable clarity. Both of these features 
facilitate the application of assumption of the risk doctrine. The 
magnitude and distinctiveness of their characteristic risks makes it 
reasonable to expect victims to recognize those risks ex ante, and 
relatively easy, ex post, to determine if they did recognize those 
risks. The presence of property rights facilitates the judgments of 
burdensomeness on which the voluntariness aspect of the doctrine 
turns.234 
The applicability of assumption of the risk to product liability 
law is more problematic. Misperception of product risks is one of 
the central problems, perhaps the central problem,235 of product lia­
bility law, and its pervasiveness frustrates the application of as­
sumption of the risk doctrine. Victims are in a poor position to 
control their encounters with risks that they do not perceive and 
cannot reasonably be expected to perceive. Historically, the de­
fense has had its greatest formal recognition in connection with 
manufacturing defects, the strictest part of product liability law.236 
The pairing of the strict liability rule and the defense confirms the 
link between assumption of the risk and strict liability, but the 
properties of manufacturing defects severely limit the substantive 
significance of the defense. Manufacturing defects are generally la­
tent, so opportunities to assume their risks are rare. 
These remarks bring us face to face with a more difficult ques­
tion: What role, if any, should victim negligence play as a defense 
to enterprise liability? Strict liability doctrines have traditionally 
limited the role of victim negligence. The provisions in the Restate­
ment (Second) of Torts dealing with abnormally dangerous activity, 
for example, recognize victim negligence as a defense only in the 
form of the victim's "knowingly and unreasonably subjecting him­
self to the risk of harm from the activity. "237 Standing close enough 
to a caged bear to be mauled through the bars of the cage is an 
example of this kind of negligence,238 but inadvertently straying 
across the median divider into an oncoming tractor trailer trans-
234. See, e.g., Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 {Tex. 1974); see also supra notes 51-61 
and accompanying text. 
235. See SHAVELL, supra note 88, at 54-56; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 822, 827-32; 
Schwartz, supra note 100, at 374. 
236. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Design defect and warning law have gen­
erally been paired with the defense of victim negligence. 
237. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 524{2) {1977). Section 524(1) states that this is 
the only kind of victim negligence that counts as a defense. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 524(1) (1977). 
238. See Heidemann v. Wheaton, 34 N.W.2d 492 (S.D. 1948). 
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porting gasoline, in a jurisdiction that counts the transport of gaso­
line in this way abnormally dangerous, is not. 
The common law origins of enterprise liability are an important 
source of its deemphasis of victim negligence as a defense. The two 
chief common law sources of modem enterprise liability are vicari­
ous liability law and the strict liability for hazardous "escaping 
things" emanating out of Rylands v. Fletcher. In both of these cir­
cumstances it is unreasonable even to demand victim precautions. 
In vicarious liability law, the duties of victims are fixed by the law 
governing the agent's wrongdoing. When that law does not de­
mand victim precautions, it establishes the victim's prima facie right 
not to have to guard against the agent's wrongdoing. If vicarious 
liability law were to insist on victim precautions when the underly­
ing law did not, it would be taking back the very rights granted by 
the underlying law. For example, requiring Ira S. Bushey & Sons to 
take precautions against unauthorized invasions of its drydock by 
Seaman Lane and his fellow sailors involves denying that they have 
the right to be free of such trespasses in the first place. That they 
do have that right is precisely what the pertinent tort law 
establishes. 
Nothing in the doctrine or justification of vicarious liability sug­
gests that it should alter the duties of victims by imposing duties of 
precaution when the underlying tort law does not do so. If vicari­
ous liability law were to impose such duties, it would be in the 
anomalous position of discriminating against those who happened 
to be victimized by the servants of others, rather than by persons 
acting on their own behalf. Discriminating in this way would not 
only be puzzling, and apparently absurd, on its face. It would also 
be contrary to the entire thrust of respondeat superior. Vicarious 
liability exists to enforce the rights of those victimized by the agents 
of other principals, not to diminish their rights. No justification is 
more fundamental to the institution than the argument that ser­
vants will usually lack the financial resources or the insurance nec­
essary for them to compensate the victims of their tortious acts.239 
The law of vicarious liability therefore does not spawn any in­
dependent duties of victim precaution. 
The logic of Rylands v. Fletcher also minimizes the role of victim 
precautions, but for somewhat different reasons. Rylands supposes 
that people are free to do as they please with and on their own 
property. Their freedom comes to an end when they injure the per-
239. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
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sons or property of others - when the dangerous things that they 
bring onto their property escape beyond its boundaries and cause 
harm. Victim negligence has no place in this framework. By virtue 
of the special freedoms conferred by the ownership of real prop­
erty, injurers are free to impose risks that might otherwise be 
deemed unreasonable, but they must pay for this special freedom 
by compensating those injured when their unusually dangerous ac­
tivities go awry. Victims must bear risks that might othenvise be 
deemed unreasonable, but they are compensated for this special 
burden not only by being assured of compensation if these risks 
issue in injury to them, but also by being relieved of the duty to 
adjust their lives, and their use of their property, in ways that mini­
mize the harm that they might suffer at the hands of these unusual 
risks. Duties of victim precaution would unfairly burden both the 
freedom and property rights of victims. The reconciliation of com­
peting rights effected by Rylands thus leaves duties of victim pre­
caution out of its calculus. 
This hereditary bias of enterprise liability law against defenses 
of victim negligence is bolstered by the difficulties of constructing 
attribution rules for circumstances when risks are the joint product 
of multiple activities, and by the administrative complexities intro­
duced by combining defenses of victim negligence with enterprise 
liability. The case for negligence liability is most compelling when 
multiple parties are in a position to affect the level of the relevant 
risk, and can all be reasonably asked to guard against it.240 These 
are precisely the circumstances when it is difficult to devise worka­
ble tests for identifying the characteristic risks of each of the differ­
ent activities. Enterprise liability regimes have thus been hard to 
fashion in those situations when defenses of victim negligence seem 
most urgent. This fact has hindered the development of doctrines 
that combine enterprise liability with defenses of victim negligence. 
The administrative complexities introduced by combining victim 
negligence with enterprise liability compound the problem. When 
adequate attribution rules can be devised, legal economists have ar­
gued persuasively that enterprise liability is easier to administer 
than negligence. Deciding who should make the choice between 
preventing an accident and letting it happen - whose risk it is that 
has occasioned an injury - is simpler and therefore cheaper than 
deciding not only whose risk it is, but also whether or not that risk 
240. Recall an earlier example: railroads, traffic agencies, and drivers can all affect the 
risks of railroad crossing accidents and can all be asked to take steps to reduce those risks. 
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should have been eliminated.241 Combining a defense of victim 
negligence with strict (enterprise) liability not only partially com­
promises this administrative advantage by requiring a fuller inquiry 
into the victim's conduct, it also runs the risk of compromising this 
administrative advantage entirely. In at least some circumstances, it 
may not be possible to determine what precautions victims should 
take without first deciding what precautions injurers should take. 
For example, we may not be able to decide just what precau­
tions drivers should take to minimize the risks of harm threatened 
by car crashes without first deciding what precautions manufactur­
ers should have taken. Whether drivers should wear seat belts, 
what kinds of seat belts they should wear, whether their passengers 
should use or avoid air bags, and whether they should lock their 
doors to minimize the risk of the doors popping open during colli­
sions, or leave them unlocked to minimize the risk of being trapped 
in their cars after accidents, are all questions that cannot be an­
swered independently of inquiries into correct car design and what 
it can accomplish in the way of risk reduction. When the content of 
duties of victim negligence is dependent in this way on the content 
of injurer duties of due care, the introduction of a defense of victim 
negligence will compromise the administrative advantages of a 
strict liability regime. To decide what precautions the victim should 
have taken for her own protection, we will first have to decide what 
precautions the injurer should have taken, and that is the very ques­
tion that enterprise liability is supposed to enable us to ignore.242 
For better or worse, the practical difficulties surrounding the in­
tegration of victim negligence as a defense do not render the de­
fense irrelevant in principle. The issue of principle turns on 
241. This is perhaps the most fundamental insight of Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 
215. It has been widely accepted in the economic literature. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 
88, at 264; Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 11-12; Jones, supra note 46, at 1759. In this area, 
economics has confirmed and sharpened preexisting intuition. 
242. Legal economists have made this point powerfully. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 
46, at 12. The problem is pervasive given the economic understanding of negligence. As 
Geistfeld explains, "[t]he negligence-contributory negligence approach, defined in marginal 
Hand Formula terms, yields optimal results so long as the law applies the Hand Formula to 
each party on the assumption that the other party is exercising due care." Geistfeld, supra note 
46, at 88 (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW 88 (1987)). Under this approach, contributory negligence should not be recog­
nized as a defense whenever the victim fails to take cost-justified precautions, but only when 
the victim fails to take precautions that she might have taken more cheaply than the injurer. 
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 215, at 1058. I am not persuaded that all victim negli­
gence fits this conceptualization of its structural relation to primary negligence. For example, 
the right of ways specified by traffic codes do not seem to fit this model. Some instances of 
victim negligence - for example, passenger precautions against increased injuries in car 
crashes - probably do fit this model. The fact that automobile manufacturers are not "injur­
ers" in the standard sense of the term is irrelevant for our purposes. 
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whether insisting on victim precautions is incompatible with proper 
respect for the victim's autonomy. Rylands v. Fletcher and respon­
deat superior identify circumstances when this is indeed the case. 
Insisting on duties of victim precaution in Rylands is incompatible 
with the right of victims to use their property as they see fit so long 
as they do not injure others. Insisting on special precautions by 
persons unfortunate enough to be injured by the servants of others 
is incompatible with the right of those victims to normal lives - to 
the same freedom from harm that they would have if they were 
injured by persons acting on their own behalf. 
Other circumstances when the victim's right to a normal life is 
inconsistent with a duty to guard herself against the negligence of 
others can easily be imagined. Persons should be free to walk the 
public sidewalks without the burden of being on guard against stray 
cricket balls or snow cascading off adjacent rooftops. So too, per­
sons should be free to stand in the doorways of their houses without 
bracing themselves against possible concussions from explosives 
stored at nearby mines, and should be free to live near a cricket 
field without being condemned to a lifetime of dodging cricket balls 
at their own peril.243 
Nonetheless, the imposition of duties of victim negligence is not 
always inconsistent with proper respect for the victim's autonomy 
- her right to the free use of her property, or to a normal life. It is 
quite reasonable to ask that people exercise due care to keep them­
selves beyond the reach of caged bears, and equally fair to insist 
that they owe to those transporting huge quantities of gasoline by 
tractor trailer the same duties of due care that they owe to other 
drivers.244 In principle, primary norms of enterprise liability are 
perfectly compatible with the defense of victim negligence. The 
chief justification for imposing enterprise liability - the ability of 
enterprises to spread the financial costs of their characteristic acci­
dents across those who benefit from the creation of the risks that 
issue in those accidents - simply does not speak to the desirability 
243. These examples track the facts of Bolton v. Stone, [1951] App. Cas. 850 {addressing a 
claim brought by a plaintiff who was struck by cricket ball that escaped from a nearby cricket 
field while he was walking on the street); Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194, 199 
{1870) (addressing a claim brought by a plaintiff who walked on a public sidewalk and was 
struck by falling ice and snow that had accumulated on defendant's peaked roof); and Tuck· 
ashinsky v. Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal Co., 49 A. 308 (Pa. 1901) {addressing a claim brought 
by a plaintiff who was standing in the doorway of her father's house, 700 feet from defend­
ant's mine, and was harmed by the concussion from a blast caused when lightning ignited 
explosives stored at the mine). The defendants in Bolton and Tuckashinsky were not held 
liable. My view here is in accord with Jones, supra note 46, at 1756-57. 
244. See Seigler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972). 
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of victiin negligence as a defense to enterprise-related risks. The 
appropriateness of asking victims to guard against the costs of the 
activities of others turns, rather, on whether the imposition of such 
a duty would wrongly diminish their autonomy. The answer to that 
question depends primarily on the contours of the normal life to 
which victims are presumptively entitled, and on the presence or 
absence of property rights incompatible with duties of victim 
negligence. 
The upshot of all this is that what is desirable in principle, and 
what is possible in practice, may not align as well as one might 
hope. In some circumstances when enterprise liability is fairer than 
negligence liability, duties of victim negligence will be appropriate 
in principle, but difficult to administer in practice. Whether enter­
prise liability can be extended as far as the principle of fairness 
pushes it may depend on whether this practical difficulty can be 
overcome. It may be, for instance, that a regime of strict liability 
for "escaping things" can be widely and effectively extended from 
the world of Rylands v. Fletcher to the world of Siegler v. Kuhlman 
only if duties of victim precaution can be successfully combined 
with enterprise liability. The doctrine arising out of Rylands is tai­
lored to a static sphere of landed uses, stationary enterprises, and 
sharp boundaries between the spheres of injurer and victim free­
dom. For enterprise liability to :flourish as fully as the idea of fair­
ness suggests that it should, it must be adapted to a more dynamic 
sphere of interpenetrating activities and fluid boundaries. Whether 
this can be done cannot be told in advance; it can only be told by 
testing practical ingenuity in the crucible of particular problems. 
This exploration of the defenses and limits to enterprise liability 
put us in a position to consider the tide of sentiment currently op­
posing it. We have already argued that some of the arguments on 
which this sentiment rests are plainly wrong. Fault is not an obvi­
ously fairer principle of responsibility than strict liability, and enter­
prise liability is manifestly not absolute liability. Convictions to the 
contrary, however, are not the primary force behind the tide of sen­
timent against enterprise liability. Alan Schwartz's animus against 
strict liability does not depend in any important way on the argu­
ment that strict liability slides unavoidably down the slippery slope 
to absolute liability. The preferences for negligence liability ex­
pressed by Richard Posner and Gary Schwartz are no more depen­
dent on that controversial piece of Priest's thesis. 
First and foremost, the tide of sentiment running against strict 
liability is driven by the gravitational pull of prescriptive economic 
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analysis. Alan Schwartz, Gary Schwartz, George Priest, Richard 
Posner, Mark Geistfeld and other critics of enterprise liability are 
bound together by the conviction that victim precautions matter in 
myriad ways that enterprise liability ignores.245 Efficiency can be 
achieved only if victims are encouraged to take appropriate precau­
tions against injury at the hands of others, to adjust their activity 
levels in light of prospective injury, and to insure themselves against 
any harms that they might eventually suffer. In his discussion of 
Bolton v. Stone, for example, Gary Schwartz suggests that the negli­
gence liability is appropriate because the victim should be expected 
to adjust both her use of the sidewalk and her choice of residential 
neighborhood in light of the risks imposed by cricket fields.246 
Writing with William Landes, Judge Posner similarly insists that vic­
tims are not presumptively entitled to stand in the doorways of 
their father's houses without guarding against the concussive effects 
of explosive blasts on nearby properties: people "do not have to 
live 700 feet from a mine shaft. "247 Individuals should be expected 
to adjust their housing choices - their activity levels as victims -
in light of the risks presented by nearby properties.248 
245. See supra Part III. 
246. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 
GA. L. REv. 963, 993 n.156 (1981) (noting that the plaintiff helped to cause her own injury at 
the hand of the stray cricket ball because she "chose to live in a neighborhood near a pre­
existing cricket field and chose to walk on a street adjacent to that field while a cricket match 
was in progress"). This objection to imposing liability on the cricket club must be distin­
guished from another, more plausible, objection. One might argue that the risk is so remote 
that it should be counted a background risk of living. I am not considering that objection 
here. 
In a recent piece, Professor Schwartz makes a similar objection to Friendly's "characteris­
tic risk" criterion and fairness justification for vicarious liability. See Gary T. Schwartz, The 
Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 
1750 (1996). Schwartz writes: "[I]n many cases, the accident's etiology also involves contri· 
butions by various third parties (including the plaintiff)." Id. at 1750. Schwartz's focus on 
"cause" misses the pertinent justification for ignoring victim contributions. Insisting on vic­
tim precautions above and beyond those required by the underlying tort law is inconsistent 
with the victim's entitlement to the same legal rights as everyone else. To insist that victims 
must waive their normal rights whenever the exercise of those rights would impede the pur­
suit of efficiency is to deny that they have any rights. This view implicitly asserts that victims 
are merely the keepers of their own lives and property, holding them in trust for the common 
good (conceived of as the maximization of wealth). This denies individual autonomy in an 
elemental, extreme, and unconvincing way. 
247. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 242, at 117. 
248. See id. at 117-18. Jones puts the case against the views of Schwartz and Posner very 
lucidly: 
These arguments are similar to those made in connection with the railway spark cases, 
suggesting that farmers plant fire-resistant crops or allow some of their land to lie fallow 
to form a buffer zone adjacent to the railway tracks. All such arguments are unsound. 
The plaintiff in Tuckashinsky was standing in her home; the plaintiff in Bolton was stand· 
ing on a public street. . . .  To argue that they should not have been in this particular 
building or on this particular street is to give the defendants control over adjacent pri­
vate and public properties to which they hold no entitlement. If the owner of the mine 
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Once the general superiority of first-party insurance over third­
party insurance is added to the picture, the legitimate sphere of 
strict liability shrinks still further. As Mark Geistfeld explains, in a 
world where individuals perfectly comply with the negligence norm 
there will be no unjustified injuries: 
Instead, all injuries [will be] "unavoidable" in the sense that they 
[will] occur despite the exercise of reasonable care by the injurer and 
victim. Victims will therefore be financially responsible for their own 
injuries and will self-insure or purchase first-party insurance to pro­
vide compensation in the event of injury. Strict liability would shift 
the injury cost to injurers, but due to the higher costs of third-party 
insurance, negligence is more desirable except for "extraordinary" 
cases in which strict liability significantly reduces the amount of risk­
taking activity within the community.249 
Thus, even in the nonideal world in which we live, the only legiti­
mate role of strict liability is to reduce the intensity with which cer­
tain risks are imposed. Not surprisingly, the alleged superiority of 
first-party insurance is fundamental to Alan Schwartz's case against 
strict liability and for a contract regime in products liability, and to 
George Priest's case against enterprise liability and for a negligence 
regime in the same area.25o 
The obvious and strong tendency of emphasizing these three 
forms of victim precaution is to shrink the proper sphere of enter­
prise liability relative both to negligence liability and to contract. 
Less obvious, but perhaps more telling, is the fact that this concep­
tion of the relative roles of negligence and strict (or enterprise) lia­
bility makes no place at all for the idea of conditional fault. Strict 
liability is justified, when it is justified, by the fact that the advan­
tages of inducing correct injurer care and activity levels outweigh 
the disadvantages of discouraging correct victim activity levels and 
supplying too much insurance against nonnegligent injuries. Con­
ceptually speaking, these are all "precaution" concerns. The point 
or the cricket field felt that a buffer zone was needed to provide greater safety, the 
owner should have acquired, and paid for, additional land or additional rights in adja­
cent land. 
Jones, supra note 46, at 1757 (footnote omitted). To this, I would add only that these bound­
aries protect autonomy - persons' control over their lives and property - in vital ways. 
249. See Geistfeld, supra note 46, at 46. Geistfeld emphasizes that the proper scope of 
strict liability is this narrow only when we make "unrealistic" assumptions about the deter­
rent efficacy of negligence law. Still, the main point of Geistfeld's article is that even if we 
relax that unrealistic assumption, once we take account of the superiority of first-party insur­
ance against nonnegligent harms, we will not embrace the "strict liability for hazardous busi­
ness enterprises" proposed by Jones. See Jones, supra note 46. Thus, the proper sphere of 
strict liability expands under more realistic assumptions, but only so much. Geistfeld's argu­
ment starts from Professor Shavell's analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
250. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 7. Croley and Han­
son challenge the alleged superiority of first-party insurance. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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of strict liability is to get the optimal level of injurer precaution and 
activity - the level that would be achieved under a perfectly ad­
ministered negligence standard. Strict liability is thus explained and 
justified without ever acknowledging that it expresses a competing 
principle of responsibility, namely the "conditional fault" principle 
that the legitimate conduct of an activity sometimes requires paying 
compensation to those injured by its nonnegligent risks. 
Put differently, the claim of contemporary critics of enterprise 
liability is this: the imposition of strict liability implies that the de­
fendant's conduct is reasonably careful, but unreasonably intense. 
Viewed through the lens of this conception of strict liability, the 
point of Rylands is that, although there was nothing unreasonable 
about Fletcher's selection of the contractor who constructed his res­
ervoir, and nothing unreasonable about the way that he maintained 
and operated that reservoir, there was something unreasonable 
about his decision to construct a reservoir in the first place. That 
use of water was "unreasonably intense." Applied to Bushey, this 
conception of strict liability implies that there was nothing unrea­
sonable about the care that the Coast Guard took in supervising its 
sailors on shore leave, but something unreasonably intense about its 
unleashing of sailors on the unsuspecting borough of Brooklyn in 
the first place. 
Kantian social contract theory holds that this account of strict 
liability is subtly, but fundamentally, mistaken. Although strict lia­
bility often realizes the aims of negligence liability more effectively 
than does negligence liability itself, these different forms of liability 
express different principles of responsibility. The unreasonableness 
of the conduct subject to strict (or enterprise) liability lies not in the 
imposition of the risk, but in the refusal to accept financial responsi­
bility for the harms issuing from that risk. Fletcher is presumptively 
free to put his own property to whatever use he desires, and the 
Coast Guard is presumptively free to schedule its sailors' shore 
leaves as it sees fit. There is, in fact, something a bit unreasonable 
- a bit officious or meddlesome - in our presuming to determine 
how Fletcher should use his property, or how the Coast Guard 
should run its own affairs. What is wrong with Fletcher's conduct is 
not that he has made an unreasonable choice of activity, but that it 
is unreasonable for him to expect others to bear the costs of his 
unusually dangerous activity. 
What is true about Rylands v. Fletcher is also true about abnor­
mally dangerous activity law in general. The law of abnormally 
dangerous activities does not condemn the use of explosives as un-
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reasonable, but rather holds those who use explosives liable for 
their miscarriage. What it condemns as unreasonable is the imposi­
tion of the characteristic costs of unusually dangerous activities on 
victims who are not parties to the abnormally dangerous activities 
themselves. And what is true of abnormally dangerous activity lia­
bility in general is also true of vicarious liability in general. niat 
body of law does not condemn the daily decisions of employers to 
put their employees in positions where they may commit torts. It 
holds employers financially responsible for the torts that their em­
ployees commit. What it criticizes is not the decision to impose the 
risk, but the imposition of the costs of that decision on others. 
If this interpretation of the character of enterprise liability is 
correct - if enterprise liability is a kind of "conditional fault" -
then the economic case against enterprise liability is suspect simply 
because it fails to recognize the distinctive principle of responsibil­
ity that enterprise liability embodies. But the flaws in the economic 
case against enterprise liability are not merely interpretive, they are 
also normative. By placing so much weight on the superiority of 
first-party insurance, the economic critique betrays once more its 
implausible belief that victims must always and everywhere take 
precautions against injury at the hands of others. Not only must 
victims always exercise care in the conduct of their lives (for exam­
ple, always be on guard against stray golf balls in the street or stun­
ning concussions in their doorways) and in their choice of activities 
(for example, always adjust their lives in light of nearby cricket 
fields or mines), they must also always insure themselves against 
accidental injury and death at the hands of others. If they do not, 
society will not maximize total wealth. 
Kantian social contract theory is unconvinced. We have no gen­
eral duty to maximize total social wealth, and we therefore have no 
general duty to insure ourselves against the wrongdoing of others. 
Demanding that victims must insure themselves against accidental 
injury and death at the hands of others adds "institutional insult to 
personal injury."251 The imposition of strict (enterprise) liability 
expresses the conclusion that it is wrong for an enterprise to impose 
nonnegligent risks unless it compensates those whose lives, limbs, 
and property are injured by accidents issuing from those risks. Re-
251. I owe this expression and a more general debt to Jules L. Coleman, Adding Institu­
tional Insult to Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 223, 230 (1990); see also COLEMAN, supra 
note 94, at 427-28, 437-39; JuLES L. COLEMAN, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, in 
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 28, 49 (1988). I am also indebted to JUDITH J. THOMSON, 
Remarks on Causation and Liability, in RIGms, RESTITIJTION AND RISK 192, 199 (1986). 
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quiring victims to insure against such injuries denies what the liabil­
ity regime asserts - that the injurer's conduct is legitimate only if 
she fully compensates all those that she injures. The case for full 
compensation rests on two simple premises. The first is that injur­
ers have a duty to repair the damage that they cause. The second is 
that people do not forfeit a share of their authority over their own 
lives and property simply because they suffer the misfortune of hav­
ing those lives and that property violated by accidental injury. By 
compensating the plaintiff for all of the harm that she has suffered, 
the award of traditional tort damages expresses an appropriate re­
spect for the plaintiff's authority over her own life and property. In 
insisting that victims should insure themselves against wrongful vio­
lations of their own lives, limbs, and property, economics denies 
that persons really are the legal masters of their own lives and the 
owners of their own property. Economics asserts, and liberalism 
denies, that persons hold their lives, limbs and property in trust 
from society, and on condition that they use both resources in ways 
that maximize overall social welfare. The assault on enterprise lia­
bility is an expression of that fundamental, and unconvincing, 
premise.252 
The prevailing hostility to strict liability is thus ill-founded. In 
some circumstances, negligence liability will reconcile the freedom 
of injurers and the security of victims more fairly than enterprise 
liability. In other circumstances, the reverse will be true. In still 
other circumstances (product liability comes to mind), some hybrid 
regime will be most appropriate. Tue most that can be said in­
dependent of a particular context is that our world both favors and 
undercuts the spread of enterprise liability. It favors the spread of 
enterprise liability by generating social circumstances that enable 
enterprises to distribute the costs of nonnegligent accidents among 
those whose activities engender them, thereby triggering the appli­
cation of the enterprise liability principle of fairness. It undercuts 
the spread of enterprise liability by pressing more and more activi­
ties into contact with one another, thereby blurring the boundaries 
252. I do not mean to suggest that enterprise liability regimes must always award normal 
tort damages or compromise autonomy. Nonfault administrative schemes, such as worker's 
compensation, for example, award lesser damages, and they are important instances of enter­
prise liability. These schemes, however, apply to participants in enterprises. The imposition 
of the relevant risks therefore furthers the autonomy of victims. The same is not true when 
the victims are strangers, which is usually the case in vicarious liability or abnormally danger­
ous activity liability cases. I believe that this difference in the relationship between victim 
and enterprise accounts for and legitimates the basic difference in damage measures, but I 
cannot pursue the matter here. 
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between them and making it difficult to sort out the distinctive risks 
of different activities. 
IX. THE PRIORITY OF FAIRNESS 
At the outset of Part VII, I argued that an interpretively ade­
quate Kantian justification for the enterprise liability principle of 
fairness would meet a number of constraints. Some of those con­
straints are :fixed by Kantian social contract theory, others are :fixed 
by the characteristics of enterprise liability law. In closing I wish to 
show both how the view presented in Parts VII and VIII meets 
those constraints, and that it vindicates and generalizes Judge 
Friendly's claim for the priority of fairness over efficiency. That pri­
ority is a local expression of the general priority, within our moral 
sensibility, of considerations of justice over those of utility. 
A satisfactory social contract justification for enterprise liability 
must show why it reconciles the competing claims of liberty and 
security more reasonably than negligence. In doing so, it should 
also explain the force of the reciprocity of risk criterion that has for 
so long dominated social contract theory's account of the proper 
division of labor between negligence and strict liability. The de­
fense of the enterprise liability principle of fairness offered in Part 
VII meets both of these constraints. 
The defense shows that in the "world of activities" enterprise 
liability reconciles the competing claims of liberty and security 
more fairly and more favorably than negligence liability. Enter­
prise liability aligns the financial burdens and benefits of nonnegli­
gent accidents, thereby satisfying the principle of benefit-burden 
proportionality with respect to the distribution of the financial costs 
of accidents, as well as the burdens and benefits of the underlying 
risks. Even when risks are reciprocal, negligence fairly apportions 
only the burdens and benefits of the underlying risks. Enterprise 
liability is thus fairer than negligence liability. Because harm is 
more threatening than risk is to persons' capacity to pursue their 
conceptions of the good over complete lives, other things being 
equal, a liability regime that diminishes the incidence of nonnegli­
gent harm, and minimizes its impact on victims, reconciles the com­
peting demands of freedom and security more favorably than a 
regime that only succeeds in apportioning the burdens and benefits 
of risk fairly. Because enterprise liability is capable of diminishing 
the disruptions of victim security occasioned by nonnegligent harms 
without imposing a correspondingly great disruption on the free-
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dom of action of injurers, it succeeds in reconciling freedom and 
security more favorably than negligence does. 
By drawing upon Holmes' implicit distinction between the 
"world of acts" and the "world of activities," the preceding defense 
of enterprise liability also captures the force of the "reciprocity of 
risk" criterion, and reconciles it with the principle of burden-benefit 
proportionality, with which it appears to compete. When the finan­
cial burdens of nonnegligent harms cannot be fairly apportioned, 
the "reciprocity of risk" criterion reconciles the competing claims of 
liberty and security as fairly as practicable. This is the general situa­
tion in the "world of acts." When those burdens can be fairly ap­
portioned, the principle of benefit-burden proportionality 
reconciles the competing claims of liberty and security more fairly. 
This is the general situation in the "world of activities." 
The account of enterprise liability proposed in Part VII also 
meets the interpretive constraints fixed by the features of enterprise 
liability doctrine. Enterprise liability requires injurers to bear the 
financial burdens of risks whose prevention it would be unreason­
able to demand.253 The payment of damages in enterprise liability 
is thus a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activity, whereas 
the payment of damages under negligence liability is redress for the 
wrongful infringement of the property and physical integrity of 
others. On the social contract view developed in this article, these 
differences are readily comprehended and readily justified. The 
conduct subject to negligence liability is unreasonable because the 
injurer's imposition of the underlying risk is wrongful. The conduct 
subject to strict liability is unreasonable because the injurer's failure 
to compensate the victim is wrongful. When an enterprise is in a 
position to minimize the financial impact of an accident characteris­
tic of the enterprise's activities on the accident victim, and able to 
distribute the accident cost across the activity that engendered it by 
the same stroke, it is only reasonable that the enterprise do so. So 
doing reconciles the competing claims of freedom and security 
more favorably and more fairly than negligence liability does. This 
is the central constructive argument of the paper, and it justifies the 
imposition of financial responsibility on enterprises for harms that 
they should not have prevented. 
Part VIII shows that the social contract account of the grounds 
of enterprise liability also "fits and justifies" enterprise liability doc­
trine's relative indifference to optimal precaution and insurance 
253. See text accompanying supra notes 119-20. 
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concerns. The imposition of duties of victim precaution is fre­
quently inconsistent with the demands of equal freedom, fairly 
specified. Persons are presumptively entitled to lead normal lives, 
and to use their property as they see fit. Property rights and the 
eclectic conventions specifying the contours of a normal life are the 
concrete (if imperfect) incarnations of individual freedom. The im­
position of duties of victim precaution and insurance is often incon­
sistent with adequate respect for those facets of freedom. When 
this is the case, the law of accidents rightly rejects duties of victim 
precaution and insurance. While persons are free to maximize their 
own wealth, and to take precautions for their own benefit, when the 
demand that they do so runs contrary to the claims of justice, the 
claims of justice override that demand. 
This priority returns us to Judge Friendly, whose celebrated 
opinion in Bushey eloquently and precisely framed the conflict be­
tween fairness and efficiency with which this paper began, and to 
which it must now return. In his generous tribute to Friendly, Judge 
Posner calls him "the greatest federal appellate judge of his time -
in analytic power, memory, and application perhaps of any time."254 
The tribute that we have paid here is of a different kind, but, I 
hope, no less generous. This paper tries to provide the theoretical 
underpinning for Judge Friendly's claim that the institution of vica­
rious liability "even within its traditional limits, rests not so much 
on policy grounds consistent with the governing principles of tort 
law as in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise can­
not justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be 
said to be characteristic of its activities. "255 
That "deeply rooted sentiment" is the conviction that "[e]ach 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. "256 The priority of 
fairness over efficiency that Judge Friendly discerned is nothing less 
than the priority of justice over utility - the acknowledgment that 
"the loss of freedom for some is [not] made right by a greater good 
shared by others."257 If "the concept and language of justice [are] 
the test . . .  by which any area of law must be judged,"258 then 
254. Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1724 
(1986). 
255. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968). 
256. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 3. 
257. Id. at 3-4. 
258. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry 
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 69, 70 (1975). 
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within the law of enterprise liability, the principle of fairness must 
have priority over the policy of wealth-maximization. 
